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Top: Jewish Mind Control: The New Left (1960-Present)




In a fascinating, detailed, article in The Journal of Psychohistory,Fall 1978, Psychohistorian Stanley Rothman provides a useful summary of Jewish involvement with Communism throughout the western World in "Group Fantasies and Jewish Radicalism". He writes:

"In the inter-war years this role was probably most visible in the countries of Eastern Europe, where Jews were prominent in Bela Kuhn's abortive attempt to set up a Communist regime in Hungary and where they came to constitute over 40% of the cadres of the Polish Communist Party, and probably comparable percentages elsewhere. In Hungary, immediately after the Communist Party's accession to power, the Politburo of the party contained only onenon-Jew. It was jokingly suggested that this 'Goy' had been admitted to the inner circles only because someone was needed to sign decrees on Saturdays.

"In Germany the situation was rather different. Jews played a very important role in the revolutionary Spartacist Movement of 1918-1919. However... radical Jewish Intellectuals remained largely unaffiliated, serving as unattached (often bitter) radical critics of the Weimar Republic. The Frankfurt School which produced Adorn, Fromm, Marcuse, Horkheimer and others was almost entirely Jewish.

"In the United States, perhaps some 50% of the Communist Party was of Jewish background during the 1930s; the radical American Student Union was heavily Jewish and, just as importantly, the Soviet espionage apparatus in this country ... was pretty largely of Jewish background.

"In Western Europe ... Jews continued to take an active radical role. InFrance, during the 1968 upheavals, students of Jewish background dominated Trotskyite leadership cadres.

"Jews provided the critical mass for the student left and the counterculture in the United States during the early and mid-1960s. Studies indicate that in its initial phases, SDS leadership was about 67% Jewish."

Rothman goes on to show how Jewish radicals even "ran the show" at mid-Western campuses. One (Gentile) SDS Organizer at Madison, Wisconsin, commented: "I am struck by the lack of Wisconsin-born people (in the left)and the massive preponderance of New York Jews. The situation at the University of Minnesota is similar." In the faculties too, the radical factions were"largely Jewish".

In another article aimed at cognoscenti (American Jewish Historical Quarterly, December 1976) Arthur Liebman shows in "The Ties ThatBind":

"The members and particularly the officers of the left organizations were predominantly Jewish ... Andre Schiffrin, President of SLID in 1956-57, and himself of Jewish background, was very cognizant of the 'foreign element' within SLID. 'For a while, all our national officers, myself included, were 'foreign born' and the militant rhetoric within the organization was 'usually voiced in a heavy Yiddish accent'. Others noted the frequent usage of Yiddish expressions among the members. Another indication of the large Jewish component was the care taken to ensure that regional and national conventions of these left non-sectarian groups would not coincide with important Jewish holidays. No such attention was paid to Christian holidays and on one occasion a Protestant minister was sharply critical of SLID for scheduling a meeting on GoodFriday."

Indeed, Liebman shows that Jews have regarded Communism as an extension of Judaism for many years.

"The Jewish Daily Forward (a Yiddish socialist newspaper) to a large extent surpassed the rabbis and Orthodoxy as the educator of the Jewish community in the United States ... The more astute and sensitive Jewish Socialists in the pre-World War I years ... sought opportunities to demonstrate that Judaism, as they defined and interpreted it, was quite compatible if not supportive of Socialism. Socialism was presented to the Jewish masses as a secular version of Judaism. Thus, during a strike, the Law of Moses was cited in support of the strikers. The Socialist Party's Rand School was lyricized by the Forward at its founding in 1906 as 'the socialist' yeshiva ... where the rabbis and teachers of our movement were being prepared'..

"In their curriculum, these schools emphasized the inter-relatedness between Jewish and radical concerns. The progressive aspects of Judaism were stressed: for example in the case of the Jewish New Year, Rosh Hashanah:

"'The traditional blowing of the shofar was the clarion to rally for liberation of the Jewish people from oppressors ... the shofar blowing for the laboring masses will drown out the trumpeting of the temporary ruling interests of the earth.'

"The accomplishments of these schools were summarized in an editorial in Jewish Life, a magazine with close ties to them, in the following manner:

" 'The schools develop in the children a kinship with Jewish and non-Jewish laboring masses and with the history and progressive culture and traditions of the Jewish people. The children acquire an elementary knowledge of Yiddish. They are taught to identify their interest with those of the Negro people and other oppressed groups.' "

At this point we could enter into a tedious cataloging of names (and pseudonyms) of Communist leaders throughout the 20th century who "happened to be Jewish". Certainly such a roll-call would be useful for archival purposes, but it would undoubtedly be a boring and unnecessary chore for the reader. Such lists are already available in the British samizdat publication mischievously titled Let My People Go! and in the American: Behind Communism. But our purpose is not to go over again ground which has already been firmly established. Even our two Jewish writers cited above implicitly acknowledge the aphorism that Communism is, was, and probably always will be,Jewish. Our aim is to explore behind the pages of history; to read between thel ines; to analyze and ask why. Why are Jews radicals?

Rothman writes that:

"Jerry Rubin ascribes his own radicalism to being Jewish, and finds that Cohn-Bendit shares the same feelings. It is clear, too, that his primary hostility is toward Christianity, 'telling Pat Boone that Christianity has murdered more people than any other ism in the history of the World.' Roger Kahn, writing about the Columbia conflict, keeps remembering how badly Jews were treated by the WASP establishment, and Paul Cowan is convinced, from his experiences at Choate, that the WASPS are all anti-Semitic racists as Teitelbaum has shown, Jews anxious to deny their Jewishness (those who feel marginal) are more likely to perceive Christians as anti-Semitic than those who continue to identify as Jews."

Rothman argues that "Jewish radicalism (as well as Zionism) stems from the historically marginal position of Jews in Christian societies and to the family structure and personality patterns derived from that marginality. Jews have developed a particular set of perceptions and underlying motivations which can be described as a group fantasy."

It may well be that Jews are marginal in western society in terms of religion, culture, lifestyle etc. But they are certainly less marginal than, say, the Orientals so one wonders why Orientals are not more radical than the Jews.

Rothman's subsidiary point is more interesting. He suggests that Jews, perceiving themselves as being surrounded by a hostile, threatening host society, are too few in number to openly display hostility back. So instead they channel their hostility and aggression toward their own families (hence the" emasculating" Jewish mother) and into occupations which allow for much indirect (verbal) aggression. But as Rothman admits "Good studies of 'Jewish Personality Traits' are few in number for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is, as Sanua points out, that scholars have tended to avoid the subject." (No mention of why, of course.) Rothman goes on:

"It is arguable that the European Diaspora and the ghetto experience encouraged among Jews the emergence of a particular family pattern; a pattern characterized by mothers who were 'protective' and controlling, especially withtheir male children. It was not enough to teach such children to curb the direct expression of aggression against the Christian enemy, for under suchcircumstances control might be lost in a crisis situation. Rather, aggression must be driven underground by appropriate child-rearing practices.

"The institutionalization of this pattern was to have profound effects upon both Jewish males and Jewish females, effects which have been alluded to in part and are spelled out in some detail by Bibring and Wolfenstein. The Jewish family became, in Bibring's terms, a kind of matriarchy in which the husband was perceived by the children as more fearful, less capable, and weaker than the wife who cared for and somewhat dominated him in crucial areas, whatever his professional and/or business achievements."

He goes on:

"Herbert Krugman, in a study of ex-Communists, found thatmiddle-class members of the Party (mostly Jews) placed far more stress on theneed for 'hardness' than did working-class members of the Party who were lesslikely to be Jewish. Krugman studied in greatest depth the case reports byanalysts of 10 men and 8 women. Five of the men evidenced strong wishes tosubmit and 'some slight evidence of overt, passive homosexuality' duringadolescence. The therapists described them as sado-masochistic, turning suchaggression onto themselves. Their self-images varied between extremes - fromworthlessness to superiority - and with many there was an attitude of martyrdom,a 'bittersweet' anticipation of revenge ...

"Many Jewish males, then, seemed to have a character structureclassified by Jules Nydes as 'paranoid masochistic'... The following representsa summary of Nydes' formulation:


1. Identifies with the aggressor.

2. Hostility is reactive and compensatory.

3. Effect of rage is accompanied by a sense of malicious triumph and releaseis experienced as effect is discharged.

4. The motive for aggression is to hurt someone who seems unable to fightback, and the effect is often intimidation of the victims.


1. Identifies with the victim in the sense that he is being persecuted.

2. Hostility is defensive against anticipated attack because of unconsciousfeeling of guilt.

3. Effect of rage is accompanied by self-righteousness and often leads tomounting fury rather than relief.

4. The apparent motive for aggression is to avoid being hurt bycounter-attacking an assumed aggressor. The effect is often to provokepunishment -- gratification of a repressed wish -- and a reality confirmation ofpreconceived persecution.

Rothman cites several profound examples of this exclusively Jewishphenomenon. He quotes from an interview with a Jewish ex-Weatherman who recallsthe motivations of himself and his peers in the 1960s:

"A lot of the Weatherman leadership was Jewish and had never beentough street kids, and I really believe that a tremendous amount of what theywere doing was overcoming their own fears about their masculinity ... Most ofthem ... had been intellectually aggressive, but all of a sudden they weretrying to be tough street kids ... I think there was a lot of self-hate goingon."

Rothman even draws on fictional, though highly accurate, caricature, such asPhilip Roth's highly personal Portnoy in Portnoy's Complaint.

"Portnoy, of course, is only a quasi-radical but, whatever he wouldlike to think his real motives are, his tirade to the analyst makes it quiteclear that his love for suffering humanity is far less important than his envyand hatred of WASPS and his desire to literally 'screw' the 'goyim', despite thefact that he despises his parents for their 'anti-goyish' attitudes. As he putsit:

"'I was on the staff of the house sub-committee investigating thetelevision quiz scandals. Perfect for the closet socialist like myself;commercial deceit on a national scale, exploitation of the innocent public,elaborate corporate chicanery -- in short good old capitalist greed. And then ofcourse that extra bonus, Charles Van Doren. Such character, such brains, suchbreeding, that candor and school boyish charm -- that WASP wouldn't you say?And, turns out he's a fake. Well, what do you know about that, Gentile America?Super-goy, a 'gonif'! Steals money ... Goodness, gracious me, almost as bad asJews -- you sanctimonious WASPS!

"'Yes, I was one happy Yiddle down there in Washington, a little Sterngang on my own, busily exploding Charlie's honor and integrity, whilesimultaneously becoming lover to the aristocratic Yankee beauty whose forebearsarrived on these shores in the seventeenth century.'

"The situation is not quite so simple, for, as the quotation indicates,Portnoy also wants to become one of these strong, blond, 'goyim' who own Americaand whose brothers are 'the engaging, good-natured, confident, clean, swift andpowerful halfbacks for the college football teams'. His unconscious hope is thathe can somehow become a Goy by sleeping with the 'shikses'."

There is much truth in Rothman's analysis. Jewish bourgeois Communism is notjust a bunch of Jewish Capitalists suddenly discovering a more profitableventure -- State Capitalism. It is also a symptom of the eternal Jewishneurosis; the envy of all things goyish that in turn becomes hatred of allthings goyish. Portnoy caricatures for us the eternal Jew: he would like nothingbetter than to have blue blood flowing through his veins, and by sleeping withthe shikse he hopes that some of her blond, aristocratic ways will rub off onhim. But when nothing much seems to change, and Portnoy stays pretty much thesame little Yiddle he started off, then his envy turns to hate, and hissleeping-with becomes "screwing". We are immediately reminded ofEldridge Cleaver's Soul on Ice where he tells us that he raped Whitewomen in order to get his own back on Whitey. We also observe the extraordinarydisproportion in inter-racial rapes (both male-female and male-male) which arealmost 100% Black against White.

Can it be that "Marxism" is no more than an expression of Jewishself-hate redirected against the rest of us?


Thefollowing is from 

The Culture ofCritique

Review By Stanley Hornbeck

The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish
Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements,
Prager, 1998, $65.00, 379 pp. -Kevin MacDonald, Professor of
Psychology at California State University-Long Beach, CA, USA

In The Culture of Critique, Kevin MacDonald advances a carefully
researched but extremely controversial thesis: that certain 20th
century intellectual movements - largely established and led by Jews -
have changed European societies in fundamental ways and destroyed the
confidence of Western man. He claims that these movements were
designed, consciously or unconsciously, to advance Jewish interests
even though they were presented to non-Jews as universalistic and even
utopian. He concludes that the increasing dominance of these ideas has
had profound political and social consequences that benefited Jews but
caused great harm to gentile societies. This analysis, which he makes
with considerable force, is an unusual indictment of a people
generally thought to be more sinned against than sinning.

The Culture of Critique is the final title in Prof. MacDonald's
massive, three-volume study of Jews and their role in history. The two
previous volumes are A People That Shall Dwell Alone and Separation
and its Discontents, published by Praeger in 1994 and 1998. The series
is written from a sociobiological perspective that views Judaism as a
unique survival strategy that helps Jews compete with other ethnic
groups. Prof. MacDonald, who is a psychologist at the University of
California at Long Beach, explains this perspective in the first
volume, which describes Jews as having a very powerful sense of
uniqueness that has kept them socially and genetically separate from
other peoples. The second volume traces the history of Jewish-gentile
relations, and finds the causes of anti-Semitism primarily in the
almost invariable commercial and intellectual dominance of gentile
societies by Jews and in their refusal to assimilate. The Culture of
Critique brings his analysis into the present century, with an account
of the Jewish role in the radical critique of traditional culture.

The intellectual movements Prof. MacDonald discusses in this volume
are Marxism, Freudian psychoanalysis, the Frankfurt school of
sociology, and Boasian anthropology. Perhaps most relevant from a
racial perspective, he also traces the role of Jews in promoting
multi-culturalism and Third World immigration. Throughout his analysis
Prof. MacDonald reiterates his view that Jews have promoted these
movements as Jews and in the interests of Jews, though they have often
tried to give the impression that they had no distinctive interests of
their own. Therefore Prof. MacDonald's most profound charge against
Jews is not ethnocentrism but dishonesty - that while claiming to be
working for the good of mankind they have often worked for their own
good and to the detriment of others. While attempting to promote the
brotherhood of man by dissolving the ethnic identification of
gentiles, Jews have maintained precisely the kind of intense group
solidarity they decry as immoral in others.

Celebrating Diversity

Prof. MacDonald claims that one of the most consistent ways in which
Jews have advanced their interests has been to promote pluralism and
diversity - but only for others. Ever since the 19th century, they
have led movements that tried to discredit the traditional foundations
of gentile society: patriotism, racial loyalty, and the Christian
basis for morality, social homogeneity, and sexual restraint. At the
same time, within their own communities, and with regard to the state
of Israel, they have often supported the very institutions they attack
in gentile society.

Why is this in the interests of Jews? Because the parochial group
loyalty characteristic of Jews attracts far less attention in a
society that does not have a cohesive racial and cultural core. The
Jewish determination not to assimilate fully, which accounts for their
survival as a people for thousands of years - even without a country -
has invariably attracted unpleasant and even murderous scrutiny in
nations with well-defined national identities. In Prof. MacDonald's
view it is therefore in the interest of Jews to dilute and weaken the
identity of any people among whom they live. Jewish identity can
flower in safety only when gentile identity is weak.

Prof. MacDonald quotes a remarkable passage from Charles Silverman:
"American Jews are committed to cultural tolerance because of their
belief-one firmly rooted in history-that Jews are safe only in a
society acceptant of a wide range of attitudes and behaviors, as well
as a diversity of religious and ethnic groups. It is this belief, for
example, not approval of homosexuality, that leads an overwhelming
majority of American Jews to endorse 'gay rights' and to take a
liberal stance on most other so-called 'social' issues."

He is saying, in effect, that when Jews make the
diversity-is-our-strength argument it is in support of their real goal
of diluting a society's homogeneity so that Jews will feel safe. They
are couching a Jewish agenda in terms they think gentiles will accept.
Likewise, as the second part of the Silverman quotation suggests, Jews
may support deviant movements, not because they think it is good for
the country but because it is good for the Jews.

Prof. Silverman also provides an illuminating quote from a Jewish
economist who thought that Republicans had more sensible economic
policies but who voted for the Democratic presidential candidate
anyway. His reason? "I'd rather live in a country governed by the
faces I saw at the Democratic convention than those I saw at the
Republican convention." This man apparently distrusts white gentiles
and voted for a racially mixed party even if its economic policies
were wrong. What is good for Jews appears to come before what is good
for the country.

Earl Raab, former president of heavily Jewish Brandies University
makes the diversity argument in a slightly different way. Expressing
his satisfaction with the prediction that by the middle of the next
century whites will become a minority, he writes, "We have tipped
beyond the point where a Nazi-Aryan party will be able to prevail in
this country." He is apparently prepared to displace the people and
culture of the founding stock in order to prevent the theoretical rise
of an anti-Jewish regime. Prof. Raab appears to see whites mainly as
potential Nazis, and is willing to sacrifice their culture and
national continuity in order to defuse an imagined threat to Jews.
This passage takes for granted the continued future existence of Jews
as a distinct community even as gentile whites decline in numbers and

In the same passage, Prof. Raab continues by noting that, "[w] e
[Jews] have been nourishing the American climate of opposition to
bigotry for about half a century. That climate has not yet been
perfected, but the heterogeneous nature of our population tends to
make it irreversible..." - just as it tends to make the ultimate
displacement of European culture also irreversible.

Prof. MacDonald traces the development of this diversity strategy to
several sources. It is widely recognized that the German-Jewish
immigrant Franz Boas (1858-1942) almost single-handedly established
the current contours of anthropology, ridding it of all biological
explanations for differences in human culture or behavior. Prof.
MacDonald reports that he and his followers - with the notable
exceptions of Margaret Meade and Ruth Benedict - were all Jews with
strong Jewish identities: "Jewish identification and the pursuit of
perceived Jewish interests, particularly in advocating an ideology of
cultural pluralism as a model for Western societies, has been the
'invisible subject' of American anthropology."

By 1915, Boas and his students controlled the American Anthropological
Association and by 1926 they headed every major American university
anthropology department. From this position of dominance they promoted
the idea that race and biology are trivial matters, and that
environment counts for everything. They completely recast anthropology
so as to provide intellectual support for open immigration,
integration, and miscegenation. They also laid the foundation for the
idea that because all races have the same potential, the failures of
non-whites must be blamed exclusively on white oppression. The
ultimate conclusion of Boasian anthropology was that since environment
accounts for all human differences, changing the environment could
eliminate every inequality in achievement. This has been the
justification for enormous and wasteful government intervention

The entire "civil rights" movement can be seen as a natural
consequence of the triumph of Boasian thinking. Since all races were
equivalent, separation was immoral. The color line also sharpened
white self-consciousness in ways that might make whites more aware of
Jewish parochialism. Thus it was, according to Prof. MacDonald, that
Jews almost single-handedly launched the desegregation movement.
Without the leadership of Jews, the NAACP might never have been
established, and until 1975 every one of its presidents was a Jew.
Prof. MacDonald reports that in 1917, when the black separatist Marcus
Garvey visited NAACP headquarters, he saw so many white faces that he
stormed out, complaining that it was a white organization.

Prof. MacDonald concludes that the efforts of Jews were crucial to the
"civil rights" transformation of America. He quotes a lawyer for the
American Jewish Congress who claims "many of these [civil rights] laws
were actually written in the offices of Jewish agencies by Jewish
staff people, introduced by Jewish legislators and pressured into
being by Jewish voters." While the Boas school was promoting
integration and racial equivalence, it was also critical of, in Prof.
MacDonald's words, "American culture as overly homogeneous,
hypocritical, emotionally and esthetically repressive (especially with
regard to sexuality). Central to this program was creating
ethnographies do idyllic [Third-World] cultures that were free of the
negatively perceived traits that were attributed to Western culture."

The Role of the anthropologist became one of criticizing everything
about Western society while glorifying everything primitive. Prof.
MacDonald notes that Boasian portrayals of non-Western peoples
deliberately ignored barbarism and cruelty or simply attributed it to
contamination from the West. He sees this as a deliberate attempt to
undermine the confidence of Western societies and to make them
permeable to Third World influences and people. Today, this view is
enshrined in the dogma that America must remain open to immigration
because immigrants bring spirit and energy that natives somehow lack.

Authoritarian Personalities

In order to open European-derived societies to the immigration that
would transform them, it was necessary to discredit racial solidarity
and commitment to tradition. Prof. MacDonald argues that this was the
basic purpose of a group of intellectuals known as the Frankfurt
School. What is properly known as the Institute of Social Research was
founded in Frankfurt, Germany, during the Weimar period by a Jewish
millionaire but was closed down by the Nazis shortly after they took
power. Most of its staff emigrated to the United States and the
institute reconstituted itself at UC Berkeley. Max Horkheimer headed
the organization, and its most influential members were T.W. Adorno,
Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse, all of whom had strong Jewish
identities. Horkheimer made no secret of the partisan nature of the
institute's activities: "Research would be able here to transform
itself directly into propaganda," he wrote. (Italics in the original)

Prof. MacDonald devotes many pages to an analysis of The Authoritarian
Personality, which was written by Adorno and appeared in 1950. It was
part of a series called Studies in Prejudice, produced by the
Frankfurt school, which included titles like Anti-Semitism and
Emotional Disorder. The Authoritarian Personality, which was
particularly influential because, according to Prof. MacDonald, the
American Jewish Committee heavily funded its promotion and because
Jewish academics took up its message so enthusiastically.

The book's purpose is to make every group affiliation sound as if it
were a sign of mental disorder. Everything from patriotism to religion
to family - and race - loyalty are sign of a dangerous and defective
"authoritarian personality." Because drawning distinctions between
different groups is illegitimate, all group loyalties - even close
family ties! - are "prejudice." As Christopher Lasch has written, the
book leads to the conclusion that prejudice "could be eradicated only
by subjecting the American people to what amounted to collective
psychotherapy - by treating them as inmates of an insane asylum."

But according to Prof. MacDonald it is precisely the kind of group
loyalty, respect for tradition, and consciousness of differences
central to Jewish identity that Horkheimer and Adorno described as
mental illness in gentiles. These writers adopted what eventually
became a favorite Soviet tactic against dissidents: Anyone whose
political views were different from theirs was insane. As Prof.
MacDonald explains, the Frankfurt school never criticized or even
described Jewish group identity - only that of gentiles: "behavior
that is critical to Judaism as a successful group evolutionary
strategy is conceptualized as pathological in gentiles."

For these Jewish intellectuals, anti-Semitism was also a sign of
mental illness: They concluded that Christian self-denial and
especially sexual repression caused hatred of Jews. The Frankfurt
school was enthusiastic about psychoanalysis, according to which
"Oedipal ambivalence toward the father and anal-sadistic relations in
early childhood are the anti-Semite's irrevocable inheritance."

In addition to ridiculing patriotism and racial identity, the
Frankfurt school glorified promiscuity and Bohemian poverty. Prof.
MacDonald sees the school as a seminal influence: "Certainly many of
the central attitudes of the largely successful 1960s counter cultural
revolution find expression in The Authoritarian Personality, including
idealizing rebellion against parents, low-investment sexual
relationships, and scorn for upward social mobility, social status,
family pride, the Christian religion, and patriotism."

Of the interest here, however, is the movement's success in branding
ancient loyalties to nation and race as mental illnesses. Although he
came later, the French-Jewish "deconstructionist" Jacques Derrida was
in the same tradition when he wrote: "The idea behind deconstruction
is to deconstruct the workings of strong nation-states with powerful
immigration policies, to deconstruct the rhetoric of nationalism, the
politics of place, the metaphysics of native land and native tongue...
The idea is to disarm the bombs... of identity that nation-states
build to defend themselves against the stranger, against Jews and
Arabs and immigrants... "

As Prof. MacDonald puts it, "Viewed at its most abstract level, a
fundamental agenda is thus to influence the European-derived peoples
of the United States to view concern about their own demographic and
cultural eclipse as irrational and as an indication of
psychopathology." Needless to say, this project has been successful;
anyone opposed to the displacement of whites is routinely treated as a
mentally unhinged "hate-monger," and whenever whites defend their
group interests they are described as psychologically inadequate. The
irony has not escaped Prof. MacDonald: "The ideology that
ethnocentrism was a form of psychopathology was promulgated by a group
that over its long history had arguably been the most ethnocentric
group among all the cultures of the world."


MacDonald argues that it is entirely natural for Jews to promote open
immigration. It brings about the "diversity" Jews find comforting and
it keeps America open to persecuted co-religionists throughout the
world. He says Jews are the only group that has always fought for mass
immigration; a few European ethnic organizations have made sporadic
efforts to make it easier for their own people to come, but only Jews
have consistently promoted open borders for all comers. Moreover,
whatever disagreements they may have had on other issues, Jews of
every political persuasion have favored high immigration.

This, too, goes back many years, and Prof. MacDonald traces in
considerable detail the sustained Jewish pro-immigration effort.
Israel Agnail, author of the eponymous 1908 play The Melting Pot, was
of the view that "there is only one way to World Peace, and that is
the absolute abolition of passports, visas, frontiers, custom
houses... " He was nevertheless an ardent Zionist and disapproved of
Jewish intermarriage.

Although the statue of liberty, properly known as Liberty Enlightening
the World, was a gift to the United States from France as a tribute to
American political traditions, the sonnet by the Jewish Emma Lazarus
helped change it into a symbol of immigration. Affixed to the base of
the statue several decades after its contraction, the poem welcomes to
America "huddled masses yearning to breath free/The wretched refuse of
your teeming shore."

Prof. MacDonald has discovered that Jews have made implausible
arguments about diversity being a quintessentially American strength
for a long time. He reports that in 1948 the American Jewish Committee
was urging Congress to believe that "Americanism is the spirit behind
the welcome that America has traditionally extended to people of all
races, all religions, all nationalities." Of course, there had never
been such a tradition. In 1952, the American Jewish Congress argued in
hearings on immigration that "our national experience has confirmed
beyond a doubt that our very strength lies in the diversity of our
peoples." This, too, was at a time when U.S. immigration law was still
explicitly designed to maintain a white majority.

It is often said that when the old immigration policy was scrapped in
1965, scarcely anyone knew, and no one predicted, that the new law
would change the racial makeup of the country. Prof. MacDonald
disputes this, arguing that this had been the objective of Jewish
groups from the beginning.

Prof. MacDonald finds that Jews have been the foremost advocates of
immigration in England, France, and Canada, and that Jewish groups
were the most vocal opponents of independence for Quebec. Australian
Jews led the effort to dismantle the "white Australia" policy, one
reason for which was cited in an editorial in the Australian Jewish
Democrat: "The strengthening of multicultural or diverse Australia is
also our most effective insurance policy against anti-Semitism. The
day Australia has a Chinese Australian Governor General I would feel
more confident of my freedom to live as a Jewish Australian." Like
Earl Raab writing about the United States, this Australian Jew is
prepared to sacrifice the traditional culture, people, and identity of
Australia to specifically Jewish interests. It would not be surprising
if such an openly expressed objective did not have the opposite effect
from the intended, and increase anti-Jewish sentiment.

Jews and the Left

It is well known that Jews have been traditionally associated with the
left, and Prof. MacDonald investigates this connection in some detail.
Historically it was understandable that Jews should support movements
that advocated overthrowing the existing order. After emancipation,
Jews met resistance from gentile elites who did not want to lose
ground to competitors, and outsiders easily become revolutionaries.
However, in Prof. MacDonald's view, Jewish commitment to leftist
causes has often been motivated by the hope that communism,
especially, would be a tool for combating anti-Semitism, and by
expectation that universalistic social solutions would be yet another
way to dissolve gentile loyalties that might exclude Jews. The appeal
of universalistic ideologies is tied to the implicit understanding
that Jewish particularism will be exempt: "At the extreme, acceptance
of a universalist ideology by gentiles would result in gentiles not
perceiving Jews as in a different social category at all, while
nonetheless Jews would be able to maintain a strong personal identity
as Jews."

Prof. MacDonald argues that Jews had specifically Jewish reasons for
supporting the Bolshevik revolution. Czarist Russia was notorious for
its anti-Semitic policies and, during its early years, the Soviet
Union seemed to be the promised land for Jews: it ended state
anti-Semitism, tried to eradicate Christianity, opened opportunities
to individual Jews, and preached a "classless" society in which Jewish
ness would presumably attract no negative attention. Moreover, since
Marxism taught that all conflict was economic rather than ethnic, many
Jews believed it heralded the end of anti-Semitism.

Prof. MacDonald emphasizes that although Jewish Communists preached
both atheism and the solidarity of the world's working people, they
took pains to preserve a distinct, secular Jewish identity. He reports
that Lenin himself (who had one Jewish grandparent) approved the
continuation of an explicitly Jewish identity under Communism, and in
1946 the Communist Party of the United States voted a resolution also
supporting Jewish people hood in Communist countries. Thus, although
Communism was supposed to be without borders or religion, Jews were
confident that it would make a place for their own group identity. He
writes that despite the official view that all men were to be
brothers, "very few Jews lost their Jewish identity during the entire
soviet era."

Jewish Communists sometimes betrayed remarkable particularism. Prof.
MacDonald quotes Charles Pappoport, the French Communist leader: "The
Jewish people [are] the bearer of all the great ideas of unity and
human community in history... The disappearance of the Jewish people
would signify the death of humankind, the final transformation of man
into a wild beast." This seems to attribute to Jews an elite position
incompatible with "unity and human community."

Prof. MacDonald argues that many Jews began to fall away from
Communism only after Stalin showed himself to be anti-Semitic. And
just as Jews had been the leading revolutionaries in anti-Semitic
pre-Revolutionary Russia, Jews became the leading dissidents in an
anti-Semitic Soviet Union. A similar pattern can be found in the
imposed Communist governments of Eastern Europe, which were largely
dominated by Jews. The majority of the leaders of the Polish Communist
Party, for example, spoke better Yiddish than Polish, and they too
maintained a strong Jewish identity. After the fall of Communism many
stopped being Polish and emigrated to Israel.

Prof. MacDonald writes that in Bela Kun's short-lived 1919 Communist
government of Hungary, 95 percent of the leaders were Jews, and that
at the time of the 1956 uprising Communism was so closely associated
with Jews that the rioting had almost the flavor of a pogrom. He
argues that in the United States as well, the hard core among
Communists and members of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was
mainly Jewish. Here, too, a revolutionary, atheist, and Universalist
world-view was fully compatible with strong identification as Jews.
Prof. MacDonald quotes from a study of American leftists:

"Many Communists, for example, state that they could never have
married a spouse who was not a leftist. When Jews were asked if they
could have married Gentiles, many hesitated, surprised by the
question, and found it difficult to answer. Upon reflection, many
concluded that they had always taken marriage to someone Jewish for
granted." Their commitment as Jews was even more fundamental and
unexamined than their commitment to the left.

Prof. MacDonald reports that many American Jews also abandoned
Communism as it became increasingly anti-Semitic. For a large number,
the Soviet Union's severing of diplomatic ties with Israel during the
1967 war was the last straw. A former SDS activist no doubt spoke for
many when he explained, "If I must choose between the Jewish cause and
a 'progressive' anti-Israel SDS, I shall choose the Jewish cause. If
barricades are erected, I will fight as a Jew." According to Prof.
MacDonald, American neoconservatism can also be described as a surface
shift in external politics that leaves the more fundamental commitment
to Jewish identity unchanged. Thus, former leftists abandoned an
ideology that had turned against Israel and refashioned American
conservatism into a different movement, the one unshakable theme of
which was support for Israel. Neoconservatives also support high
levels of immigration and were active in excluding white racial
identification from the "respectable" right.


There are many possible objections to Prof. MacDonald's thesis. The
first is that it is largely built on the assumption that Jews are
dishonest. It is always risky to assume one understands the motives of
others better than they do themselves. Jews have traditionally thought
of themselves as a benevolent presence, even as a "light unto the
nations" or a "chosen people." This is echoed today in the Jewish
self-image as champions of the excluded and the oppressed. Most of the
time what passes for "social justice" has the effect of undermining
the traditions and loyalties of gentile society, but are Jews
deliberately undermining these things rather than righting what they
perceive to be wrongs?

Prof. MacDonald concedes that many Jews are sincere in their support
for liberal causes, but then escalates his indictment by arguing, "The
best deceivers are those who deceive themselves." In other words, many
Jews who are actually working for Jewish interests have first
convinced themselves otherwise. A Jew who mainly wants America to
become less white may also have convinced himself that America
benefits from a multitude of cultures. Having convinced himself he can
more effectively convince others.

Many Jews, Prof. MacDonald argues, are not even conscious of the
extent to which their Jewish ness is central to their identities or
their political views. He quotes Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel on his
surprise at how passionately he embraced the Israeli side during the
1967 war: "I had not known how Jewish I was." This is an arresting
statement from a man who was thought to be perhaps the greatest Jewish
spiritual leader of his time. And whether or not it affects their
politics, Jews certainly appear to have a very vivid sense of people
hood. Prof. MacDonald quotes theologian Eugene Borowitz as saying,"
most Jews claim to be equipped with an interpersonal friend-or-foe
sensing device that enables them to detect the presence of another
Jew, despite heavy camouflage." Always to think in terms of "friends
or foe" is no insignificant matter.

Prof. MacDonald is therefore skeptical of Jewish disavowals: "Surface
declarations of a lack of Jewish identity may be highly misleading."
He notes that Jewish publications write about the power and influence
of American Jews in language Jews would immediately denounce as
"anti-Semitic" if used by gentiles. He agrees with Joseph Sobran, who
has said "they want to be Jews among themselves but resent being seen
as Jews by Gentiles. They want to pursue their own distinct interests
while pretending that they have no such interests... "

Prof. MacDonald argues that the success of Jewish-led intellectual
movements has been possible only because their Jewish character was
hidden. If Orthodox Jews had promoted multiculturalism or mass
immigration or The Authoritarian Personality in black coats the Jewish
element would have been clear. Prof. MacDonald writes that in fact,
"the Jewish political agenda was not an aspect of the theory and the
theories themselves had no overt Jewish content. Gentile intellectuals
approaching these theories were therefore unlikely to view them as
aspects of Jewish-gentile cultural competition or as an aspect of a
specifically Jewish political agenda." Prof. MacDonald also claims
that Jews have often tried to conceal the Jewish character of an
intellectual movement by recruiting token gentiles for visible
positions as spokesmen. He writes that this tactic was so common in
the American Communist Party that gentiles often saw through it and

But how can motives ever be completely known? Prof. MacDonald sets a
difficult test: "The best evidence that individuals have really ceased
to have a Jewish identity is if they choose a political option that
they perceive as clearly not in the interest of Jews as a group. In
the absence of a clearly perceived conflict with Jewish interests, it
remains possible that different political choices among ethnic Jews
are only differences in tactics for how best to achieve Jewish
interest." This standard may seem unduly harsh - until it is applied
to white gentiles. Third-World immigration, affirmative action,
anti-discrimination laws, and forced integration are clearly not in
the interests of whites, yet many whites embrace them, thus
demonstrating how completely they have abandoned their racial

Finally, Prof. MacDonald raises the disturbing possibility that some
Jews, because of centuries of conflict with gentiles, actively hate
gentile society and consciously wish to destroy it: "a fundamental
motivation of Jewish intellectuals involved in social criticism has
simply been hatred of the gentile-dominated power structure perceived
as anti-Semitic." He describes the 19th century German-Jewish poet
Hein rich Heine as "using his skill, reputation and popularity to
undermine the intellectual confidence of the established order."

In defense of this highly provocative view, Prof. MacDonald quotes
Benjamin Disraeli on the effects of centuries of Jewish-gentile
relations on Jews: "They may have become so odious and so hostile to
mankind as to merit for their present conduct, no matter how
occasioned, the obloquy and ill-treatment of the communities in which
they dwell and with which they are scarcely permitted to mingle."

Apart from any questions of motives, however, is the question of
numbers. Jews are a tiny minority in the United States and within that
minority there is disagreement even on matters that clearly affect
Jews. How can Jews possibly be responsible for dramatic changes in the
intellectual landscape? In Prof. MacDonald's view, the explanation
lies in the intelligence, energy, dedication, and cohesiveness of
Jews. He attributes a great deal to the average IQ of Jews - at 115, a
full standard deviation above the white gentile average - and to
"their hard work and dedication, their desire to make a mark on the
world, and their desire to rise in the world, engage in personal
promotion, and achieve public acclaim... " He also believes Jews have
worked together unfailingly on any question they consider necessary
for survival: "Intellectual activity is like any other human endeavor:
Cohesive groups out compete individual strategies." He notes that
there has never been a time when large numbers of white Americans
favored non-white immigration; it was a cohesive, determined minority
that beat down the disorganized resistance of the majority.

Prof. MacDonald believe that because of the effectiveness of some
Jews, it was not even necessary that most Jews actively support
anti-majoritarian movements, but that Jewish activity was still
decisive. As he puts it, "Jewish-dominated intellectual movements were
a critical factor (necessary condition) for the triumph of the
intellectual left in late twentieth-century Western societies." This,
of course, can never be tested, but there can be no doubt that
American Jews have had a disproportionate effect on the American
intellect. Prof. MacDonald quotes Walter Kerr, writing in 1968, to the
effect that "what has happened since World War II is that the American
sensibility has become part Jewish, perhaps as much Jewish as it is
anything else... The literate American mind has come in some measure
to think Jewishly."

Aside from the question of whether Prof. MacDonald is right is the
further question of what difference it makes if he is right. If
correct, his thesis certainly sheds light on the rapidity with which
whites lost their will. Just a few decades ago whites were a confident
race, proud of their achievements, convinced of their fitness to
dominate the globe. Today they are a declining, apologetic people,
ashamed of their history and not sure even of their claim to lands
they have occupied for centuries. It is very rare for fundamental
concepts to be stood on their heads in the course of just a generation
or two, as has happened with thinking about race. Such speed suggests
there has been something more than natural change.®

Stanley Hornbeck is the pen name of a Washington, DC, - area

Quotesfrom The Culture of Critique

Kevin MacDonald on Hellenism cf. Judaism, and the Jewish Rolein the 60s Counterculture & New Left.

Selections by Peter Myers; my comments are shown {thus}, June 4, 2001; updateMay 5, 2004.

You are at

Suppose the 50s be called Thesis, and the 60s Counterculture calledAntithesis, then I advocate Synthesis, whereas MacDonald advocates a return toThesis. But his books are cogently argued and deserve debate.

(1) Kevin MacDonald, A People That Shall Dwell Alone (2) KevinMacDonald, The Culture of Critique

(1) Kevin MacDonald, A People That Shall Dwell Alone(Praeger, Westport, CT 1994):

{p. 58} From an evolutionary perspective, the uniqueness of the Jews lies intheir being the only people to successfully remain intact and resist normalassimilative processes after living for very long periods as a minority in othersocieties. This unique resistance to assimilation dates from the period ofthe Babylonian exile and perhaps even the Egyptian sojourn described inGenesis. Bickerman (1988, 38; see also Cohen 1987) points out that in theancient world there were voluntary diasporas of Greek, Aramaic, and Phoenicianpeoples, which eventually became assimilated into the surrounding societies.Moreover, it was a common practice of the Assyrians, Babylonians, and Persiansto displace the peoples whom they had conquered, just as the Jews were displacedduring the Babylonian exile. For considerable periods, it was common for thesedisplaced peoples to live in separate communities and to continue to identifywith the ethnic group and the religion that were left behind: "It couldhardly be otherwise: the tribal organization of oriental peoples blocked theroad to assimilation" (Bickerman 1988, 38). However, in the long run, thesedisplaced peoples became assimilated, while the Jews did not.

{p. 59} During the period of Greek hegemony, the Jewish religion wasunique in forcibly resisting Hellenizing influences (Schurer [1885] 1973,146), and the Jewish struggle with Rome was the most prolonged and violent ofany of the peoples in the Empire. Indeed, one of the major results of thedevelopment of the Roman Republic and Empire was that the great diversity ofethnic groups, which characterized Italy and the rest of the Mediterraneanregion, was largely assimilated. For example, in Italy during the fiflh centuryB.C., Etruscans Samnites, Umbrians, Latins, Romans, and a variety of othergroups were assimilated into a larger culture in which these ethnic divisionsdisappeared

The Jews were the only ethnic group to survive intact after theupheavals that occurred at the end of antiquity. After the barbarian invasionsand the collapse of the Roman Empire, there were further assimilative processes.The agricultural peoples of the Middle East, with the exception of the Jews,lost their identities in the early Islamic period (Goitein 1974). Moreover,Christianity steadily disappeared in parts of the Arab empire, but flourishingJewish communities remained even after Jews were relegated to a subservient,humiliated status. Similarly, Lea (1906-07, 139ff) notes the existence ofOstragoths, Visigoths, Celt-Iberians, and Romans in seventh-century Spain, butonly the Jews survived as an independent ethnic group - the others presumablybecoming completely assimilated via intermarriage. In general, after thebarbarian invasions, Western Europe was a mixture of Roman and Germanic peopleswhose ethnic identities, with the exception of the Jews, were eventually lost(e.g., Brundage 1987, Geaty 1988). And there were a variety of national groupsin medieval and post-medieval Poland besides the Poles and the Jews,particularly Scots, Germans, Armenians, and Tatars. Hundert (1986a) notes thatby the end of the 18th century, these other groups had become assimilated andthere were the beginnings of a Catholic bourgeoisie resulting from theamalgamation of these groups. The Jews, however, remained separate.


[The rulers of Alexandria] set apart for them a particular place, that theymight live without being polluted [by the gentiles]. (Flavius Josephus, TheWars of the Jews. 2:487-488)

There is excellent evidence indicating that Jews actively maintained culturalseparatism in the ancient world and that this cultural separatism acted toprevent exogamy. The following passage from 1 Maccabees (second century B.C.)illustrates the perceived connection between assimilation and intermarriage:

At that time there appeared in Israel a group of renegade Jews, who incitedthe people. 'Let us enter into a covenant with the Gentiles round about,' they

{p. 60} said, 'because disaster upon disaster has overtaken us since wesegregated ourselves from them.' The people thought this a good argument, andsome of them in their enthusiasm went to the king and received authority tointroduce non-Jewish laws and customs. They built a sport stadium in the gentilestyle in Jerusalem. They removed their marks of circumcision and repudiated theholy covenant. They intemarried with Gentiles, and abandoned themselves to evilways. (1 Macc. 1:11-15)

Assimilation was thus beginning to lead to intermarriage. However, theresult of the Hasmonean victory and the end of Greek domination "wasto set up anew walls of separation between Hebrew and heathen" (Epstein1942, 168). The Book of Jubilees, written during this period, shows an extremeconcem for intermarriage. "If there is any man in Israel who wishes to givehis daughter or his sister to any man who is of the stock of the gentiles, heshall surely die, and they shall stone him with stones ... and they shall bumthe woman with fire because she hath dishonored the name of the house of herfather and she shall be rooted out of Israel" (Jub. 30:7). A variety ofseparatist practices derive from this period, including prohibitions on feastingwith gentiles, using wine or oil from gentiles, and having any kind of sexualcontact with gentiles. Although Epstein (1942, 170) notes that the racialism ofEzra was replaced by religious nationalism as the basis for erecting barriersagainst intermarriage, it goes without saying that the end result was the samefrom an evolutionary perspective: genetic segregation of the Jewish gene poolfrom the surrounding peoples. ...

{p. 231} Later, during the Roman period, Jews alone of all the subjectpeoples in the Roman Empire engaged in prolonged, even suicidal wars against thegovernment in order to attain national sovereignty. Baron (1952b) notes thatTitus's victory was the result of a very difficult campaign. Even after this,the Jews remained defiant and unassimilable, and there were two otherrebellions: in Alexandria and other areas in Egypt, Cyprus, Cyrenaica, Libya,and possibly Mesopotamia and Judaea during the reign of Trajan (115-117 A.D.)and in Judaea during the reign of Hadrian (131-135 A.D.) under Simon Bar Kocheba.The latter held out for over three years against the best of Hadrian's generals,with many dying as martyrs. There were also rebellions during Constantine's reinin 326 and under Patricius in 351. There were also several very bloody revoltsagainst Byzantine authority in Palestine during the fifth and sixth centuries (Avi-Yonah1984, 251, 254; Bachrach 1984).

The Jews were by far the most vehement in their objection to Roman rule,compared to any of the many peoples of the Empire. Alon ([1980, 1984] 1989, 698)notes "the long, drawn-out stubborn refusal of the Jews to come to any kindof terms with Roman rule" and the fact that even after the thaw Jews nevercompletely submitted to "the wicked kingdom" (p. 698). Many authorshave noted the religious fanaticism of the Jews in the ancient world and theirwillingness to die rather than tolerate offenses to Israel or live under foreign

{p. 232} domination. For example, Josephus, the first-century Jewishhistorian and apologist, stated that

[We face] death on behalf of our laws with a courage which no other nationcan equal. (Against Apion, 2:234)

And from these laws of ours nothing has had power to deflect us, neither fearof our masters, nor envy of the institutions esteemed by other nations. (AgainstApion, 2:271 )

Although not all Jews were willing to die rather than betray the law,"story after story reveals that this generalization is true" (Sanders1992, 42). "No other nation can be shown to have fought so often in defenceof its own way of life, and the readiness of Jews to die for their cause isproved by example after example" (Sanders 1992, 239). Crossan (1991,103ff)shows that Jewish political activity against the Romans often included threatsof martyrdom if external signs of Roman domination were not removed fromJerusalem and the Temple. Only the Jews, of all of Rome's subjectpeoples, were exempted from having to sacrifice to the Empire's gods, andthey were the only group that was allowed to have their own courts and anex officio government under the Patriarchate/Sanhedrin.

{p. 238} Bickerman (1988) notes the relatively greater sense of ethnicexclusiveness ong the Near Eastern peoples than was apparent in the Greek worldof antiquity. The Greek view of cities in the ancient world was thatthey were open to any person and that any person who adopted the languageand customs of these cities could feel at home. Indeed, there isconsiderable scholarly agreement that Greek anti-Semitism in the ancient worldderived from the fact that Jews wanted political rights, but unwilling toadopt a common language and set of customs with the Greeks(see SAID, ch. 2). On the other hand, "[o]riental civilizations had noconcept of naturalization and were averse to acculturation" (Bickerman1987, 80). This general contrast is also compatible with Johnson's (1987, 134)point that the Greek conceptualization of a multi-racial, multi-national societystrongly conflicted with Jewlsh separatism and unwillingness to respect thedeities and practices of other peoples.

The Romans are generally viewed as being derived from an ethnically mixedgroup of Italians and other groups (McDonald 1966). Moreover, the long-termtrend in the Roman Empire was for gradually increasing conferral of citizenship,culminating in the granting of virtually universal citizenship in 212A.D. by Caracalla. There was also a gradual representation of provincials in thesenate

{p. 239} and equestrian order, and provincials replaced Italians as emperorsby the third century (Garnsey & Saller 1987, 9). Jordan (1989, 111) notesthe general tolerance of "alien" groups in Roman society andthe idealization of this tolerance in Roman jurisprudence.

Indeed, as Schurer (1885] 1986,132) notes, the Roman imperial governmenttended to protect the Jews from repeated outbreaks of hostility in citiesthroughout the Empire. And the Roman government repeatedly confirmed the rightof Jews (unique among the subject peoples) to their own religious communitiesand their exemption from sacrifiing to the imperial cults and from service inthe military. As a result, a major source of popular anti-Semitism in theancient world derived from the Jewish unwillinness to participate in ahomogeneous, assimilative culture: "Precisely at the time when throughRoman world-rule and the levelling effect of Hellenism there was a generaltendency for local cultures either to be submerged or to be absorbed in theoverall Graeco-Roman culture, it must have been felt as doubly frustrating thatonly the Jews were unwilling to be thought of as taking part in the process ofamalgamation" (Schurer [1885] 1986, 152-153; see also SAID, ch. 2).

The Greek and Roman pattern of conquest and empire-building, unlike that ofthe Israelites described in the Tanakh, did not involve genocide followed by thecreation of an ethnically exclusive state that dominated the remnants of theconquered peoples (the Nethinim) and never assimilated them even after manycenturies. Rather, the tendency was for conquest to be followed in the long runby genetic and cultural assimilation.

The paradigm for such assimilative behavior is Alexander the Great'sintention of building a universalist state in which there would be completegenetic and cultural assimilation with the conquered peoples - the dream of auniversal world-state based on universal brotherhood and partnership and oncooperation between conquerors and conquered (see Hegermann 1989). Alexanderadopted many Persian cultural practices (e.g., type of dress and courtceremonies), and he married an Iranian princess and forced his men to do thesame. In contrast, the whole point of historical Judaism has been to resistalien cultures. Moreover, Israelites who married foreign women in the periodof conquest after the Exodus and in the resettlement after the Babylonian exilewere condemned and excluded, and Joshua "destroyed all that breathed, asthe LORD, the God of Israel, commanded" (Josh. 10:40).

Similarly, the Germanic conquerors of the Roman Empire in the fifth centurytook their places among their new subjects largely without displacing the formercitizens of the Empire, so that in some areas people were quite unaware thatthey were no longer members of the Empire (see Geary 1988). Eventually, therewas complete cultural and genetic assimilation among the conquerors and theirnew subjects.

{p. 241} The Christian Church, despite its obvious Jewish origins, is from anevolutionary perspective fundamentally opposed to Judaism in matters of interestto an evolutionist. Boyarin (1993, 6) contrasts the basic Jewish concern withsexuality, reproduction, genealogy, and a concept of historical peoplehood basedon genetic relatedness with the denial of the importance of these quaiities inChristianity. Early Christian thinkers criticized the Jewish tendency to takethese Biblical themes literally, while they themselves tended to allegorizethese Biblical themes and created new cultural symbols such as the virgin birthand the cultural ideal of celibacy, which were diametrically opposed to theseJewish themes. ...

Moreover, while collectivist societies emphasize genealogy and degree ofgenetic relatedness in marriage, individualist societies tend to emphasizepersonal attraction (e.g., romantic love, common interests) (Triandis 1990). ...

{end of quotes}

(2) Kevin MacDonald, THECULTURE OF CRITIQUE: An Evolutionary Analysis of JewishInvolvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements (Westport,Connecticut 1998).

{p. 1 Chapter 1} {quote} For 1,500 years Jewish society had been designedto produce intellectuals. ... Jewish society was geared to support them.... Richmerchants married sages' daughters; . . . Quite suddenly, around the year1800, this ancient and highly efficient social machine for the productionof intellectuals began to shift its output. Instead of pouring all itsproducts into the closed circuit of rabbinical studies, . . . it unleashed asignificant and ever-growing proportion of them into secular life. This was anevent of shattering importance in world history. {end quote} (A History ofthe Jews, Paul Johnson 1988, 340-341)

An important theme of Separation and Its Discontents (hereafter SAID){volume 2 in this trilogy} was the manipulation of ideology in the service ofrationalizing specific forms of Judaism, interpreting history, and combatinganti-Semitism. The present volume is in many ways an extension of thesephenomena. However, the intellectual movements and political activity discussedin this volume have typically occurred in the wider intellectual and politicalworld and have not been designed to rationalize specific forms of Judaism.Rather, they may be characterized in the broadest sense as efforts at culturalcriticism and at times as attempts to influence the wider culture of the societyin a manner that conforms to specific Jewish interests.

There is no implication here of a unified Jewish "conspiracy" toundermine gentile culture, as portrayed in the notorious Protocols of the Eldersof Zion. Since the Enlightenment, Judaism has never been a unified, monolithicmovement, and there has clearly been a great deal of disagreement among Jews asto how to protect themselves and attain their interests during this period. Themovements discussed in this volume (Boasian anthropology, political radicalism,psychoanalysis, the Frankfurt School of Social Research, and the New YorkIntellectuals) were advanced by relatively few individuals

{p. 8} Anti-Semitism among university professors during the Weimar period waspartially fueled by the perception that "the Jew represented the criticalor 'negative' aspects of modern thought, the acids of analysis and skepticismthat helped to dissolve the moral certainties, patriotic commitment, and socialcohesion of modern states" (Ringer 1983, 7). Reflecting this perception,National Socialist propaganda during the period claimed that Jews attempted toundermine the social cohesion of gentile society while remaining committed to ahighly cohesive group themselves -- an intellectual double standard in which thebasis of social cohesion among gentiles was subjected to intense criticism whilethe Jews "would retain their international cohesiveness, blood ties, andspiritual unity" (Aschheim 1985, 239). Viewed from this perspective animportant goal of Jewish intellectual effort may be understood as attempting toundermine cohesive gentile group strategies while continuing to engage in theirown highly cohesive group strategy. This issue re-emerges in the discussion ofJewish involvement in radical political movements and the Frankfurt School ofSocial Research in Chapters 3 and 5.

This phenomenon was not restricted to Germany. Gilson (1962, 31-32), indiscussing his Jewish professors at the turn of the century in France, states:

The doctrines of these university professors were really quite different fromone another. Even the personal philosophy of Levy-Bruhl did not coincide exactlywith that of Durkheim, while Frederic Rauh was going his own way.... The onlyelement common to their doctrines is a negative one, but nonetheless real andvery active in its own order. One might describe it as a radical defiance of allthat which is social conceived as a constraint from which to be liberated.Spinoza and Bmnschvieg achieved this liberation through metaphysics. Durkheimand Levy-Bruhl through science and sociology, Bergson through intuition.

Jews have also been at the forefront of the adversarial culture in the UnitedStates, England, and France since the mid-1960s, especially as defenders of theadversary culture in the media and the academic world (Ginsberg 1993 125ff;Rothman & Isenberg 1974a, 66 67).4 Stein (1979, 28; see also Lichter et al.1994; Powers et al. 1996) shows that his sample of predominantly Jewish writersand producers of television shows in the 1970s had very negative attitudestoward what they viewed as a gentile-dominated cultural establishment, althoughtheir most negative comments were elicited in informal conversation rather thanduring formal interviews. Television portrayals of gentile establishment figuresin business and the military tended to be very negative. For example, "thewriters clearly thought of military men as clean-shaven blond, and of completelyWASP background. In the minds of a few of the people I interviewed, these blondofficers were always a hair's breadth away from becoming National Socialists.They were thought of as part of an Aryan

{p. 9} ruling class that actually or potentially repressed those of differentethnic backgrounds" (pp. 55-56).

Indeed, Glazer and Moynihan (1963/1970) credit the emergence of the adversaryculture in the United States as a triumph of the New York Jewishcultural-political perspective. Jewish writers and visual artists (including E.L. Doctorow, Norman Mailer, Joseph Heller,5 Frederick Wiseman, and Norman Lear)were disproportionately involved in attempts to portray American society as"sick" (Rothman & Lichter 1982, 120). A common technique ofcultural subversion "involves an attack upon genuine inequities orirrationalities. Since all societies abound in both, there is never an absenceof targets. However, the attack is generally not directed at the particularinequity or irrationality per se. Rather, such inequities or irrationalities areused as a means for achieving a larger purpose: the general weakening of thesocial order itself" (Rothman & Lichter 1982, 120).

In this volume I will concentrate on Jewish involvement in movements opposedto evolutionary, biological, and genetic findings in the social sciences,radical political ideology, psychoanalysis, the Frankfurt School of SocialResearch, and the New York Intellectuals. These movements are not specificallyJewish in the sense that they are not intended to rationalize specific aspectsof Judaism such as cultural and genetic separatism. A major point will be thatJews were vastly overrepresented in these movements, that a strong sense ofJewish identity characterized the great majority of these individuals, and thatall involved alienation from and rejection of gentile culture.

The discussion therefore reflects Sorkin's (1985, 102) description ofnineteenth-century German-Jewish intellectuals as constituting an "invisiblecommunity of acculturating German Jews who perpetuated distinct cultural formswithin the majority culture." The Jewish cultural contribution to thewider gentile culture was therefore accomplished from a highly particularisticperspective in which Jewish group identity continued to be of paramountimportance despite its "invisibility." Even Berthold Auerbach (b.1812), the exemplar of the assimilated Jewish intellectual, "manipulate[d]elements of the majority culture in a way peculiar to the German-Jewishminority" (Sorkin 1985, 107). Auerbach became a model, for secular Jewishintellectuals, of the assimilated Jew who did not renounce his Judaism.For the most part, these secular Jewish intellectuals socialized exclusivelywith other secular Jews and viewed their contribution to German culture as asecular form of Judaism - thus the "invisible community" of stronglyidentified Jewish intellectuals. This cultural manipulation in the service ofgroup interests was a common theme of anti-Semitic writings. Thus, HeinrichHeine's critique of German culture was viewed as directed at the pursuit ofpower for his group at the expense of the cohesiveness of gentile society (seeMosse 1970, 52).

In several of the movements discussed in the following chapters it is ofconsiderable importance that their propagators have attempted to clothe theirrhetoric in the garb of science - the modem arbiter of truth and intellectual

{p. 10} respectability. As White (1966, 2) notes with respect to the Boasianschool of anthropology. the aura of science is deceptive: "They would makeit appear and would have everyone believe that their choice of premises andgoals has been detelmined by scientific considerations. This is definitely notthe case.... They are obviously sincere. Their sincerity and group loyalty tend,however, to persuade and consequently to deceive."

The comment is an excellent illustration of Robert Trivers's (1985)evolutionary theory of self-deception: The best deceivers are those who areself-deceived. At times the deception becomes conscious. Charles Liebman (1973,213 ) describes his unselfconscious acceptance of universalist ideologies(behaviorism and liberalism) in his work as a social scientist and suggests thathe was engaged in self-deception regarding the role of Jewish identification inhis beliefs: "As a behaviorist (and a liberal) I can testify to having beenquite unselfconscious about my academic methodology, but I suspect that thiswould have to be the case. Otherwise I would be defeating the very universalismI espouse."


The foregoing has documented a general tendency for Jewish intellectuals in avariety of periods to be involved with social criticism, and I have hinted at ananalysis in terms of social identity theory. More formally, two quite differenttypes of reasons explain why Jews might be expected to advocate ideologies andpolitical movements aimed at undermining the existing gentile social order.

First, such ideologies and movements may be directed at benefiting Jewseconomically or socially. Clearly one of the themes of post-EnlightenmentJudaism has been the rapid upward mobility of Jews and attempts by gentile powerstructures to limit Jewish access to power and social status. Given thisrather conspicuous reality, practical reasons of economic and politicalselfinterest would result in Jews being attracted to movements that criticizedthe gentile power structure or even advocated overthrowing it entirely.

Thus the czarist government of Russia enforced restrictions on Jews mainlyout of fear that Jews would overwhelm gentile Russians in free economiccompetition (Lindemann 1991; SAID, Ch. 2). These czarist restrictions on Jewswere a prominent rallying point for Jews around the world, and it is not at allunreasonable to suppose that Jewish participation in radical movements inRussia was motivated by perceived Jewish interest in overthrowing the czaristregime. Indeed, Arthur Liebman (1979, 29ff) notes that Jewish politicalradicalism in czarist Russia must be understood as resulting from economicrestrictions on Jews that were enforced by the government in the context ofconsiderable Jewish poverty and a very rapid Jewish demographic increase.Similarly, well into the 1930s the Jewish socialist labor movement in the

{p. 11} United States aimed at bettering the working conditions of itspredominantly Jewish membership (Liebman 1979, 267).

Another practical goal of Jewish political and intellectual movements hasbeen to combat anti-Semitism. For example, Jewish attraction to socialism inmany countries in the 1930s was motivated partly by communist opposition tofascism and anti-Semitism (Lipset 1988, 383; Marcus 1983). The generalassociation between anti-Semitism and conservative political views has oftenbeen advanced as an explanation for Jewish involvement with the left, includingthe leftist tendencies of many wealthy Jews (e.g., Lipset 1988, 375ff).Combating anti-Semitism also became a prime goal of Jewish radicals in theUnited States after Jews had predominantly moved into the middle class (Levin1977, 211). Rising anti-Semitism and consequent restrictions on Jewish upwardmobility during the 1930s also resulted in an attraction of Jews to the left (Liebman1979, 420ff, 507).

It will be apparent in Chapter 2 that the cultural determinism of the Boasianschool of anthropology functioned to combat anti-Semitism by combating racialistthinking and eugenic programs advocated mainly by gentiles. Psychoanalysis (Ch.4) and the Frankfurt School (Ch. 5) have also been instrumental in developingand propagating theories of anti-Semitism which attribute anti-Semitism toirrational projections of gentiles. In the case of the Frankfurt School, thetheory also functioned to pathologize gentile group allegiances as a symptomof a psychiatric disorder while ignoring Jewish group cohesion.

Second, Jewish involvement in social criticism may be influenced by socialidentity processes independent of any practical goal such as ending antiSemitism.Research in social identity processes finds a tendency for displacement ofingroup views away from outgroup norms (Hogg & Abrams 1988). In the case ofJewish-gentile contact, these outgroup norms would paradigmatically representthe consensus views of the gentile society. Moreover, individuals who identifythemselves as Jews would be expected to develop negative attributions regardingthe outgroup, and for Jews the most salient outgroup is the gentile powerstructure and indeed the gentile-dominated social structure generally.

Jewish ingroup status vis-a-vis the gentile world as an outgroup would beexpected to lead to a generalized negative conceptualization of the gentileoutgroup and a tendency to overemphasize the negative aspects of gentile societyand social structure. From the social identity perspective, the Jewish tendencyto subvert the social order is thus expected to extend beyond developingideologies and social programs that satisfy specific Jewish economic and socialinterests and extend to a general devaluation and critique of gentile culture - "thesheer destructive power of Jewish rationalism once it escaped the restraints ofthe traditional community" (Johnson 1988, 291-292).

The social identity perspective also pledicts that such negative attributionsare especially likely if the gentile power stluchlre is anti-Semitic orperceived

{p. 14} affiliation (i.e., group identity) rather than from individualeffort: "In the sixteenth century the scale of values became ever moreunbalanced, resulting in the concept that it was more important to establish whothe person was rather than evaluate his capacity for work or thought"(Castro 1971, 581; italics in text). The ideology of individual merit as thebasis of value promoted by the Converso intellectuals may thus be seen as aninstance of combating categories of social identity in which one is devalued.9

The other side of the coin is that Jews have often reacted quite negativelyto Jewish writers who portray Jewish characters as having negative ordisapproved traits. For example, Philip Roth has been extensively criticizedby Jews and Jewish organizations for portraying such characters, or at least forportraying such characters in America, where his work could be read byanti-Semites (see Roth 1963). While the ostensible reason for this concernwas the possibility that such portrayals might lead to anti-Semitism, Roth(1963, 452) suggests also that "what is really objected to, what isimmediately painful . . . is its direct effect upon certain Jews. 'You have hurta lot of people's feelings because you have revealed something they are ashamedof.'" The implication of Roth's critics is that the ingroup shouldbe portrayed in positive terms; and indeed, the most common type of Jewishliterary activity has portrayed Jews as having positive traits (Alter 1965, 72).The quote also reflects the discussion of Jewish self-deception in SAID (Ch. 8):The shame resulting from awareness of actual Jewish behavior is onlyhalf-conscious, and any challenge to this self-deception results in a great dealof psychological conflict.

The importance of social identity processes in Jewish intellectual activitywas recognized some time ago by Thorstein Veblen (1934). Veblen described thepreeminence of Jewish scholars and scientists in Europe and noted their tendencyto be iconoclasts. He noted that the Enlightenment had destroyed the abilityof Jewish intellectuals to find comfort in the identity provided by religion,but they do not therefore simply accept uncritically the intellectual structuresof gentile society. By engaging in iconoclasm, Veblen suggests, Jews are infact subjecting to criticism the basic social categorization system of thegentile world - a categorization system with which the gentile, but not theJew, is comfortable. The Jew "is not . . . invested with the gentile'speculiar heritage of conventional preconceptions which have stood over, byinertia of habit, out of the gentile past, which go, on the one hand, to makethe safe and sane gentile conservative and complacent, and which conduce also,on the other hand, to blur the safe and sane gentile's intellectual vision, andto leave him intellectually sessile" (Veblen 1934, 229).10

Indeed, Jewish social scientists have at least sometimes been aware of theselinkages: Peter Gay (1987, 137) quotes the following from a 1926 letter writtenby Sigmund Freud, whose antipathy to Western culture is described in Chapter 4:"Because I was a Jew, I found myself free from many prejudices whichlimited others in the employment of their intellects, and as a Jew I wasprepared to go into opposition and to do without the agreement of the

{p. 15} 'compact majority.'" In a later letter, Freud stated that toaccept psychoanalysis "called for a certain measure of readiness to accepta situation of solitary opposition - a situation with which nobody is morefamiliar than a Jew" (in Gay 1987, 146).11

There is a sense of alienation vis-a-vis the surrounding society. The Jewishintellectual, in the words of New York Intellectual and political radical IrvingHowe, tends "to feel at some distance from society; to assume, almost as abirthright, a critical stance toward received dogmas, to recognize oneself asnot quite at home in the world" (1978, 106).

From Solomon Maimon to Normon Podhoretz, from Rachel Varnhagen to CynthiaOzick, from Marx and Lassalle to Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel, from Herzland Ereud to Harold Laski and Lionel Trilling, from Moses Mendelssohn to J.Robert Oppenheimer and Ayn Rand, Gertrude Stein, and Reich I and 11 (Wilhelm andCharles), one dominating structure of an identical predicament and a shared fateimposes itself upon the consciousness and behavior of the Jewish intellectual inGalut [exile]: with the advent of Jewish Emancipation, when ghetto walls crumbleand the shtetlach [small Jewish towns] begin to dissolve, Jewry - like somewide-eyed anthropologist - enters upon a strange world, to explore a strangepeople observing a strange halakah (code). They examine this world in dismay,with wonder, anger, and punitive objectivity. This wonder, this anger, and thevindictive objectivity of the marginal nonmember are recidivist; they continueunabated into our own time because Jewish Emancipation continues into our owntime. (Cuddihy l974, 68)

Although intellectual criticism resulting from social identity processes neednot be functional in attaining any concrete goal of Judaism, this body of theoryis highly compatible with supposing that Jewish intellectual activity may bedirected at influencing social categorization processes in a manner thatbenefits Jews. Evidence will be provided in later chapters that Jewishintellectual movements have advocated universalist ideologies for the entiresociety in which the Jew-gentile social category is reduced in salienceand is of no theoretical importance. Thus, for example, within aMarxist analysis social conflict is theorized to result solely fromeconomically based conflict between social classes in which resourcecompetition between ethnic groups is irrelevant. Social identity researchpredicts that the acceptance of such a theory would lessen anti-Semitismbecause within the universalist ideology the Jew-gentile social categorizationis not salient.

Finally, there is good reason to suppose that minority perspectives are ableto have a strong influence on the attitudes of the majority (e.g., Perez &Mugny 1990). Social identity research indicates that a minority viewpoint,especially when possessing a high degree of internal consistency, is able tohave an impact

because it introduces the possibility of an alternative tO thetaken-for-granted, unquestioned, consensual majority perspective. Suddenlypeople can discern cracks in the facade of majority consensus. New issues,problems, and questions arise which

{p. 16} demand attention. The status quo is no longer passively acceptedas an immutable and stable entity which is the sole legitimate arbiter of thenature of things. People are free to change their beliefs, views,customs, and so forth. And where do they turn? One direction is to theactive minority. It (by definition and design) furnishes a conceptuallycoherent and elegantly simple resolution of the very issues which, dueto its activitics, now plague the public consciousness. In the language of'ideology' . . ., active minorities seek to replace the dominant ideologywith a new one. (Hogg & Abrams 1988, 181)

A critical component of minority group influence is intellectualconsistency (Moscovici 1976), and an important theme in the following willbe that Jewish-dominated intellectual movements have had a high degree ofinternal group cohesion and have often been typified by high levels ofingroup-outgroup thinking - a traditional aspect of Judaism. However,because these movements were intended to appeal to gentiles, they were forced tominimize any overt indication that Jewish group identity or Jewish groupinterests were important to the participants.

Such a result is also highly compatible with social identity theory: Theextent to which individuals are willing to be influenced depends on theirwillingness to accept the social category from which the divergent opinionderives. For Jews intent on influencing the wider society, overt Jewish groupidentity and overtly stated Jewish interests could only detract from the abilityof these movements to influence their intended targets. As a result, Jewishinvolvement in these movements was often actively concealed, and theintellectual structures themselves were phrased in universalist terms tominimize the importance of the social category of Jew-gentile.

Moreover, since one's willingness to accept influence depends on one'swillingness to identify with the stereotypical qualities of an ingroup, themovements not only were conceptualized in universalist terms, rather thanJewish particularist terms; they were also depicted as motivated only by thehighest moral and ethical standards. As Cuddihy (1974, 66n) notes, Jewishintellectuals developed a sense that Judaism had a "mission to theWest" in which corrupt Western civilization would be confronted by aspecifically Jewish sense of morality. To a considerable extent thesemovements constitute concrete examples of the ancient and recurrent Jewishself-conceptualization as a "light of the nations," reviewedextensively in S~ID (Ch. 7). This rhetoric of moral condemnation of the outgroupthus represents a secular version of the central pose of post-EnlightenmentJewish intellectuals that Judaism represents a moral beacon to the rest ofhumanity. But to exert their influence, they ¥vere forced to deny theimportance of specifically Jewish identity and interests at the heart of themovement.

The high degree of internal group cohesion characteristic of the movementsconsidered in this volume was accompanied by the development of theoriesthat not only possessed a great deal of internal intellectual consistency butalso, as in the case of psychoanalysis and radical political theory, couldtake

{p. 17} the form of hermeneutic systems able to accommodate any and allevents into their interpretive schemas. And although these movements soughtthe veneer of science, they inevitably controverted the fimdamental principlesof science as an individualistic inquiry into the nature of reality (see Ch. 6).Although the extent to which these intellectual and political movementsinfluenced gentile society cannot be assessed with certainty, the materialpresented in the following chapters is highly compatible with supposing that Jewish-dominatedintellectual movements were a critical factor (necessary condition) forthe triumph of the intellectual left in late twentieth-century Westernsocieties.

No evolutionist should be surprised at the implicit theory in all this,namely, that intellectual activities of all types may at bottom involveethnic warfare, any more than one should be surprised at the fact thatpolitical and religious ideologies typically reflect the interests of thoseholding them. The truly doubtful proposition for an evolutionist is whetherreal social science as a disinterested attempt to understand human behavior isat all possible.

This does not imply that all strongly identified Jewish social scientistsparticipated in the movements discussed in the following chapters. It impliesonly that Jewish identification and perceived Jewish interests were a powerfulmotivating force among those who led these movements and among many of theirfollowers. These scientist-activists had very strong Jewish identities. Theywere very concerned with anti-Semitism and self-consciously developed theoriesaimed at showing that Jewish behavior was irrelevant to antiSemitism whileat same time (in the case of psychoanalysis and the Frankfurt School) showingthat gentile ethnocentrism and participation in cohesive antiSemiticmovements were indications of psychopathology.

Collectively, these movements have called into question the fundamentalmoral, political, cultural, and economic foundations of Western society. It willbe apparent that these movements have also served various Jewish interests quitewell. It will also become apparent, however, that these movements have oftenconflicted with the cultural and ultimately genetic interests of importantsectors of the non-Jewish, European-derived peoples of late-twentieth-centuryEuropean and North American societies.


1. As indicated in SAID (p. 261), the AJCommittee's endeavor to portray Jewsas not overrepresented in radical movcments involved deception and perhapsselfdeception. Thc AJCommittec cngaged in intensive efforts to changc opinionwithin the Jewish community to attcmpt to show that Jewish intcrests werc morccompatiblc with advocating Amcrican democracy than Sovict communism (e.g..emphasizing Soviet anti-Scmitism and So~ iet support of nations opposed tolsracl in the period after World War 11) (Cohen 1972, 347ff).

{p. 18} 2. A similar phenomenon is apparent in the American movie industry,where anecdotal evidence indicates that gentiles sometimes attempt to presentthemselves as Jews in order to advance their careers in aJewish-dominated environment (see Cash 1994).

3. As anti-Semitism increased during the Weimar period, Jewish-owned liberalnewspapers began to suffer economic hardship because of public hostility to theethnic composition of the editorial boards and staffs (Mosse 1987, 371). Theresponse of Hans Lachman-Mosse was to "depoliticize his newspapers byfiring large numbers of Jewish editors and correspondents. Eksteins ( 1975, 229)suggests that the response was an attempt to deflect right-wing categorizationsof his newspapers as part of the Judenpresse.

4. A recent, perhaps trivial, example of this type of intellectual ethnicwarfare is the popular movie Addams Family Values (released in November 1993),produced by Scott Rudin, directed by Barry Sonnenfeld, and written by PaulRudnick. The bad guys in the movie are virtually anyone with blond hair (theexception being an overweight child), and the good guys include two Jewishchildren wearing yarmulkes. (Indeed, having blond hair is viewed as a pathology,so that when the dark-haired Addams baby temporarily becomes blond, there is afamily crisis.) The featured Jewish child has dark hair, wears glasses, and isphysically frail and nonathletic. He often makes precociously intelligentcomments, and he is severely punished by the blond-haired counselors for readinga highly intellectual book. The evil gentile children are the opposite: blond,athletic, and unintellectual. Together with other assorted dark-haired childrenfrom a variety of ethnic backgrounds and white gentile children rejected bytheir peers (for being overweight, etc.), the Jewish boy and the Addams familychildren lead a very violent movement that succeeds in destroying the blondenemy. The movie is a parable illustrating the general thrust of Jewishintellectual and political activity relating to immigration and multi-culturalismin Western societies (see Ch. 7). It is also consistent with the general thrustof Hollywood movies. SAID (Ch. 2) reviews data indicating Jewish domination ofthe entertainment industry in the United States. Powers, Rothman and Rothman(1996, 207) characterize television as promoting liberal, cosmopolitan values,and Lichter, Lichter and Rothman (1994, 251) find that television portrayscultural pluralism in positive terms and as easily achieved apart from theactivities of a few ignorant or bigoted miscreants.

5. Heller combines social criticism with a strong Jewish identity. In a talkdescribed in The Economist (March 18, 1995, p. 92), Heller is quoted as sayingthat "being Jewish informs everything I do. My books are getting more andmore Jewish."

6. The ellipsis is as follows: "Destruction of the Semitic principle,extirpation of the Jewish religion, whether in the Mosaic or in the Christianform, the natural equality of man and the abrogation of property, are proclaimedby the secret societies who form, provisional governments, and men of Jewishrace are found at the head of every one of them." Rather (1986) notes thatanti-Semites who believed in Jewish conspiracies often cited this passage aswell as the Protocols in support of their theories. He also points out, citingRoberts (1972), that Disraeli's view that events were controlled by vastinternational conspiracies was commonplace in the nineteenth century. Ratherlinks these beliefs with the secret society at the center of the psychoanalyticmovement (see Ch. 4) as well as with a secret society named "the sons ofMoshe" organized by the Zionist Ahad Ha'am (Asher Ginsberg) whose work isdiscussed in SAID (Ch. 5).

7. This passage was invoked by Lucien Wolf, secretary of the Conjoint ForeignCommittee of the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association, torationalize Jewish support for Russian revolutionary movementts (see Szajkowski1967, 9).

{p. 19} 8. The New Christian ideology implies that members of a highlycohesive, economically successful group are seeking to be judged as individualsrather than as members of a group by the surrounding society. It is ofinterest that the moral imperative of judging on the basis of individual meritwas also a theme in the work of nineteenth-century Jewish writer Michael Beer(see Kahn 1985, 122) and is a major theme of the contemporary neoconservativemovement of Jewish intellectuals. Beer was forced to disguise the identity ofhis protagonist (as a lower-caste Hindu) because his audience was unlikely toview an explicitly Jewish protagonist positively.

9. Castro's thesis is that economic and intellectual backwardness was theheavy price Spain paid for its successful resistance to the ideology ofindividual merit. As noted in SAID (Ch. 1), maladaptive ideologies can developin the context of group conflict because they provide a positive social identityin opposition to an outgroup. Thus Spain was unlikely to move toward anindividualist, post-Enlightenment society when the advocates of individualismwere viewed as covertly having allegiance to a highly cohesive group.

10. Paul Johnson (1988, 408) takes the view that Jewish iconoclasmsimply speeded up "changes that were coming anyway. The Jews werenatural iconoclasts. Like the prophets, they set about smiting and overturningall the idols of the conventional modes with skill and ferocious glee."Because it essentially trivializes the ultimate effects of Jewish intellectualefforts, such a view is inconsistent with Johnson's claim that the emergence ofJews into the mainstream of Western intellectual discourse was "an event ofshattering importance to world history" (pp. 340-341). Johnson offers noevidence for his view that the changes advocated by Jewish intellectuals wereinevitable. Surely traditional Judaism did not encourage iconoclasm within theJewish community (witness Spinoza's fate and the generally authoritarian natureof community controls in traditional Jewish society [PTSDA Ch. 8]). Nor didtraditional Jewish scholarship eneourage iconoclasm. Although Talmudicstudies definitely encouraged argumentation (pilpul; see PTSDA Ch. 7), thesediseussions were performed within a very narrowly prescribed range in whieh thebasic assumptions were not questioned. In the post-Enlightenment world,Jewish iconoclasm has clearly been much more directed at gentile culture than atJudaism, and evidence provided here and in the following chapters indicatesthat the iconoclasm was often motivated by hostility toward gentile culture.By Johnson's own account, both Marxism and psychoanalysis are unlikely tohave arisen from gentiles, since they both contain strong overtones of Jewishreligious thinking, and I would argue that psychoanalysis especially isunlikely to have arisen except as a tool in the war on gentile culture. Theresults are much more plausibly due to the generally higher verbal IQ among Jewsand their ability to form cohesive groups now directed at critiquing gentileculture rather than at comprehending the Torah and thereby achieving goodmarriages, financial success, and status within the Jewish community.

11. The comment referring to "solitary opposition" is disingenuous,since psychoanalysis from its origins was characterized by a strong groupconsciousness emanating from a committed core of members. Psychoanalysisitself energetically cultivated the image of Freud as a solitary hero-scientistbattling for truth against a biased intellectual establishment. See Chapter4.

{More of MacDonald's Culture of Critique: theJewish Communists of Poland}

{p. 69 Chater 3 Jews and the Left} Radicalism and Jewish Identification inthe United States and England

From the origins of the movement in the late nineteenth century, a strongsense of Jewish identification also characterized American Jewish radicals(e.g., the Union of Hebrew Trades and the Jewish Socialist Federation; see Levin1977; Liebman 1979). In Sorin's (1985) study of Jewish radicals whoimmigrated to the United States early in the twentieth century, only 7 percentwere hostile to any form of Jewish separatism. Over 70 percent "wereimbued with positive Jewish consciousness. The great majority were significantlycaught up in a web of overlapping institutions, affiliations, and Jewishsocial formations" (p. 119). Moreover, "at the very most" 26of 95 radicals were in Sorin's "hostile, ambivalent, or assimilationist"categories, but "in some if not all of the cases, these were personsstruggling, often creatively, to synthesize new identities" (p. 115). Amajor theme of this chapter is that a great many avowedly "de-racinated"Jewish radicals had self-deceptive images of their lack of Jewishidentification.

The following comment about a very prominent American Jewish radical, EmmaGoldman, illustrates the general trend:

The pages of the magazine Mother Earth that Emma Goldman edited from 1906to 1917 are filled with Yiddish stories, tales from the Talmud, andtranslations of Morris Rosenfeld's poetry. Moreover, her commitment to anarchismdid not divert her from speaking and writing, openly and frequently, about theparficular burdens Jews faced in a world in which antisemitism was a livingenemy. Apparently, Emma Goldman's faith in anarchism, with its emphasis onuniversalism, did not result from and was not dependent on a casting off ofJewish identity. (Sorin 1985, 8; italics in text)

Twentieth-century American Jewish radicalism was a specifically Jewishsubculture, or "contraculture" to use Arthur Liebman's (1979, 37)term. The American Jewish left never removed itself from the wider Jewishcommunity, and, indeed, membership of Jews in the movement fluctuateddepending on whether these movements clashed with specifically Jewish interests.

Fundamentally, the Jewish Old Left, including the unions, the leftist press,and the leftist fraternal orders (which were often associated with a synagogue [Liebman1979, 284]), were part of the wider Jewish community, and when the Jewishworking class declined, specifically Jewish concerns and identity gainedincreasing prominence as the importance of radical political beliefs declined.This tendency for Jewish members of leftist organizations to concern themselveswith specifically Jewish affairs increased after 1930 primarily because ofrecurring gaps between specific Jewish interests and universalist

{p. 70} leftist causes at that time. This phenomenon occurred within theentire spectrum of leftist organizations, including organizations such as theCommunist Party and the Socialist Party, whose membership also included gentiles(Liebman 1979, 267ff).

Jewish separatism in leftist movements was facilitated by a verytraditional aspect of Jewish separatism - the use of an ingroup language.Yiddish eventually became highly valued for its unifying effect on the Jewishlabor movement and its ability to cement ties to the wider Jewish community(Levin 1977, 210; Liebman 1979, 259-260). "The landsmanshaften [Jewishsocial clubs], the Yiddish press and theatre, East Side socialist cafes,literary societies and fereyns, which were so much a part of Jewish socialistculture, created an unmistakable Jewish milieu, which the shop, union, orSocialist party could not possibly duplicate. Even the class enemy - the Jewishemployer - spoke Yiddish" (Levin 1977, 210).

Indeed, the socialist educational program of the Workman's Circle (thelargest Jewish labor fraternal order in the early twentieth century) failed atfirst (prior to 1916) because of the absence of Yiddish and Jewish content:"Even radical Jewish parents wanted their children to learn Yiddish andknow something about their people" (Liebman 1979, 292). These schoolssucceeded when they began including a Jewish curriculum with a stress on Jewishpeoplehood. They persisted through the 940s as Jewish schools with a socialistideology which stressed the idea that a concern for social justice was the keyto Jewish survival in the modern world. Clearly, socialism and liberalpolitics had become a form of secular Judaism. The organization had beentransformed over its history "from a radical labor fraternal order withJewish members into a Jewish fraternal order with liberal sentiments and asocialist heritage" (Liebman 1979, 295).

Similarly, the communist-oriented Jewish subculture, including organizationssuch as the International Workers Order (IWO), included Yiddishspeakingsections. One such section, the Jewish Peoples Fraternal Order (JPFO), was anaffiliate of the American Jewish Congress (AJCongress) and was listed as asubversive organization by the U.S. Attorney General. The JPFO had 50,000members and was the financial and organizational "bulwark" of theCPUSA after World War II; it also provided critical funding for the Daily Workerand the Morning Freiheit (Svonkin 1997, 166). Consistent with the presentemphasis on the compatibility of communism-radicalism and Jewish identity, itfunded children's educational programs that promulgated a strong relationshipbetween Jewish identity and radical concerns. The IWO Yiddish schools andsummer camps, which continued into the 1960s, stressed Jewish culture and evenreinterpreted Marxism not as a theory of class struggle but as a theory ofstruggle for Jewish freedom from oppression. Although the AJCongresseventually severed its ties with the JPFO during the cold war period and statedthat communism was a threat, it was "at best a reluctant and unenthusiasticparticipant" (Svonkin 1997, 132) in the Jewish

{p. 71} effort to develop a public image of anti-communism - a positionreflecting the sympathies of many among its predominantly second- andthird-generation Eastern European immigrant membership. David Horowitz (1997,42) describes the world of his parents who had joined a "shul" run bythe CPUSA in which Jewish holidays were given a political interpretation.Psychologically these people might as well have been in eighteenth-centuryPoland:

What my parents had done in joining the Communist Party and moving toSunnyside was to return to the ghetto. There was the same shared privatelanguage, the same hermetically sealed universe, the same dual posturingrevealing one face to the outer world and another to the tribe. Moreimportantly, there was the same conviction of being marked for persecution andspecially ordained, the sense of moral superiority toward the strongerand more numerous goyim outside. And there was the same fear of expulsionfor heretical thoughts, which was the fear that riveted the chosen to the faith.

A strong sense of Jewish peoplehood was also characteristic of the leftistYiddish press. Thus a letter writer to the radical Jewish DailyForward complained that his nonreligious parents were upset because he wanted tomarry a non-Jew. "He wrote to the Forward on the presumption that he wouldfind sympathy, only to discover that the socialist and freethinkingeditors of the paper insisted . . . that it was imperative that he marrya Jew and that he continue to identify with the Jewish community.... [T]hosewho read the Forward knew that the commitment of Jews to remain Jewish wasbeyond question and discussion" (Hertzberg 1989, 211-212). The Forward hadthe largest circulation of any Jewish periodical in the world into the 1930s andmaintained close ties to the Socialist Party. Werner Cohn (1958, 621)describes the general milieu of the immigrant Jewish community from 1886 to 1920as "one big radical debating society":

By 1886 the Jewish community in New York had become conspicuous for itssupport of the third-party (United Labor) candidacy of Henry George, thetheoretician of the Smgle Tax. Erom then on Jewish districts in New York andelsewhere were famous for their radical voting habits. The Lower East Siderepeatedly picked as its congressman Meyer London, the only New York Socialistever to be elected to Congress And many Socialists went to the State Assembly inAlbany from Jewish districts In the 1917 mayoralty campaign in New York City,the Socialist and anti-war candidacy of Morris Hillquit was supported by themost authoritative voices of the Jewish Lower East Side: The United HebrewTrades, the Intemational Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, and most importantly,the very popular Yiddish Daily Forward This was the period in which extremeradicals - like Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman - were giants in the Jewishcommunity, and when almost all the Jewish giants - among them Abraham Cahan,Morris Hillquit, and the young Morris R Cohen - were radicals Even SamuelGompers, when speaking before Jewish audiences, felt it necessary to use radicalphrases.

{p. 72} In addition, The Freiheit, which was an unofficial organ of theCommunist Party from the 1920s to the 1950s, "stood at the center ofYiddish proletarian institutions and subculture . . . [which offered] identity,meaning, friendship, and understanding" (Liebman 1979, 349 350). Thenewspaper lost considerable support in the Jewish community in 1929 when it tookthe Communist Party position in opposition to Zionism, and by the 1950s itessentially had to choose between satisfying its Jewish soul or its status as acommunist organ. Choosing the former, by the late 1960s it was justifyingnot returning the Israeli-occupied territories in opposition to the line of theCPUSA.

The relationship of Jews and the CPUSA is particularly interesting becausethe party often adopted anti-Jewish positions, especially because of its closeassociation with the Soviet Union. Beginning in the late 1920s Jews played avery prominent role in the CPUSA (Klehr 1978, 37ff). Merely citing percentagesof Jewish leaders does not adequately indicate the extent of Jewish influence,however, because it fails to take account of the personal characteristics ofJewish radicals as a talented, educated and ambitious group (see pp. 5, 95-96),but also because efforts were made to recruit gentiles as "windowdressing" to conceal the extent of Jewish dominance (Klehr 1978, 40;Rothman & Lichter 1982, 99). Lyons (1982, 81) quotes a gentile Communist whosaid that many working-class gentiles felt that they were recruited in order to"diversify the Party's ethnic composition." The informant recounts hisexperience as a gentile representative at a communist-sponsored youthconference:

It became increasingly apparent to most partic!pants that virtually all ofthe speakers were Jewish New Yorkers. Speakers with thick New York accentswould identify themselves as "the delegate from the Lower East Side"or "the comrade from Brownsville." Finally the national leadershipcalled a recess to discuss what was becoming an embarrassment. How could asupposedly national student organization bc so totally dominated by New YorkJews? Finally, they resolved to intervene and remedy the situation by asking theNew York caucus to give "out-of-towners" a chance to speak. Theconvention was held in Wisconsin.

Klehr (1978, 40) estimates that from 1921 to 1961, Jews constituted 33.5percent of the Central Committee members, and the representation of Jews wasoften above 40 percent (Klehr 1978, 46). Jews were the only native-bom ethnicgroup from which the party was able to recruit. Glazer (1969, 129) states thatat least half of the CPUSA membership of around 50,000 were Jews into the 1950sand that the rate of turnover was very high; thus perhaps ten times that numberof individuals were involved in the party and there were "an equal orlarger number who were Socialists of one kind or another." Writing of the1920s, Buhle (1980, 89) notes that "most of those favorable to the partyand the Freiheit simply did not join - no more than a few thousand out of afollowing of a hundred times that large."

Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, who were convicted of spying for the SovietUnion, exemplify the powerful sense of Jewish identification among many

{p. 73} Jews on the left. Svonkin (1997, 158) shows that theyviewed themselves as Jewish martyrs. Like many other Jewish leftists, theyperceived a strong link between Judaism and their communist sympathies. Theirprison correspondence, in the words of one reviewer, was filled with a"continual display of Judaism and Jewishness," including the commentthat "in a couple of days, the Passover celebration of our people'ssearch for freedom will be here. This cultural heritage has an added meaningfor us, who are imprisoned away from each other and our loved ones by the modernPharaohs" (pp. 158-159). (Embarrassed by the self-perceptions of theRosenbergs as Jewish martyrs, the Anti-Defamation League [ADL] interpretedJulius Rosenberg's professions of Jewishness as an attempt to obtain "everypossible shred of advantage from the faith that he had repudiated" [Svonkin1997, 159] - another example of the many revisionist attempts, some recounted inthis chapter, to render incompatible Jewish identification and politicalradicalism and thus completely obscure an important chapter of Jewish history.)

As in the case of the Soviet Union in the early years, the CPUSA hadseparate sections for different ethnic groups, including a Yiddish-speakingJewish Federation. When these were abolished in 1925 in the interestsof developing a party that would appeal to native Americans (who tended to havea low level of ethnic consciousness), there was a mass exodus of Jews fromthe party, and many of those who remained continued to participate in anunofficial Yiddish subculture within the party.

In the following years Jewish support for the CPUSA rose and fell dependingon party support for specific Jewish issues. During the 1930s the CPUSA changedits position and took great pains to appeal to specific Jewish interests,including a primary focus against anti-Semitism, supporting Zionism andeventually Israel, and advocating the importance of maintaining Jewish culturaltraditions. As in Poland during this period, "The American radical movementglorified the development of Jewish life in the Soviet Union.... The SovietUnion was living proof that under socialism the Jewish question could be solved"(Kann 1981, 152-153). Communism was thus perceived as "good for Jews."Despite temporary problems caused by the Soviet-German nonaggression pact of1939, the result was an end to the CPUSA's isolation from the Jewish communityduring World War II and the immediate postwar years .

Interestingly, the Jews who remained within the party during the period ofthe nonaggression pact faced a difficult conflict between divided loyalties,indicating that Jewish identity was still important to these individuals. Thenonaggression pact provoked a great deal of rationalization on the part ofJewish CPUSA members, often involving an attempt to interpret the Soviet Union'sactions as actually benefiting Jewish interests - clearly an indication thatthese individuals had not given up their Jewish identities. 1l Others continuedto be members but silently opposed the party's line because of their Jewishloyalties. Of great concem for all of these individuals was that the

{p. 74} nonaggression pact was destroying their relationship with the widerJewish community.

At the time of the creation of Israel in 1948, part of the CPUSA's appeal toJews was due to its support for Israel at a time when Truman was waffling on theissue. In 1945 the CPUSA even adopted a resolution advocating thecontinuation of the Jewish people as an ethnic entity within socialistsocieties. Arthur Liebman describes CPUSA members during the perioc' asbeing elated because of the congruity of their Jewish interests and membershipin the party. Feelings of commonality with the wider Jewish community wereexpressed, and there was an enhanced feeling of Jewishness resulting frominteractions with other Jews within the CPUSA: During the postwar period"Communist Jews were expected and encouraged to be Jews, to relate to Jews,and to think of the Jewish people and the Jewish culture in a positive light. Atthe same time, non-Communist Jews, with some notable exceptions [in thenoncommunist Jewish left] . . . accepted their Jewish credentials and agreed towork with them in an all-Jewish context" (Liebman 1979, 514). As hashappened so often in Jewish history, this upsurge in Jewish self-identity wasfacilitated by the persecution of Jews, in this case the Holocaust.

This period of easy compatibility of Jewish interests with CPUSA interestsevaporated after 1948, especially because of the altered Soviet position onIsrael and revelations of state-sponsored anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union andEastern Europe. Many Jews abandoned the CPUSA as a result. Once again, thosewho remained in the CPUSA tended to rationalize Soviet antiSemitism in a waythat allowed them to maintain their Jewish identification. Some viewed thepersecutions as an aberration and the result of individual pathology rather thanthe fault of the communist system itself. Or the West was blamed as beingindirectly responsible. Moreover, the reasons for remaining in the CPUSA appearto have typically involved a desire to remain in the self-contained Yiddishcommunist subculture. Liebman (1979, 522) describes an individual who finallyresigned when the evidence on Soviet anti-Semitism became overwhelming: "In1958, after more than 25 years with the Communist party, this leader resignedand developed a strong Jewish identity which encompassed a fierce loyalty toIsrael." Alternatively, Jewish CPUSA members simply failed to adoptthe Soviet party line, as occurred on the issue of support for Israel during the1967 and 1973 wars. Eventually, there was virtually a complete severingof Jews from the CPUSA.

Lyons's (1982, 180) description of a Jewish-Communist club in Philadelphiareveals the ambivalence and self-deception that occurred when Jewish interestsclashed with communist sympathies.

The club . . . faced rising tension over Jewishness, especially as itrelated to Israel. In the mid-sixties conflict erupted over the club'sdecision to criticize Soviet treatment of Jews. Some orthodox pro-Soviet clubmembers resigned; others disagrccd but staved. Meanwhile the club continued tochange, becoming less Marxist and morc Zionist. During the 1967 Middle EastWar, "we got dogmatic, for one week" as Ben Green, a

{p. 75} club leader, puts it. They allowed no discussion on the merits ofsupporting Israel, but simply raised funds to show their full support.Nevertheless, several members insist that the club is not Zionist and engages in"critical support" of Israel.

As in the case of Poland, there is every reason to suppose that AmericanJewish Communists regarded the USSR as generally satisfying Jewish interests atleast until well into the post-World War II era. Beginning in the 1920s theCPUSA was financially supported by the Soviet Union, adhered closely to itspositions, and engaged in a successful espionage effort against the UnitedStates on behalf of the Soviet Union, including stealing atomic secrets (Klehr,Haynes & Firsov 1995) 12 In the 1930s Jews "constituted a substantialmajority of known members of the Soviet underground in the United States"and almost half of the individuals prosecuted under the Smith Act of 1947(Rothman & Lichter 1982, 100).

Although all party functionaries may not have known the details of thespecial relationship with the Soviet Union, 'special work' [i.e., espionage] waspart and parcel of the Communist mission in the United States, and this was wellknown and discussed openly in the CPUSA's Political Bureau.... [I]t was theseordinary Communists whose lives demonstrate that some rank-and-file members werewilling to serve the USSR by spying on their own country. There but for thegrace of not being asked went other American Communists. The CPUSA showeredhosannas on the USSR as the promised land. In Communist propaganda the survivalof the Soviet Union as the one bright, shining star of humankind was a constantrefrain, as in the 1934 American Communist poem that described the Soviet Unionas "a heaven . . . brought to earth in Russia." (Klehr et al. 1995,324)

Klehr et al. (1995, 325) suggest that the CPUSA had important effects on U.S.history. Without excusing the excesses of the anti-communist movement, they notethat "the peculiar and particular edge to American anticommunism cannot besevered from the CPUSA's allegiance to the Soviet Union; the belief thatAmerican communists were disloyal is what made the communist issue so powerfuland at times poisonous."

Communists lied to and deceived the New Dealers with whom they were allied.Those liberals who believed the denials then denounced as mudslingers thoseanti-Communists who complained of concealed Communist activity. Furious atdenials of what they knew to be true, anti-Communists then suspected that thosewho denied the Communist presence were themselves dishonest. The Communists'duplicity poisoned normal political relationships and contributed to theharshness of the anti-Communist reaction of the late 1940s and 1950s. (Klehr etal. 1995, 106)

The liberal defense of communism during the Cold War era also raises issuesrelated to this volume. Nicholas von Hoffman ( 1996) notes the role of theliberal defenders of communism during this period, such as the editors of The Ne~Repl(blic and Harvard historian Richard Hofstadter (1965) who attributed

{p. 76} the contemporary concem with communist infiltration of the U.S.government to the "paranoid style of American politics." (Rothman andLichter [1982, 105] include The New Republic as among a group of liberal andradical publications with a large presence of Jewish writers and editors.) Theofficial liberal version was that American Communists were sui generis andunconnected to the Soviet Union, so there was no domestic communist threat. Theliberals had seized the intellectual and moral high ground during this period.Supporters of McCarthy were viewed as intellectual and cultural primitives:"In the ongoing kulturkampf dividing the society, the elites ofHollywood, Cambridge and liberal thank-tankery had little sympathy forbow-legged men with their American Legion caps and their fat wives, theiryapping about Yalta and the Katyn Forest. Catholic and kitsch, looking outof their picture windows at their flock of pink plastic flamingos, the lowermiddles and their foreign policy anguish were too infra dig to be takenseriously" (von Hoffman 1996, C2).

However, besides poisoning the atmosphere of domestic politics, communistespionage had effects on foreign policy as well:

It is difficult to overstate the importance of Soviet atomic espionage inshaping the history of the Cold War. World War Il had ended with Americansconfident that the atomic bomb gave them a monopoly on the ultimate weapon, amonopoly expected to last ten to twenty years. The Soviet explosion of a nuclearbomb in 1949 destroyed this sense of physical security. America had fought intwo world wars without suffering serious civilian deaths or destruction. Now itfaced an enemy led by a ruthless dictator who could wipe out any American citywith a single bomb. Had the American nuclear monopoly lasted longer, Stalinmight have refused to allow North Korean Communists to launch the Korean War, orthe Chinese Communists might have hesitated to intervene in the war. Had theAmerican nuclear monopoly lasted until Stalin's death, the restraint on Sovietaggressiveness might have alleviated the most dangerous years of the Cold War.(Klehr et al. 1995, 106)

The Jewish "contraculture" continued to sustain a radical,specifically Jewish subculture into the 1950s - long after the great majority ofJews were no longer in the working class (Liebman 1979, 206, 289ff). Thefundamentally Jewish institutions and families that constituted the Old Leftthen fed into the New Left (Liebman 1979, 536ff). The original impetus of the1960s student protest movement "almost necessanly began with the scions ofthe relatively well-to-do, liberal-to-left, disproportionately Jewishintelligentsia the largest pool of those ideologically disposed to sympathizewith radical student action in the population" (Lipset 1971, 83; see alsoGlazer 1969). Flacks (1967, 64) found that 45 percent of studentsinvolved in a protest at the University of Chicago were Jewish, but his originalsample was "'adjusted' to obtain better balance" (Rothman &Lichter 1982, 82). Jews constituted 80 percent of the students signing apetition to end ROTC at Harvard and 30-50 percent of the Students for aDemocratic Society (SDS) - the central organization of student

{p. 77} radicals. Adelson (1972) found that 90 percent of his sample ofradical students at the University of Michigan were Jewish, and it wouldappear that a similar rate of participation is likely to have occurred at otherschools, such as Wisconsin and Minnesota. Braungart (1979) found that 43 percentof the SDS membership in his sample of ten universities had at least one Jewishparent and an additional 20 percent had no religious affiliation. The latter aremost likely to be predominantly Jewish: Rothrnan and Lichter (1982, 82) foundthat the "overwhelming majority" of the radical students whoclaimed that their parents were atheists had Jewish backgrounds.

Jews also tended to be the most publicized leaders of campus protests (Sachar1992, 804). Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, and Rennie Davis achieved nationalfame as members of the "Chicago Seven" group convicted of crossingstate lines with intent to incite a riot at the 1968 Democratic NationalConvention. Cuddlhy (1974, 193ff) notes the overtly ethnic subplot of the trial,particularly the infighting between defendant Abbie Hoffman and Judge JuliusHoffman, the former representing the children of the Eastern European immigrantgeneration that tended toward political radicalism, and the latter representingthe older, more assimilated German-Jewish establishment. During the trial AbbieHoffman ridiculed Judge Hoffman in Yiddish as "Shande fur de Goyim"(disgrace for the gentiles) - translated by Abbie Hoffman as "Frontman for the WASP power elite." Clearly Hoffman and Rubin (who spenttime on a Kibbutz in Israel) had strong Jewish identifications and antipathy tothe white Protestant establishment. Cuddihy (1974, 191-192) also credits theorigins of the Yippie movement to the activities of the underground journalistPaul Krassner (publisher of The Realist, a "daring, scatological, curiouslyapolitical" journal of "irreverent satire and impolitereportage") and the countercultural sensibility of comedian Lenny Bruce. Asa group, radical students came from relatively well-to-do families, whereasconservative students tended to come from less affluent families (Gottfried1993, 53). The movement was therefore initiated and led by an elite, butit was not aimed at advancing the interests of the unionized lower middle class.Indeed, the New Left regarded the working class as "fat, contented, andconservative, and their trade unions reflected them" (Glazer 1969,123).

Moreover, although mild forms of Jewish anti-Semitism and rebellion againstparental hypocrisy did occur among Jewish New Left radicals, the predominantpattern was a continuity with parental ideology (Flacks 1967; Glazer 1969, 12;Lipset 1988, 393; Rothman & Lichter 1982, 82). (Similarly, during the Weimarperiod the Frankfurt School radicals rejected their parents' commercial valuesbut did not personally reject their family. Indeed, their families tended toprovide moral and financial support for them in their radical politicalactivities [Cuddihy 1974, 154].) Many of these "red diaper babies"came from "families which around the breakfast table, day after day inScarsdale~ Newton, Great Neck, and Beverly Hills have discussed what an

{p. 78} awful, corrupt, immoral, undemocratic, racist society the UnitedStates is. Many Jewish parents live in the lily-white suburbs, go to MiamiBeach in the winter, belong to expensive country clubs, arrange Bar Mitzvahscosting thousands of dollars - all the while espousing a left-liberal ideology"(Lipset 1988, 393). As indicated above, Glazer (1969) estimates thatapproximately 1 million Jews were members of the CPUSA or were socialists priorto 1950. The result was that among Jews there was "a substantial reservoirof present-day parents for whose children to be radical is not somethingshocking and strange but may well be seen as a means of fulfilling the bestdrives of their parents" (Glazer 1969, 129).

Moreover, the "American Jewish establishment never really distanceditself from these young Jews" (Hertzberg 1989, 369). Indeed, establishmentJewish organizations, including the AJCongress, the Union of American HebrewCongregations (a lay Reform group), and the Synagogue Council of America(Winston 1978), were prominent early opponents of the war in Vietnam. Theanti-war attitudes of official Jewish organizations may have resulted in someanti-Semitism. President Lyndon Johnson was reported to be "disturbed bythe lack of support for the Vietnam war in the American Jewish community at atime when he is taking new steps to aid Israel" (in Winston 1978, 198), andthe ADL took steps to deal with an anti-Jewish backlash they expected to occuras a result of Jews tending to be hawks on military matters related to Israeland doves on military matters related to Vietnam (Winston 1978).

As with the Old Left, many of the Jewish New Left strongly identified asJews (Liebman 1979, 536ff). Chanukah services were held and the "Hatikvah"(the Israeli national anthem) was sung during an important sit-in at Berkeley(Rothman & Lichter 1982, 81). The New Left lost Jewish members when itadvocated positions incompatible with specific Jewish interests (especiallyregarding Israel) and attracted members when its positions coincided with theseinterests (Liebman 1979, 527ff). Leaders often spent time at Kibbutzim inIsrael, and there is some indication that New Leftists consciously attempted tominimize the more overt signs of Jewish identity and to minimize discussion ofissues on which Jewish and non-Jewish New Leftists would disagree, particularlyIsrael. Eventually the incompatibility of Jewish interests and the New Leftresulted in most Jews abandoning the New Left, with many going to Israel tojoin kibbutzim, becoming involved in more traditional Jewish religiousobservances, or becoming involved in leftist organizations with a specificallyJewish identity. After the 1967 Six-Day War, the most important issue for theJewish New Left was Israel, but the movement also worked on behalf of SovietJews and demanded Jewish studies programs at universities (Shapiro 1992,225). As SDS activist, Jay Rosenberg, wrote, "From this point on I shalijoin no movement that does not accept and support my people's struggle. If Imust choose between the Jewish cause and a 'progressive' anti-Israel SDS, Ishall choose the Jewish cause. If barricades are erected, I will fight as aJew" (in Sachar 1992, 808).

{p. 79} Jews were also a critical component of the public acceptance of theNew Left. Jews were overrepresented among radicals and their supporters in themedia, the university, and the wider intellectual community, and Jewish leftistsocial scientists were instrumental in conducting research that portrayedstudent radicalism in a positive light (Rothman & Lichter 1982, 104).However, in their recent review of the literature on the New Left, Rothman andLichter ( 1996, ix, xiii) note a continuing tendency to ignore the role ofJews in the movement and that when the Jewish role is mentioned, it isattributed to Jewish idealism or other positively valued traits. Cuddihy(1974, 194n) notes that the media almost completely ignored the Jewishinfighting that occurred during the Chicago Seven trial. He also describesseveral evaluations of the trial written by Jews in the media (New York Times,New York Post, Village Voice) that excused the behavior of the defendants andpraised their radical Jewish lawyer, William Kunstler.

Finally, a similar ebb and flow of Jewish attraction to communismdepending on its convergence with specifically Jewish interests occurred also inEngland. During the 1930s the Communist Party appealed to Jews partlybecause it was the only political movement that was stridently anti-fascist.There was no conflict at all between a strong Jewish ethnic identity and being amember of the Communist Party: "Communist sympathy among Jews of thatgeneration had about it some of the qualities of a group identification, ameans, perhaps, of ethnic self-assertion" (Alderrnan 1992, 317-318). In thepost-World War II period, virtually all the successful communist politicalcandidates represented Jewish wards. However, Jewish support for communismdeclined with the revelation of Stalin's anti-Semitism, and many Jews leftthe Communist Party after the Middle East crisis of 1967 when the USSR brokeoff diplomatic relations with Israel (Alderrnan 1983, 162).

The conclusion must be that Jewish identity was generally perceived to behighly compatible with radical politics. When radical politics came in conflictwith specific Jewish interests, Jews eventually ceased being radical, althoughthere were often instances of ambivalence and rationalization.


One view of Jewish radicalism emphasizes the moral basis of Judaism. This isyet another example of the attempt to portray Judaism as a universalist, morallysuperior movement - the "light of the nations" theme that hasrepeatedly emerged as an aspect of Jewish self-identity since antiquity andespecially since the Enlightenment (S~ID, Ch. 7). Thus Fuchs (1956, 190 191)suggests that the Jewish involvement in liberal causes stems from the uniquemoral nature of Judaism in inculcating charity towards the poor and needy.Involvement in these causes is viewed as simply an extension of traditionalJewish religious practices. Similarly, Hertzberg (1985, 22) writes of "theecho of a

{p. 80} unique moral sensibility, a willingness to act in disregard ofeconomic interest when the cause seems just." {Yet Benjamin Ginsberg writesin The Fatal Embrace, "That fully three-fourths of America's foreign aidbudget is devoted to Israel's security interests is a tribute inconsiderable measure to the lobbying prowess of AIPAC and the importance of theJewish community in American politics" (p. 2). Jews are either deceivingthemselves about their unique moral sensibility, or deceiving Gentiles.}

As indicated in PTSDA (Chs. 5, 6), there is every indication thattraditional Jewish concern for the poor and needy was confined within Jewishgroups, and in fact Jews have often served oppressive ruling elites intraditional societies and in post-World War II Eastern Europe. Ginsberg (1993,140) describes these putative humanistic motivations as "a bitfanciful," and notes that in different contexts (notably in thepostrevolutionary Soviet Union) Jews have organized "ruthless agencies ofcoercion and terror," including especially a very prominent involvement inthe Soviet secret police from the postrevolutionary period into the 1930s (seealso Baron 1975, 170; Lincoln 1989; Rapoport 1990, 30-31). Similarly, we haveseen that Jews were very prominent in the domestic security forces in Poland(see Schatz 1991, 223-228) and Hungary (Rothman & Lichter 1982, 89).

Pipes (1993, 112) theorizes that although it is "undeniable" thatJews were overrepresented in the Bolshevik party and the early Soviet governmentas well as communist revolutionary activities in Hungary, Germany, and Austriain the period from 1918 to 1923, Jews were also overrepresented in a variety ofother areas, including business, art, literature, and science. As a result,Pipes argues that their disproportionate representation in communist politicalmovements should not be an issue. Pipes couples this argument with the assertionthat Jewish Bolsheviks did not identify as Jews - an issue that, as we haveseen, is questionable at best.

However, even assuming that these ethnically Jewish communists did notidentify as Jews, such an argument fails to explain why such "de-ethnicized"Jews (as well as Jewish businessmen, artists, writers and scientists) shouldhave typically been overrepresented in leftist movements and underrepresented innationalist, populist, and other types of rightist political movements: Even ifnationalist movements are anti-Semitic, as has often been the case,anti-Semitism should be irrelevant if these individuals are indeed completelydeethnicized as Pipes proposes. Jewish prominence in occupations requiring highintelligence is no argument for understanding their very prominent role incommunist and other leftist movements and their relative underrepresentation innationalist movements.

Social identity theory provides a quite different perspective on Jewishradicalism. It stresses that perceived Jewish group interests are fundamentalto Jewish political behavior, and that these perceived group interests areimportantly influenced by social identity processes. If indeed radicalpolitics resulted in a strong sense of identification with a Jewish ingroup,then Jewish involvement in these movements would be associated with verynegative and exaggerated conceptions of the wider gentile society, andparticularly the most powerful elements of that society, as an outgroup. Inconformity with this expectation, Liebman (1979, 26) uses the term "contraculture"to describe the American Jewish left because "conflict with or antagonismtoward society is a

{p. 81} central feature of this subculture and . . . many of its values andcultural patterns are contradictions of those existing in the surroundingsociety." For example, the New Left was fundamentally involved in radicalsocial criticism in which all elements that contributed to the cohesivesocial fabric of midcentury America were regarded as oppressive and in need ofradical alteration.

The emphasis here on social identity processes is compatible with Jewishradicalism serving particular perceived Jewish group interests. Anti-Semitismand Jewish economic interests were undoubtedly important motivating factors forJewish leftism in czarist Russia. Jewish leaders in Western societies, manyof whom were wealthy capitalists, proudly acknowledged Jewish overrepresentationin the Russian revolutionary movement; they also provided financial andpolitical support for these movements by, for example, attemptingto influence U.S. foreign policy (Szajkowski 1967). Representative of thisattitude is financier Jacob Schiff's statement that "the claim that amongthe ranks of those who in Russia are seeking to undermine governmental authoritythere are a considerable number of Jews may perhaps be true. In fact, it wouldbe rather surprising if some of those so terribly afflicted by persecution andexceptional laws should not at last have turned against their mercilessoppressors" (in Szajkowski 1967, 10).

Indeed, at the risk of oversimplification, one might note that anti-Semitismand economic adversity combined with the Jewish demographic explosion in EasternEurope were of critical importance for producing the sheer numbers ofdisaffected Jewish radicals and therefore the ultimate influence of Jewishradicalism in Europe and its spillover into the United States. Jewishpopulations in Eastern Europe had the highest rate of natural increase of anyEuropean population in the nineteenth century, with a natural increase of120,000 per year in the 1880s and an overall increase within the Russian Empirefrom 1 to 6 million in the course of the nineteenth century (Alderman 1992, 112;Frankel 1981, 103; Lindemann 1991, 28-29, 133-135). Despite the emigration ofclose to 2 million Jews to the United States and elsewhere, many EasternEuropean Jews were impoverished at least in part because of czarist anti-Jewishpolicies that prevented Jewish upward mobility.

As a result, a great many Jews were attracted to radical political solutionsthat would transform the economic and political basis of society and would alsobe consistent with the continuity of Judaism. Within Russian Jewish communities,the acceptance of radical political ideology often coexisted with messianicforms of Zionism as well as intense commitment to Jewish nationalism andreligious and cultural separatism, and many individuals held various and oftenrapidly changing combinations of these ideas (see Frankel 1981).

Religious fanaticism and messianic expectations have been a typical Jewishresponse to anti-Semitic persecutions throughout history (e.g., Scholem 1971;PTSD~, Ch. 3). Indeed, one might propose that messianic forms of politicalradicalism may be viewed as secular forms of this Jewish response topersecution, different from traditional forms only in that they also promise autopian

{p. 84} Even successful Jewish capitalists have tended to adopt politicalbeliefs to the left of the beliefs of their gentile counterparts. Forexample, German-Jewish capitalists in the nineteenth century "tended totake up positions distinctly to the 'left' of their Gentile peers and thus toplace themselves in isolation from them" (Mosse 1989, 225). Although as agroup they tended to be to the right of the Jewish population as a whole, a feweven supported the Social Democratic Party and its socialist program. Among theplausible reasons for this state of affairs suggested by Mosse is thatanti-Semitism tended to be associated with the German Right. Consistent withsocial identity theory, Jewish capitalists did not identify with groups thatperceived them negatively and identified with groups that opposed an outgroupperceived as hostile. Social identity processes and their influence onperception of ethnic (group) interests rather than economic self-interestappears to be paramount here.

The association between Jews and liberal political attitudes is thereforeindependent of the usual demographic associations. In a passage that shows that Jewishcultural and ethnic estrangement supersedes economic interests in explainingJewish political behavior, Silberman (1985, 347-348) comments on theattraction of Jews to "the Democratic party . . . with its traditionalhospitality to non-WASP ethnic groups.... A distinguished economist who stronglydisagreed with [presidential candidate Walter] Mondale's economic policies votedfor him nonetheless. 'I watched the conventions on television,' he explained,'and the Republicans did not look like my kind of people.' That same reactionled many Jews to vote for Carter in 1980 despite their dislike of him; 'I'drather live in a country governed by the faces I saw at the Democraticconvention than by those I saw at the Republican convention,' a well-knownauthor told me."

The suggestion is that in general Jewish political motivation is influencedby non-economic issues related to perceived Jewish group interests, the latterinfluenced by social identity processes. Similarly in the politically chargedarea of cultural attitudes, Silberman (1985, 350) notes "American Jewsare committed to cultural tolerance because of their belief - one firmlyrooted in history - that Jews are safe only in a society acceptant of a widerange of attitudes and behaviors, as well as a diversity of religious and ethnicgroups. It is this belief, for example, not approval of homosexuality,that leads an overwhelming majority of American Jews to endorse 'gay rights' andto take a liberal stance on most other so-called 'social' issues."A perceived Jewish group interest in cultural pluralism transcends negativepersonal attitudes regarding the behavior in question.

Silberman's comment that Jewish attitudes are "firmly rooted inhistory" is particularly relevant: A consistent tendency has been forJews to be persecuted as a minority group within a culturally or ethnicallyhomogeneous society. A discussion of the politlcal, religious, and culturalpluralism as a very rational motivation for American Jews will be highlighted inChapter 7, which dis-

{p. 85} cusses Jewish involvement in shaping U.S. immigration policy. Thepoint here is that the perceived Jewish group interest in developing apluralistic society is of far more importance than mere economic self-interestin determining Jewish political behavior. Similarly Earl Raab ( 1996, 44)explains Jewish political behavior in terms of security issues related in partto a long memory of the Republican Party as linked to Christian fundamentalismand its history of being "resolutely nativist and anti-immigrant." Thepattern of supporting the Democratic Party is therefore an aspect of ethnicconflict between Jews and sectors of the European-derived Caucasian populationin the United States, not economic issues. Indeed, economic issues appear tohave no relevance at all, since support for the Democratic Party among Jews doesnot differ by social status (Raab 1996, 45).

Nevertheless, there is evidence that recent Jewish voting behaviorincreasingly separates the traditional economic left-liberalism from issuesrelated to cultural pluralism, immigration, and church-state separation. Recentpolls and data on Jewish voting patterns indicate that Jews continue to view theright wing of the Republican Party as "a threat to Americancosmopolitanism" because it is perceived as advocating a homogeneousChristian culture and is opposed to immigration (Beinart 1997, 25). However,Jewish voters were more supportive of conservative fiscal policies and lesssupportive of government attempts to redistribute wealth than either AfricanAmericans or other white Americans. Recent Jewish political behavior is thusself-interested both economically and in its opposition to the ethnic interestsof white Americans to develop an ethnically and culturally homogeneous society.

In addition to the pursuit of specific group interests, however, socialidentity processes appear to make an independent contribution to explainingJewish political behavior. Social identity processes appear to be necessary forexplaining why the Jewish labor movement was far more radical than the rest ofthe American labor movement. In a passage that indicates Jewish radicals'profound sense of Jewish identity and separatism as well as complete antipathyto the entire gentile social order, Levin (1977, 213) notes that "theirsocialist ideas . . . created a gulf between themselves and other Americanworkers who were not interested in radical changes in the social order. AlthoughJewish trade unions joined the AFL, they never felt ideologically at home there,for the AFL did not seek a radical transformation of society, nor was itinternationalist in outlook." We have also noted that the New Leftcompletely abandoned the aims and interests of the lower middle working classonce that group had essentially achieved its social aims with the success of thetrade union movement.

Again, there is the strong suggestion that social criticism and feelings ofcultural estrangement among Jews have deep psychological roots that reach farbeyond particular economic or political interests. As indicated in Chapter 1,one critical psychological component appears to involve a very deep antipathy tothe entire gentile-dominated social order, which is viewed as anti-

{p. 86} Semitic - the desire for "malignant vengeance" thatDisraeli asserted made many Jews "odious and so hostile to mankind."Recall Lipset's (1988, 393) description of the many Jewish "families whicharound the breakfast table, day after day, in Scarsdale, Newton, Great Neck, andBeverly Hills have discussed what an awful, corrupt, immoral, undemocratic,racist society the United States is." These families clearly perceivethemselves as separate from the wider culture of the United States; they alsoview conservative forces as attempting to maintain this malignant culture. As inthe case of traditional Judaism vis-a-vis gentile society, the traditionalculture of the United States - and particularly the political basis of culturalconservatism that has historically been associated with anti-Semitism - isperceived as a manifestation of a negatively evaluated outgroup.

This antipathy toward gentile-dominated society was often accompanied by apowerful desire to avenge the evils of the old social order. For many Jewish NewLeftists "the revolution promises to avenge the sufferings and to rightthe wrongs which have, for so long, been inflicted on Jews with thepermission or encouragement, or even at the command of, theauthorities in prerevolutionary societies" (Cohen 1980, 208).Interviews with New Left Jewish radicals revealed that many had destructivefantasies in which the revolution would result in "humiliation,dispossession, imprisonment or execution of the oppressors" (Cohen 1980,208) combined with the belief in their own omnipotence and their ability tocreate a nonoppressive social order - findings that are reminiscent of themotivating role of revenge for anti-Semitism among the Jewish-dominated securityforces in communist Poland discussed above. These findings are also entirelyconsistent with my experience among Jewish New Left activists at the Universityof Wisconsin in the 1960s (see note 13).

The social identity perspective predicts that generalized negativeattributions of the outgroup would be accompanied by positive attributionsregarding the Jewish ingroup. Both Jewish communists in Poland and Jewish NewLeft radicals had a powerful feeling of cultural superiority that was continuouswith traditional Jewish conceptions of the superiority of their ingroup (Cohen1980, 212; Schatz 1991, 119). Jewish self-conceptualizations of their activityin developing an adversarial culture in the United States tended to emphasizeeither the Jew as the historical victim of gentile anti-Semitism or the Jew asmoral hero, but "in both cases the portrait is the obverse of that of theantiSemite. Jews lack warts. Their motives are pure, their idealism genuine"(Rothman & Lichter 1982, 112). Studies of Jewish radicals by Jewish socialscientists have tended to gratuitously attribute Jewish radicalism to a"free choice of a gifted minority" (Rothman & Lichter 1982,118) when economic explanations failed - yet another example where Jewish groupstatus appears to affect social science research in a manner that serves Jewishgroup interests.

Moreover, a universalist utopian ideology such as Marxism is an ideal vehiclefor serving Jewish attempts to develop a positive self-identity while stillretaining their positive identity as Jews and their negative evaluation ofgentile

{p. 87} power structures. First, the utopian nature of radical ideology incontrast to existing gentile-dominated social systems (which areinevitably less than perfect) facilitates development of a positive identityfor the ingroup. Radical ideology thus facilitates positive group identityand a sense of moral rectitude because of its advocacy of universalist ethicalprinciples. Psychologists have found that a sense of moral rectitude is animportant component of self-esteem (e.g., Harter 1983), and self-esteem has beenproposed as a motivating factor in social identity processes (SAID, Ch. 1).

As was also true of psychoanalysis, leftist political movements developedredemptive-messianic overtones highly conducive to ingroup pride and loyalty.Members of the Russian Jewish Bund and their progeny in the United States hadintense personal pride and a powerful sense that they were "part of a moraland political vanguard for great historical change. They had a mission thatinspired them and people who believed in them" (Liebman 1979, 133).

This sense of ingroup pride and messianic fervor is undoubtedly a criticalingredient of Judaism in all historical eras. As Schatz (1991, 105) notes in hisdescription of the underground Jewish communist revolutionaries in Poland duringthe interwar period, "The movement was . . . part of a worldwide,international struggle for nothing less than the fundamental change of the veryfoundations of human society. The joint effect of this situation was aspecific sense of revolutionary loneliness and mission, an intense cohesion,a feeling of brotherhood, and a readiness for personal sacrifice on the altar ofstruggle." What distinguished Jewish communists from other communistswas not only their desire for a postrevolutionary world without anti-Semitism,but also their "distinct [emotional] intensity with roots in messianiclongings" (Schatz 1991, 140). As one respondent said, "I believedin Stalin and in the party as my father believed in the Messiah" (inSchatz 1991, 140).

Reflecting traditional Jewish social structure, these Jewish radicalgroups were hierarchical and highly authoritarian, and they developed their ownprivate language (Schatz 1991, 109-112). As in traditional Judaism,continuing study and self-education were viewed as very important features ofthe movement: "To study was a point of honor and an obligation" (p.117). The discussions replicated the traditional methods of Torah study:memorization of long passages of text combined with analysis and interpretationcarried out in an atmosphere of intense intellectual competition quite analogousto the traditional pilpul. In the words of a novice to these discussions, "Webehaved like yeshiva bukhers [students] and they [the more experiencedintellectual mentors] like rabbis" (p. 139).

As expected on the basis of social identity theory, there was also a highlevel of ingroup-outgroup thinking characterized by a lofty sense of moralrectitude among the ingroup combined with an implacable hostility and rejectionof the outgroup. In the period after World War II, for example, thePolish-Jewish communists viewed the new economic plan in truly mystical terms.[It was] a scientifically conceived, infallible scheme that would totally

{p. 88} restructure societal relations and prepare the country forsocialism" (Schatz 1991, 249). The economic difficulties that befell thepopulation merely resulted in transferring their hopes to the future,while at the same time they developed "an uncompromising attitude towardthose who might not be willing to accept the hardships of thepresent and a merciless hostility toward those perceived as the enemy.Thus the burning will to produce general harmony and happiness was married todistrust and suspiciousness regarding its objects and a hatred toward itsactual, potential, or imagined opponents" (p. 250).

Clearly, to be a communist revolutionary was to develop an intense commitmentto a cohesive authoritarian group that valued intellectual accomplishments andexhibited intense hatred against enemies and outgroups while having verypositive feelings toward an ingroup viewed as morally and intellectuallysuperior. These groups operated as embattled minorities that viewed thesurrounding society as hostile and threatening. Being a member of such agroup required a great deal of personal sacrifice and even altruism. All theseattributes can be found as defining features of more traditional Jewish groups.

Further evidence of the importance of social identity processes may be foundin Charles Liebman's (1973, 153ff) suggestion that leftist universalist ideologyallows Jews to subvert traditional social categorizations in which Jews areviewed in negative terms. The adoption of such ideologies by Jews is an attemptto overcome Jewish feelings of alienation "from the roots and thetraditions of [gentile] society" (p. 153). "The Jew continues hissearch for an ethic or ethos which is not only universal or capable ofuniversality, but which provides a cutting edge against the older traditions ofthe society, a search whose intensity is compounded and reinforced by theGentile's treatment of the Jew" (Liebman 1973, 157). Such attempts atsubverting negative social categorizations imposed by an outgroup are a centralaspect of social identity theory (Hogg & Abrams 1988; see SAID, Ch. 1).

The universalist ideology thus functions as a secular form of Judaism.Sectarian forms of Judaism are rejected as "a survival strategy" (Liebman1973, 157) because of their tendency to produce anti-Semitism, their lack ofintellectual appeal in the post-Enlightenment world, and their ineffectivenessin appealing to gentiles and thereby altering the gentile social world in amanner that furthers Jewish group interests. Indeed, while the universalistideology is formally congruent with Enlightenment ideals, the retention oftraditional Jewish separatism and patterns of association among thoseespousing the ideology suggest an element of deception orself-deception:

Jews prefer to get together with other Jews to promote ostensiblynon-Jewish enterprises (which assist Jewish acceptance), and then to pretendthe whole mattcr has nothing to do with being Jewish But this type of activityis most prevalent among Jews who are the most estranged from their owntraditions and hence most concerned with finding a value that supports Jewishacceptance without overtly destroying Jewish group ties. (Liebman 197~, 159)

{p. 89} The universalist ideology therefore allows Jews to escape theiralienation or estrangement from gentile society while nevertheless allowing forthe retention of a strong Jewish identity. Institutions that promote groupties among gentiles (such as nationalism and traditional gentilereligious associations) are actively opposed and subverted, while thestructural integrity of Jewish separatism is maintained. A consistent threadof radical theorizing since Marx has been a fear that nationalism could serve asa social cement that would result in a compromise between the social classes andresult in a highly unified social order based on hierarchical but harmoniousrelationships between existing social classes. This is only this type ofhighly cohesive gentile social organization that is fundamentally at odds withJudaism as a group evolutionary strategy (see Chs. 5, 7, 8). Both the OldLeft and the New Left, as noted, actively attempted to subvert thecohesiveness of gentile social structure, including especially the modus viveniachieved between business and labor by the 1960s {Trotskyists branded this"Capitalism", and instead promotedFree Trade}. And we have seen that the Jewish-dominated Polish communistgovernment campaigned actively against Polish nationalism, and they campaignedagainst the political and cultural power of the Catholic Church, the main forceof social cohesion in traditional Polish society.

Finally, as emphasized by Rothman and Lichter (1982, 119), Marxism isparticularly attractive as the basis for an ideology that subverts the negativesocial categorizations of the gentile outgroup because within such anideology the Jewish-gentile categorization becomes less salient while Jewishgroup cohesion and separatism may nevertheless persist: "By adoptingvariants of Marxist ideology, Jews deny the reality of cultural or religiousdifferences between Jews and Christians. These differences become'epiphenomenal,' compared to the more fundamental opposition of workers andcapitalists. Thus Jews and non-Jews are really brothers under the skin. Evenwhen not adopting a Marxist position, many Jews have tended toward radicalenvironmentalist positions which serve a similar function" (p. 119).

Such a strategy makes excellent sense from the standpoint of social identitytheory: A consistent finding in research on intergroup contact is that makingthe social categories that define groups less salient would lessen intergroupdifferentiation and would facilitate positive social interactions betweenmembers from different groups (Brewer & Miller 1984; Doise & Sinclair1973; Miller, Brewer & Edwards 1985). At the extreme, acceptance of auniversalist ideology by gentiles would result in gentiles not perceivingJews as in a different social category at all, while nonetheless Jewswould be able to maintain a strong personal identity as Jews.

These features of Jewish radicalism together constitute a very compellinganalysis of the role of social identity processes in this phenomenon. The lastmechanism is particularly interesting as an analysis of both the tendency forJewish political overrepresentation in radical causes and the Jewish tendency toadopt radical environmentalist ideologies noted as a common characteristic ofJewish social scientists in Chapter 2. The analysis implies that the Jews

{p. 90} involved in these intellectual movements are engaged in a subtleprocess of deception of gentiles (and, perhaps, self-deception), and that thesemovements essentially function as a form of crypto-Judaism.

In the language of social identity theory, an ideology is created in whichthe social categorization of Jew-gentile is minimized in importance, andthere are no negative attributions regarding Jewish group membership. Theimportance of ethnic group membership is minimized as a social category,and, because of its lack of importance, ethnic self-interest among gentilesis analyzed as fundamentally misguided because it does not recognize thepriority of class conflict between gentiles. Jews can remain Jews becausebeing a Jew is no longer important. At the same time, traditionalinstitutions of social cohesiveness within gentile society are subverted and gentilesociety itself is viewed as permeated by conflicts of interestbetween social classes rather than by commonalities of interest and feelingsof social solidarity among different social classes {and the sexes}.

Rothman and Lichter (p. I 19ff) support their argument by noting that theadoption of universalist ideologies is a common technique among minority groupsin a wide range of cultures around the world. Despite the veneer ofuniversalism, these movements are most definitely not assimilationist, and infact Rothman and Lichter view assimilation, defined as complete absorption andloss of minority group identity, as an alternative to the adoption ofuniversalist political movements. Universalist ideologies may be smokescreens that actually facilitate the continued existence of group strategieswhile promoting the denial of their importance by ingroup and outgroup membersalike. Judaism as a cohesive, ethnically based group strategy is able tocontinue to exist but in a cryptic or semi-cryptic state.

Corroborating this perspective, Levin (1977, 105) states, "Marx'sanalysis [of Judaism as a caste] gave socialist thinkers an easy way out - toignore or minimize the Jewish problem." In Poland, the Jewish-dominatedCommunist Party decried worker and peasant participation in anti-Semitic pogromsduring the 1930s because such individuals were not acting on behalf of theirclass interests (Schatz 1991, 99), an interpretation in which ethnic conflictsresult from capitalism and will end after the communist revolution. One reasonlittle anti-Semitism existed within the Social Democratic movement inlate-nineteenth-century Germany was that Marxist theory explained all socialphenomena; Social Democrats "did not need anti-Semitism, anotherallembracing theory, to explain the events of their lives" (Dawidowicz1975, 42). The Social Democrats (and Marx) never analyzed Judaism as a nationor as an ethnic group but as a religious and economic community (Pulzer1964, 269).

In theory, therefore, anti-Semitism and other ethnic conflicts woulddisappear with the advent of a socialist society. It is possible that such aninterpretation actually served to lower anti-Semitism in some cases. Levy (1975,190) suggests that anti-Semitism was minimized among the gentile working-classconstituency of the German Social Democrats by the activities of party leaders

{p. 91} and socialist theoreticians who framed the political and economicproblems of this group in terrns of class conflict rather than Jewish-gentileconflict and actively opposed any cooperation with anti-Semitic parties.

Trotsky and other Jews in the Russian Socialist Democratic Labor Partyconsidered themselves as representing the Jewish proletariat within thewider socialist movement (see note 4), but they were opposed to theseparatist, nationalist program of the Russian Jewish Bund. Arthur Liebman(1979, 122 123) suggests that these assimilationist socialists consciouslyconceptualized a postrevolutionary society in which Judaism would exist, butwith a lessened social salience: "For them, the ultimate solution of theJewish problem would be an internationalist socialist society that paid noheed to distinctions between Jews and non-Jews. To hasten the establishmentof such a society, it became necessary, in the view of these assimilationistsocialists, for Jews to consider ethnic and religious distinctions between themand non-Jews as irrelevant."

Similarly, after the revolution, "Having abandoned their own origins andidentity, yet not finding, or sharing, or being fully admitted to Russian life(except in the world of the party), the Jewish Bolsheviks found theirideological home in revolutionary universalism. They dreamt of a classless andstateless society supported by Marxist faith and doctrine that transcended theparticularities and burdens of Jewish existence" (Levin 1988, 49). Theseindividuals, along with many highly nationalist ex-Bundists, ended upadministrating programs related to Jewish national life in the Soviet Union.Apparently, although they rejected the radical Jewish separatism of either theBundists or the Zionists, they envisioned the continuity of secular Jewishnational life in the Soviet Union (e.g., Levin 1988, 52).

This belief in the invisibility of Judaism in a socialist society can also befound among American Jewish radicals. American Jewish socialists of the 1890s,for example, envisioned a society in which race played no part (Rogoff 1930,1l5), apparently a proposal in which Jews and non-Jews would remain in theirseparate spheres in a class-based workers movement. In the event, even thislevel of assimilation was not attained; these organizers worked in a completelyJewish milieu and retained strong ties with the Jewish community. "Theiractions continued to be at variance with their ideology. The more deeply theymoved into the field of organizing Jewish workers, the more loudly they insistedon their socialist universalism" (Liebman 1979, 256 257).

The gap between rhetoric and reality strongly suggests the importance ofdeception and self-deception in these phenomena. Indeed, these socialist labororganizers never abandoned their universalistic rhetoric, but activelyresisted incorporating their unions into the wider American labor movement evenafter the decline of Yiddish among their members left them without any excusesfor failing to do so. Within the unions they engaged in ethnic politicsaimed at keeping their own ethnic group in power (Liebman 1979, 270ff), actionsobviously at odds with socialist rhetoric. In the end, the attachment of manyof

{p. 92} these individuals to socialism declined and was replaced by astrong sense of Jewish ethnicity and peoplehood (Liebman 1979, 270).

The result was that the veneer or universalism covered up a continuedseparatism of radical Jewish intellectuals and political organizers:

[Gentile intellectuals] really are not totally accepted into even thesecularist humanist liberal company of their quondam Jewish friends. Jewscontinue to insist in indirect and often inexplicable ways on their ownuniqueness. Jewish universalism in relations between Jews and non-Jews hasan empty ring.... Still, we have the anomaly of Jewish secularists andatheists writing their own prayer books. We find Jewish political reformersbreaking with their local parties which stress an ethnic style of politics, andostensibly pressing for universal political goals - while organizing theirown political clubs which are so Jewish in style and manner thatnon-Jews often feel unwelcome. (Liebman 1973, 158)

Universalism may thus be viewed as a mechanism for Jewish continuity viacrypsis or semi-crypsis. The Jewish radical is invisible to the gentile as aJew and thereby avoids anti-Semitism while at the same time covertly retains hisor her Jewish identity. Lyons (1982, 73) finds that "most JewishCommunists wear their Jewishness very casually but experience it deeply. Itis not a religious or even an institutional Jewishness for most; nevertheless,it is rooted in a subculture of identity, style, language, and socialnetwork.... In fact, this second-generation Jewishness was antiethnic and yetthe height of ethnicity. The emperor believed that he was clothed intransethnic, American garb, but Gentiles saw the nuances and details of hisnaked ethnicity."

These remarks indicate an element of crypsis - a self-deceptivedisjunction between private and public personas - "a dual posturingrevealing one face to the outer world and another to the tribe" (Horowitz1997, 42). But this pose has a cost. As Albert Memmi (1966, 236), notes, "TheJew-of-the-Left must pay for this protection by his modesty and anonymity,his apparent lack of concern for all that relates to his own people....Like the poor man who enters a middle-class family, they demand that he at leasthave the good taste to make himself invisible." Because of the natureof their own ideology, Jews on the left were forced to deemphasize specificallyJewish issues, such as the Holocaust and Israel, despite their strongidentification as Jews (Wisse 1987). It is precisely this feature of the Jewishleftist intellectual movements that are most repellent to ethnically committedJews (see, e.g., Wisse 1987). Ethnic identification was often unconscious,suggesting self-deception. Lyons ( 1982, 74) finds that among his sample ofJewish American communists,

evidence of the importance of ethnicity in general and Jewishness inparticular permeates the available record. Many Communists, for example, statethat they could never have married a spouse who was not a leftist. When Jewswere asked if they could have married Gentiles, many hesitated, surprised by thequestion, and found it difficult to answer. Upon reflection, many concluded thatthey had always taken marriage to

{p. 93} someone Jewish for granted The alternative was never reallyconsidered, particularly among Jewish men.

Moreover, there were conscious attempts at deception directed at makingJewish involvement in radical political movements invisible by placing anAmerican face on what was in reality largely a Jewish movement (Liebman1979, 527ff). Both the Socialist Party and the CPUSA took pains to have , andthe CPUSA actively encouraged Jewish members to take gentile-sounding names.(This phenomenon also occurred in Poland jsee above] and the Soviet Union [seep. 97].) Despite representing over half the membership in both theSocialist Party and the CPUSA during some periods, neither party ever hadJews as presidential candidates and no Jew held the top position in the CPUSAafter 1929. Gentiles were brought from long distances and given highlyvisible staff positions in Jewish-dominated socialist organizations in New York.Jewish domination of these organizations not uncommonly led gentilesto leave when they realized their role as window dressing in a fundamentallyJewish organization.

Liebman (1979, 561) notes that New Left radicals often took pains to ignoreJewish issues entirely. The New Left deemphasized ethnicity and religion in itsideology while emphasizing social categories and political issues such as theVietnam War and discrimination against blacks which were very divisive for whitegentiles but for which Jewish identity was irrelevant; moreover, these issuesdid not threaten Jewish middle-class interests, especially Zionism. Jewishidentity, though salient to the participants, was publicly submerged. And asnoted above, when the New Left began adopting positions incompatible withJewish interests, Jews tended to sever their ties with the movement.

In a remarkable illustration of the perceived invisibility of the groupdynamics of Jewish involvement in radical political movements, Liebman (1979,167) describes 1960s student activists as completely unaware thattheir actions could lead to anti-Semitism because Jews were overrepresentedamong the activists. (Liebman shows that in fact other Jews were concernedthat their actions would lead to anti-Semitism.) From their own perspective,they were successfully engaging in crypsis: They supposed that theirJewishness was completely invisible to the outside world while at the same timeit retained a great deal of subjective salience to themselves. At a theoreticallevel, this is a classic case of self-deception, considered in SAID (Ch. 8) asan essential feature of Jewish religious ideology and reactions toanti-Semitism.

In the event, the deception appears to have generally failed, if not forthe New Left, at least for the Old Left. There was a general lack of rapportbetween Jewish radical intellectuals and non-Jewish intellectuals within OldLeft radical organizations (C. Liebman 1973, 158 159). Some gentileintellectuals found the movement attractive because of its Jewish dominance, butfor the most part the essentially Jewish milieu was a barrier (Liebman 1979,530ff).

{p. 110 (Chapter 4: Jewish Involvement in the Psychoanalytic Movement)}In addition to constituting the core of the leadership and the intellectualvanguard of the movement, Jews have also constituted the majority of themovement's members. In 1906 all 17 members of the movement were Jewish, andthey strongly identified as Jews (Klein 1981). In a 1971 study, Henry, Sims andSpray found that 62.1 percent of their sample of American psychoanalystsidentified themselves as having a Jewish cultural affinity, compared withonly 16.7 percent indicating a Protestant affinity and 2.6 percent a Catholicaffinity. An additional 18.6 percent indicated no cultural affinity, apercentage considerably higher than the other categories of mental healthprofessional and suggesting that the percentage of psychoanalysts with a Jewishbackground was even higher than 62 percent (Henry, Sims & Spray 1971,27)

We have seen that a common component of Jewish intellectual activity sincethe Enlightenment has been to criticize gentile culture. Freud's ideas haveoften been labeled as subversive. Indeed, "[Freud] was convinced that itwas in the very nature of psychoanalytic doctrine to appear shocking andsubversive. On board ship to America he did not feel that he was bringing thatcountry a new panacea. With his typically dry wit he told his travelingcompanions, 'We are bringing them the plague' " (Mannoni 1971,168).

Peter Gay labels Freud's work generally as "subversive" (1987,140), his sexual ideology in particular as "deeply subversive for histime" (p. 148), and he describes his Totem and Taboo as containing"subversive conjectures" (p. 327) in its analysis of culture."While the implications of Darwin's views were threatening and unsettling,they were not quite so directly abrasive, not quite so unrespectable, as Freud'sviews on infantile sexuality, the ubiquity of perversions, and thedynamic power of unconscious urges" (Gay 1987, 144).

There was a general perception among many anti-Semites that Jewishintellectuals were subverting German culture in the period prior to 1933 (SAID,Ch. 2), and psychoanalysis was one aspect of this concern. A great deal ofhostility to psychoanalysis centered around the perceived threat ofpsychoanalysis to Christian sexual ethics, including the acceptance ofmasturbation and premarital sex (Kurzweil 1989, 18). Psychoanalysis became atarget of gentiles decrying the Jewish subversion of culture - "thedecadent influence of Judaism," as one writer termed it (see Klein1981, 144). In 1928 Carl Christian Clemen, a professor of ethnology at theUniversity of Bonn, reacted strongly to The Future of an Illusion, Freud'sanalysis of religious belief in terms of infantile needs. Clemen decried thepsychoanalytic tendency to find sex everywhere, a tendency he attributed to theJewish composition of the movement: "One could explain this by theparticular circles from which its advocates and perhaps, too, the patients ittreats, principally hail" (in Gay 1988, 537). Freud's books were burnedin the May 1933 book burnings in Germany, and when the Nazis enteredVienna in 1938, they ordered Freud to leave and abolished theInternationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag.

{p. 111} In the United States, by the second decade of the twentieth centuryFreud was firmly associated with the movement for sexual freedom and socialreform, and had become the target of social conservatives (Torrey 1992 16ff). Aslate as 1956 a psychiatrist writing in the American Journal of Psychiatrycomplained, "Is it possible that we are developing the equivalent of asecular church, supported by government monies, staffed by a genital-levelapostolate unwittingly dispensing a broth of existential atheism, hedonism,and other dubious religio-philosophical ingredients?" (Johnson 1956, 40).

Although he rejected religion, Freud himself had a very strong Jewishidentity. In a 1931 letter he described himself as "a fanatical Jew,"and on another occasion he wrote that he found "the attraction of Judaismand of Jews so irresistible, many dark emotional powers, all the mightier theless they let themselves be grasped in words, as well as the clear consciousnessof inner identity, the secrecy of the same mental construction" (in Gay1988, 601). On another occasion he wrote of "strange secret longings"related to his Jewish identity (in Gay 1988, 601). At least by 1930 Freudalso became strongly sympathetic with Zionism. His son Ernest was also aZionist, and none of Freud's children converted to Christianity or marriedgentiles. As expected by social identity theory, Freud's strong sense ofJewish identity involved a deep estrangement from gentiles. Yerushalmi (1991,39) notes "We find in Freud a sense of otherness vis-a-vis non-Jews whichcannot be explained merely as a reaction to anti-Semitism. Though anti-Semitismwould periodically reinforce or modify it, this feeling seems to have beenprimal, inherited from his family and early milieu, and it remained with himthroughout his life."

In a revealing comment, Freud stated "I have often felt as though Iinherited all the obstinacy and all the passions of our ancestors when theydefended their temple, as though I could throw away my life with joy for agreat moment" (in Gay 1988, 604). His identity as a Jew was thus associatedwith a self-concept in which he selflessly does battle with the enemies ofthe group, dying in an act of heroic altruism defending group interests - amirror-image Jewish version of the grand finale of Wagner's Nibelungenlied thatwas an ingredient in Nazi ideology (see SAID, Ch. 5). In terms of socialidentity theory, Freud thus had a very powerful sense of group membership and asense of duty to work altruistically for the interests of the group.

Gay (1988, 601) interprets Freud as having the belief that his identity as aJew was the result of his phylogenetic heritage. As Yerushalmi (1991, 30) notes,his psycho-Lamarckianism was "neither casual nor circumstantial."Freud grasped what Yerushalmi (1991, 31) terms the "subjectivedimension" of Larmarckianism, that is, the feeling of a powerful tie to theJewish past as shaped by Jewish culture, the feeling that one can not escapebeing a Jew, and "that often what one feels most deeply and obscurely is atrilling wire in the blood."

{p. 116} Hannibal, the Semitic combatant against Rome; Cromwell, who allowedthe Jews to enter England; and Napoleon, who gave Jews civil rights. Early on hedescribed himself as a "conquistador" rather than as a man of science.

This type of messianic thought was common in fin de siecle Vienna amongJewish intellectuals who were attempting to bring about a"supranational, supraethnic world" (Klein 1981, 29) {Klein, D. B.,Jewish Origins of the Psychoanalytic Movement}, a characterization that, as seenin Chapter 3, would also apply to Jewish involvement in radical politicalmovements. These intellectuals "frequently expressed their humanitarianismin terms of their renewed Jewish self-conception.... [They had] a shared beliefthat Jews were responsible for the fate of humanity in the twentieth century"(p. 31).

Many early proponents viewed psychoanalysis as a redemptivemessianic movement that would end anti-Semitism by freeing the world of neurosesproduced by sexually repressive Western civilization. Klein shows that some ofFreud's closest associates had a very clearly articulated conception ofpsychoanalysis as a Jewish mission to the gentiles - what one might viewas a uniquely modern version of the ancient "light of the nations"theme of Jewish religious thought very common among intellectual apologists ofReform Judaism during the same period.

Thus for Otto Rank, who developed a close father-son relationship with Freud,Jews were uniquely qualified to cure neurosis and act as the healers of humanity(Klein 1981, 129). Developing a variant of the perspective Freud used in Totemand Taboo and Civilization and Its Discontents, Rank argued that whereas otherhuman cultures had repressed their primitive sexuality in the ascent tocivilization, "Jews possessed special creative powers since they had beenable to maintain a direct relation to 'nature,' to primitive sexuality"(Klein 1981, 129). Within this perspective, anti-Semitism results from thedenial of sexuality, and the role of the Jewish mission of psychoanalysiswas to end anti-Semitism by freeing humanity of its sexual repressions. Atheoretical basis for this perspective was provided by Freud's Three Essays onthe Theory of Sexuality, in which aggression was linked with the frustration ofdrives.

Klein shows that this conceptualization of psychoanalysis as a redemptive"light of the nations" was common among other Jewish intimates ofFreud. Thus Fritz Wittels advocated complete freedom of sexual expression andwrote "Some of us believed that psychoanalysis would change the surface ofthe earth . . . [and introduce] a golden age in which there would be no room forneuroses any more. We felt like great men.... Some people have a mission inlife" (in Klein 1981, 138-139). Jews were viewed as having theresponsibility to lead the gentiles toward truth and nobility of behavior."The tendency to place the Jew and the non-Jew in a relationship offundamental opposition imbued even the expressions of redemption with anadversary quality" (Klein 1981, 142). Gentile culture was something tobe conquered in battle by the morally superior, redemptive Jew: "The spiritof the Jews will conquer the world" (Wittels; in Klein 1981, 142).Coincident with Wittels's

{p. 117} belief in the mission of psychoanalysis was a positive Jewishself-identity; he described the convert Jew as characterized by the"psychological disability of hypocrisy" (Klein 1981, 139).

The cure for the aggression characteristic of anti-Semitism was thereforebelieved to lie in freeing gentiles from their sexual repressions. AlthoughFreud himself eventually developed the idea of a death instinct to explainaggression, a consistent theme of the Freudian critique of Western culture,as exemplified for example by Norman O. Brown, Herbert Marcuse,and Wilhelm Reich, has been that the liberation of sexual repressionswould lead to lowered aggression and usher in an era of universal love.

It is therefore of interest that when Jung and Alfred Adler were expelledfrom the movement for heresy, the issue that appears to have been most importantto Freud was their rejection of the interrelated ideas of the sexual etiology ofneurosis, the Oedipal complex, and childhood sexuality. Sexual repression inWestern societies during this period was highly salient and undeniable. Freud'stheory may thus be viewed as an invention whose utility in the assault onWestern culture derived from the intuitive plausibility of supposing that thesuppression of sexual urges would result in major changes in behavior that couldpossibly have psychotherapeutic effects. Moreover, the Oedipal complex ideaproved to be critical to Freud's thesis for the centrality of sexual repressionin Totem and Taboo - what Gay (1988, 329) terms some of Freud's "mostsubversive conjectures" and discussed in more detail below.

This belief in the curative powers of sexual freedom coincided with a leftistpolitical agenda common to the vast majority of Jewish intellectuals of theperiod and reviewed throughout this book. This leftist political agenda provedto be a recurrent theme throughout the history of psychoanalysis. Support ofradical and Marxist ideals was common among Freud's early followers, and leftistattitudes were common in later years among psychoanalysts (Hale 1995, 31;Kurzweil 1989, 36, 46 47, 284; Torrey 1992, 33, 93ff, 122-123), as well as inFreudian inspired offshoots such as Erich Fromm, Wilhelm Reich (see below) andAlfred Adler. (Kurzweil [1989, 287] terms Adler the leader of "farleft" psychoanalysis, noting that Adler wanted to immediatelypoliticize teachers as radicals rather than wait for the perfection ofpsychoanalysis to do so.) The apex of the association between Marxism andpsychoanalysis came in the 1920s in the Soviet Union, where all the toppsychoanalysts were Bolsheviks, Trotsky supporters, and among the most powerfulpolitical figures in the country (see Chamberlain 1995). (Trotsky himselfwas an ardent enthusiast of psychoanalysis.) This group organized agovernment-sponsored State Psychoanalytical Institute and developed a program of"pedology" aimed at producing the "new Soviet man" onthe basis of psychoanalytic principles applied to the education of children. Theprogram, which encouraged sexual precocity in children, was put intopractice in state-run schools.

There is also evidence that Freud conceptualized himself as a leader in a waron gentile culture. We have seen that Freud had a great deal of hostility to

{p. 118} Western culture, especially the Catholic Church and its ally, theAustrian Habsburg monarchy (Gay 1988; McGrath 1974; Rothman & Isenberg1974a).6 In a remarkable passage from the Interpretation of Dreams, Freud, inattempting to understand why he has been unable to set foot in Rome, proposesthat he has been retracing the footsteps of Hannibal, the Semitic leader ofCarthage against Rome during the Punic wars.

Hannibal ... had been the favourite hero of my later school days....And when in the higher classes I began to understand for the first time whatit meant to belong to an alien race . . . the figure of the semiticgeneral rose still higher in my esteem. To my youthful mind Hannibal andRome symbolized the conflict between the tenacity of Jewry and the organisationof the Catholic Church. (Freud, Inferpretation of Dreams; in Kothman &Isenberg 1974a, 64)

The passage clearly indicates that Freud was self-identified as a member of"an alien race" at war with Rome and its daughter institution, theCatholic Church, a central institution of Western culture. Gay (1988, 132)states, "A charged and ambivalent symbol, Rome stood for Freud's mostpotent concealed erotic, and only slightly less concealed aggressivewishes."7 Rome was "a supreme prize and incomprehensiblemenace" (Gay 1988, 132). Freud himself described this "Hannibalfantasy" as "one of the driving forces of [my] mental life"(in McGrath 1974, 35).

A strong connection exists between anti-Semitism and Freud's hostility toRome. Freud's conscious identification with Hannibal occurred following ananti-Semitic incident involving his father in which his father behavedpassively. Freud's response to the incident was to visualize "the scene inwhich Hannibal's father, Hamilcar Barca, made his boy swear before thehousehold altar to take vengeance on the Romans. Ever since that time Hannibalhad . . . a place in my phantasies" (in McGrath 1974, 35). "Romewas the center of Christian civilization. To conquer Rome would certainly beto avenge his father and his people" (Rothman & Isenberg 1974a,62). Cuddihy (1974, 54) makes the same point: "Like Hamilcar's sonHannibal, he will storm Rome seeking vengeance. He will control his anger,as his father had done, but he will use it to probe relentlessly beneath thebeautiful surface of the diaspora to the murderous rage and lust coiledbeneath its so-called civilities."

Rothman and Isenberg ( 1974) convincingly argue that Freud actually viewedthe Interpretation of Dreams as a victory against the Catholic Church and thathe viewed Totem and Taboo as a successful attempt to analyze the Christianreligion in terms of defense mechanisms and primitive drives. Regarding Totemand Taboo, Freud told a colleague that it would "serve to make a sharpdivision between us and all Aryan religiosity" (in Rothman &Isenberg 1974, 63; see also Gay 1988, 326). They also suggest that Freudconsciously attempted to conceal his subversive motivation: A central aspect ofFreud's theory of dreams is that rebellion against a powerful authority mustoften be carried on with deception: "According to the strength . . . of the

{p. 119} censorship, [the authority-defying individual] finds himselfcompelled . . . to speak in allusions . . . or he mustconceal his objection beneath some apparently innocent disguise"(Freud, Interpretation of Dreams; in Rothman & Isenberg 1974a, 64).

The bizarre argument of Freud's (1939) Moses and Monotheism is quite clearlyan attempt to show the moral superiority of Judaism compared to Christianity.Freud's hostility to the Catholic Church is apparent in this work: "TheCatholic Church, which so far has been the implacable enemy of all freedom ofthought and has resolutely opposed any idea of this world being governed byadvance towards the recognition of truth!" (p. 67). Freud also reiterateshis conviction that religion is nothing more than neurotic symptomatology - aview first developed in his Totem and Taboo (1912).

All religions may be symptoms of neurosis, but Freud clearly believed thatJudaism is an ethically and intellectually superior form of neurosis: Accordingto Freud, the Jewish religion "formed their [the Jews'] character for goodthrough the disdaining of magic and mysticism and encouraging them to progressin spirituality and sublimations. The people, happy in their conviction ofpossessing the truth, overcome by the consciousness of being the chosen, came tovalue highly all intellectual and ethical achievements" (Freud 1939, 109).In contrast, "The Christian religion did not keep to the lofty heightsof spirituality to which the Jewish religion had soared" (Freud 1939,112). Freud argues that in Judaism the repressed memory of killing the Mosaicfather figure lifts Judaism to a very high ethical level, whereas inChristianity the unrepressed memory of killing a father figure eventuallyresults in a reversion to Egyptian paganism. Indeed,

Freud's formulation of Judaism might even be termed reactionary, since itretains the traditional idea of Jews as a chosen people (Yerushalmi 1991,34). Freud's psychoanalytic reinterpretation may be viewed as an attempt toreinterpret Judaism in a "scientific" manner: the creation of asecular, "scientific" Jewish theology. The only substantialdifference from the traditional account is that Moses replaces God as thecentral figure of Jewish history. In this regard, it is interesting thatfrom an early period Freud strongly identified with Moses (Klein 1981, 94;Rice 1990, 123ff), suggesting an identification in which he viewed himself asa leader who would guide his people through a dangerous time. Given Freud'sintense identification with Moses, the following passage from Moses andMonotheism, ostensibly referring to the ancient prophets who followed Moses, maybe taken to apply to Freud himself: "Monotheism had failed to take rootin Egypt. The same thing might have happened in Israel after the people hadthrown off the inconvenient and pretentious religion imposed on them. Fromthe mass of the Jewish people, however, there arose again and again men who lentnew colour to the fading tradition, renewed the admonishments and demands ofMoses, and did not rest until the lost cause was once more regained"(pp. 141 142). Moses and Monotheism also links monotheism with thesuperiority of Jewish ethics,

{p. 138} males, this system underlies a low-investment style of matingbehavior in which the male's role is simply to inseminate females ratherthan provide continuing investment in the children. Many human societies havebeen characterized by intense sexual competition among males to control largenumbers of females (e.g., Betzig 1986; Dickemann 1979; MacDonald 1983). Thismale pursuit of large numbers of mates and sexual relationships has nothing todo with love. It is the defining characteristic of Western culture to havesignificantly inhibited this male tendency while at the same time providingcultural supports for pair bonding and companionate marriage. The result hasbeen a relatively egalitarian, high-investment mating system.

The psychoanalytic emphasis on legitimizing sexuality and premarital sex istherefore fundamentally a program that promotes low-investment parentingstyles. Low-investment parenting is associated with precocious sexuality,early reproduction, lack of impulse control, and unstable pair bonds (Belsky,Steinberg & Draper 1991). Ecologically, high-investment parenting isassociated with the need to produce competitive offspring, and we have seen thatone aspect of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy has been a strongemphasis on high-investment parenting (PTSDA, Ch. 7). Applied to gentileculture, the subversive program of psychoanalysis would have the expectedeffect of resulting in less-competitive children {as a result migrantchildren, from unaffected countries, do better}; in the long term, gentileculture would be increasingly characterized by low-investment parenting, and, asindicated below, there is evidence that the sexual revolution inaugurated, or atleast greatly facilitated, by psychoanalysis has indeed had this effect.

In this regard, it is interesting to note that an important aspect of thesocial imposition of monogamy in Western Europe has been the development ofcompanionate marriage. One of the peculiar features of Western marriage is thatthere has been a trend toward companionate marriage based on affection andconsent between partners (e.g., Brundage 1987; Hanawalt 1986, MacFarlane 1986;Stone 1977, 1990; Westermarck 1922). Although dating this affective revolutionin the various social strata remains controversial (Phillips 1988), severalhistorians have noted the prevalence and psychological importance ofaffectionate parent-child and husband-wife relations in Western Europe since theMiddle Ages (Hanawalt 1986; MacFarlane 1986, Pollack 1983), or at least sincethe seventeenth century (e.g., Phillips 1988; Stone 1977, 1990). Stone (1990)notes that by the end of the eighteenth century "even in great aristocratichouseholds mutual affection was regarded as the essential prerequisite formatrimony" (p. 60).

In view of Freud's animosity toward Westem culture and the Catholic Church inparticular, it is interesting that the Church's policy on marriage included alargely successful attempt to emphasize consent and affection between partnersas normative features of marriage (Brundage 1975, 1987 Duby 1983; Hanawalt 1986;Herlihy 1985; MacFarlane 1986; Noonan 1967, 1973; Quaife 1979; Rouche 1987;Sheehan 1978). Anti-hedonism and the idealization of romantic love as the basisof monogamous marriage have also

{p. 139} periodically characterized Western secular intellectual movements (Brundage1987), such as the Stoics of late antiquity (e.g., P. Brown 1987; Veyne 1987)and nineteenth-century Romanticism (e.g., Corbin 1990; Porter 1982).

From an evolutionary perspective, consent frees individuals to pursue theirown interests in marriage, among which may be compatibility and conjugalaffection. Although affection can certainly occur in the context of arrangedmarriages (and this has been emphasized by some historians of RepublicanRome [e.g., Dixon 1985]), all things being equal, free consent to marriage ismore likely to result in affection being one criterion of importance.

Indeed, one sees in these findings a fundamental difference betweenJudaism as a collectivist group strategy, in which individual decisions aresubmerged to the interests of the group, versus Western institutions based onindividualism. Recall the material reviewed in PTSDA (Ch. 7) indicating thatuntil after World War I arranged marriages were the rule among Jews becausethe economic basis of marriage was too important to leave to the vagaries ofromantic love (Hyman 1989). Although high-investment parenting was animportant aspect of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy, conjugal affectionwas not viewed as central to marriage with the result that, as Cuddihy (1974)notes, a long line of Jewish intellectuals regarded it as a highly suspectproduct of an alien culture. Jews also continued to practice consanguineousmarriages - a practice that highlights the fundamentally biological agendaof Judaism (see PTSDA, Ch. 8) - well into the twentieth century whereas, as wehave seen, the Church successfully countered consanguinity as a basis ofmarriage beginning in the Middle Ages. Judaism thus continued toemphasize the collectivist mechanism of the social control of individualbehavior in conformity to family and group interests centuries after the controlof marriage in the West passed from family and clan to individuals. Incontrast to Jewish emphasis on group mechanisms, Western culture has thusuniquely emphasized individualist mechanisms of personal attraction and freeconsent (see PTSDA, Ch. 8).

I conclude that Western religious and secular institutions have resulted in ahighly egalitarian mating system that is associated with high-investmentparenting. These institutions provided a central role for pair bonding,conjugality, and companionship as the basis of marriage. However, when theseinstitutions were subjected to the radical critique presented by psychoanalysis,they came to be seen as engendering neurosis, and Western society itself wasviewed as pathogenic. Freud's writings on this issue (see Kurzweil 1989, 85 andpassim) are replete with assertions on the need for greater sexual freedom toovercome debilitating neurosis. As we shall see, later psychoanalytic critiquesof gentile culture pointed to the repression of sexuality as leading toanti-Semitism and a host of other modern ills.

[p. 148} group identity while at the same time a principle source of gentileidentity - religion and its concomitant supports for high-investment parenting -would be conceptualized as an infantile aberration. The universalistideologies of Marxism and psychoanalysis thus were highly compatible withthe continuation of Jewish particularism.

Besides these functions, the cultural influence of psychoanalysis mayactually have benefited Judaism by increasing Jewish-gentile differences inresource competition ability, although there is no reason to suppose that thiswas consciously intended by the leaders of the movement. Given the very largemean differences between Jews and gentiles in intelligence and tendencies towardhigh-investment parenting, there is every reason to suppose that Jews andgentiles have very different interests in the construction of culture. Jewssuffer to a lesser extent than gentiles from the erosion of cultural supportsfor high-investment parenting, and Jews benefit by the decline in religiousbelief among gentiles. As Podhoretz (1995, 30) notes, it is in fact the casethat Jewish intellectuals, Jewish organizations like the AJCongress, andJewish-dominated organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (seenote 2) have ridiculed Christian religious beliefs, attempted to undermine thepublic strength of Christianity, and have led the fight for unrestrictedpornography. The evidence of this chapter indicates that psychoanalysis as aJewish-dominated intellectual movement is a central component of this war ongentile cultural supports for high-investment parenting.

It is interesting in this regard that Freud held the view that Judaism asa religion was no longer necessary because it had already performed itsfunction of creating the intellectually, spiritually, and morally superiorJewish character: "Having forged the character of the Jews, Judaism as areligion had performed its vital task and could now be dispensed with" (Yerushalmi1991, 52). The data summarized in this chapter indicate that Freud viewed Jewishethical, spiritual, and intellectual superiority as genetically determined andthat gentiles were genetically prone to being slaves of their senses and proneto brutality. The superior Jewish character was genetically determined viaLamarckian inheritance acting for generations as a result of the unique Jewishexperience. The data reviewed in PTSDA (Ch. 7) indicate that there is indeedvery good evidence for the view that there is a genetic basis for Jewish-gentiledifferences in IQ and high-investment parenting brought about ultimately byJewish religious practices over historical time (but via eugenic practices, notvia Lamarckian inheritance).

Given that the differences between Jews and gentiles are geneticallymediated, Jews would not be as dependent on the preservation of culturalsupports for high-investment parenting as would be the case among gentiles.Freud's war on gentile culture through facilitation of the pursuit of sexualgratification, low-investment parenting, and elimination of social controls onsexual behavior may therefore be expected to affect Jews and gentilesdifferently, with the result that the competitive difference between Jews andgentiles, already

{p. 149} significant on the basis of the material reviewed in PTSDA (Chs. 5,7), would be exacerbated. There is evidence, for example, that moreintelligent, affluent, and educated adolescents mature sexually at a relativelyslow rate (Belsky et al. 1991; Rushton 1995). Such adolescents are more likelyto abstain from sexual intercourse, so that sexual freedom and thelegitimization of nonmarital sex are less likely to result in early marriage,single-parenting, and other types of low-investment parenting in this group. Greaterintelligence is also associated with later age of marriage, lower levels ofillegitimacy, and lower levels of divorce (Herrnstein & Murray 1994).Hyman (1989) notes that Jewish families in contemporary America have a lowerdivorce rate (see also Cohen 1986; Waxman 1989), later age of first marriage,and greater investment in education than non-Jewish families. Recent findingsindicate that the age of first sexual intercourse for Jewish adolescents ishigher and the rate of unwed teenage pregnancy lower than for any other ethnicor religious group in the United States. Moreover, since Jews aredisproportionately economically affluent, the negative effects of divorce andsingle-parenting on children are undoubtedly much attenuated among Jews becauseof the economic stresses typically accompanying divorce and single-parenting aremuch lessened (McLanahan & Booth 1989; Wallerstein & Kelly 1980).

These data indicate that Jews have been relatively insulated from thetrends toward low-investment parenting characteristic of American societygenerally since the counter-cultural revolution of the 1960s. This findingis compatible with data reviewed by Herrnstein and Murray (1994) indicatingoverwhelming evidence that the negative effects of the shifts that havetaken place in Western practices related to sex and marriage in the last 30years have been disproportionately felt at the bottom of the IQ andsocioeconomic class distributions and have therefore included relatively fewJews. For example, only 2 percent of the white women in Herrnstein andMurray's top category of cognitive ability (IQ minimum of 125) and 4 percent ofthe white women in the second category of cognitive ability (IQ between 110 and125) gave birth to illegitimate children, compared to 23 percent in the 4thclass of cognitive ability (IQ between 75 and 90) and 42 percent in the fifthclass of cognitive ability (IQ less than 75). Even controlling for poverty failsto remove the influence of IQ: High-IQ women living in poverty are seventimes less likely to give birth to an illegitimate child than are low-IQ womenliving in poverty. Moreover, in the period from 1960 to 1991,illegitimacy among blacks rose from 24 percent to 68 percent, while illegitimacyamong whites rose from 2 percent to 18 percent. Since the mean Jewish IQ inthe United States is approximately 117 and verbal IQ even higher (see PTSDA, Ch.7), this finding is compatible with supposing that only a very smallpercentage of Jewish women are giving birth to illegitimate babies, andthose who do are undoubtedly much more likely to be wealthy, intelligent, andnurturing than the typical single mother from the lower cognitive classes.

{p. 150} The sexual revolution has thus had little effect on parentalinvestment among people in the highest categories of cognitive ability.These results are highly compatible with the findings of Dunne et al. (1997)that the heritability of age of first sexual intercourse has increased since the1960s. In their younger cohort (born between 1952 and 1965) genetic factorsaccounted for 49 percent of the variance among females and 72 percent of thevariance among males, and there were no shared environmental influences. In theolder cohort (born between 1922 and 1952) genetic influences accounted for 32percent of the variance for females and none of the variance among males, andthere was a significant shared environmental component for both sexes. Thesedata indicate that the erosion of traditional Western controls on sexuality havehad far more effect on those who are genetically inclined toward precocioussexuality and, in conjunction with the data presented above, indicate gentileshave been far more affected by these changes than have Jews.

Although other factors are undoubtedly involved, it is remarkable that theincreasing trend toward low-investment parenting in the United Stateslargely coincides with the triumph of the psychoanalytic and radicalcritiques of American culture represented by the political andcultural success of the counter-cultural movement of the 1960s. Since 1970 therate of single-parenting has increased from one in ten families to one inthree families (Norton & Miller 1992), and there have been dramaticincreases in teenage sexual activity and teenage childbearing without marriage(Furstenberg 1991). There is excellent evidence for an association among teenagesingle-parenting, poverty, lack of education, and poor developmental outcomesfor children (e.g., Dornbusch & Gray 1988; Furstenberg & Brooks-Gunn1989; McLanahan & Booth 1989; J. Q. Wilson 1993b).

Indeed, all the negative trends related to the family show very largeincreases that developed in the mid-1960s (Herrnstein & Murray 1994, 168ff;see also Bennett 1994; Kaus 1995; Magnet 1993), including increases in trendstoward lower levels of marriage, "cataclysmic" increases in divorcerates (p. 172), and rates of illegitimacy. In the case of divorce andillegitimacy rates, the data indicate a major shift upward during the 1960s frompreviously existing trend lines, with the upward trend lines established duringthat period continuing into the present. The 1960s was thus a watershed periodin American cultural history, a view that is compatible with Rothman andLichter's (1996, xviiiff) interpretation of the shift during the 1960s in thedirection of "expressive individualism" among cultural elites and thedecline of external controls on behavior that had been the cornerstone of theformerly dominant Protestant culture. They note the influence of the New Leftin producing these changes, and I have emphasized here the closeconnections between psychoanalysis and the New Left. Both movements were led anddominated by Jews.

The sexual revolution is "the most obvious culprit" underlying thedecline in the importance of marriage (Herrnstein & Murray 1994, 544) andits concomitant increase in low-investment parenting:

{p. 151} What is striking about the 1960s "sexual revolution," asit has properly been called, is how revolutionary it was, in sensibility as wellas reality. In 1965, 69 percent of American women and 65 percent of men underthe age of thirty said that premarital sex was always or almost always wrong; by1972, these figures had plummeted to 24 percent and 21 percent.... ln 1990, only6 percent of British men and women under the age of thirty-four believed that itwas always or almost always wrong. (Himmelfarb 1995, 236)

Although there is little reason to suppose that the battle for sexualfreedom so central to psychoanalysis had the intention of benefiting theaverage resource competition ability of Jews vis-a-vis gentiles, thepsychoanalytic intellectual war on gentile culture may indeed have resulted inan increased competitive advantage for Jews beyond merely lessening thetheoretical importance of the Jew-gentile distinction and providing a"scientific" rationale for pathologizing anti-Semitism. It is alsoa war that has resulted in a society increasingly split between adisproportionately Jewish "cognitive elite" and a growing mass ofindividuals who are intellectually incompetent, irresponsible as parents,prone to requiring public assistance, and prone to criminal behavior,psychiatric disorders, and substance abuse.

Although psychoanalysis is in decline now, especially in the United States,the historical record suggests that other ideological structures will attempt toaccomplish some of the same goals psychoanalysis attempted to achieve. As it hasdone throughout its history, Judaism continues to show extraordinary ideologicalflexibility in achieving the goal of legitimizing the continuation of Jewishgroup identity and genetic separatism. As indicated in Chapter 2, many Jewishsocial scientists continue to fashion a social science that serves the interestsof Judaism and to develop powerful critiques of theories perceived asantithetical to those interests. The incipient demise of psychoanalysis as aweapon in these battles will be of little long-term importance in this effort.


1. The ethnic composition of the editorial board of the PsychoanalyticQuarterly is overwhelmingly Jewish, indicating that psychoanalysis remainsfundamentally an ethnic movement. The editor, six of seven associate editors,and 20 of 27 editorial board members ofthe 1997 volume have Jewish surnames.

2. The continuing role of psychoanalysis in the movement toward sexualliberation can be seen in a recent debate over teenage sexuality. An article inthe Los Angeles Times (Feb. 15, 1994, Al, A16) noted the opposition of theAmerican Civil Liberties Union and Planned Parenthood to a school program thatadvocated teenage celibacy. Sheldon Zablow, a psychiatrist and spokesperson forthis perspective, stated "Repeated studies show that if you try to represssexual feelings, they may come out later in far more dangerous ways - sexualabuse, rape" (p Al6). This psychoanalytic fantasy was compounded byZablow's claim that sexual abstinence has never worked in all of human history -a claim that indicates his unawareness of historical data on sexual behavior inthe West (including Jewish sexual behavior), at least from the Middle Ages

{p. 158 (Chapter 5: The Frankfurt School of Social Research and thePathologization of Gentile Group Allegiances} part of the currentHorkheimer-Adorno line: "[Fromm] takes the easy way out with the conceptof authority, without which, after all, neither Lenin's avantgarde nordictatorship can be conceived of. I would strongly advise him to read Lenin....I must tell you that I see a real threat in this article to the line whichthe journal takes" (Adorno, in Wiggershaus 1994, 266).

Fromm was excised from the Institute despite the fact that hisposition was among the most radically leftist to emerge from the psychoanalyticcamp. Throughout his career, Fromm remained the embodiment of the psychoanalyticleft and its view that bourgeois-capitalist society and fascism resulted from(and reliably reproduced) gross distortions of human nature (see Ch. 4). Similarly,Herbert Marcuse was excluded when his orthodox Marxist views began to divergefrom the evolving ideology of Adorno and Horkheimer (see Wiggershaus 1994,391-392).2

These exclusionary trends are also apparent in the aborted plans toreinstitute the Institute's journal in the 1950s. It was decided that there weretoo few contributors with the Horkheimer-Adorno line to support a journal andthe plans foundered (Wiggershaus 1994, 471). Throughout its history, to be amember of the Institute was to adopt a certain view and to submit to heavyediting and even censorship of one's works to ensure conformity to a clearlyarticulated ideological position.

As might be expected from a highly authoritarian political movement, theresult was a speculative, philosophical body of work that ultimately had noinfluence on empirically oriented sociology, although, as indicated below, ithas had a profound influence on theory in the humanities. (TheA~uthoritarianPersonality is not included in this statement; it was very influential but hadan empirical basis of sorts.) This body of work does not qualify as sciencebecause of its rejection of experimentation, quantification, and verification,and because of the priority of moral and political concerns over theinvestigation of the nature of human social psychology.

The priority of the moral and political agenda of Critical Theory isessential to understanding the Frankfurt School and its influence. Horkheimerand Adorno eventually rejected the classical Marxist perspective on theimportance of class struggle for the development of fascism in favor of aperspective in which both fascism and capitalism were fundamentallyconceptualized as involving domination and authoritarianism. Further, theydeveloped the theory that disturbed parent-child relations involving thesuppression of human nature were a necessary condition for domination andauthoritarianism.

Obviously, this is a perspective that is highly compatible withpsychoanalytic theory, and indeed psychoanalysis was a basic influence on theirthinking. Virtually from the beginning, psychoanalysis had a respected positionwithin the Institute for Social Research, particularly under the influence ofErich Fromm. Fromm held positions at the Frankfurt PsychoanalyticInstitute as well as at the fnstitute for Social Research, and along withother "left-Freudians" such as Wilhelm Reich and eventually Marcuse,he developed

{p. 159} theories that incorporated both Marxism and psychoanalysisessentially by developing a theoretical link between the repression ofinstincts in the context of family relationships (or, as in the caseof Fromm, the development of sadomasochistic and anal personality traits withinthe family) and the development of oppressive social and economicstructures.

It is interesting that although the Horkheimer group developed a very stronghostility to empirical science and the positivistic philosophy of science, theyfelt no need to abandon psychoanalysis. Indeed, psychoanalysis was "acentral factor in giving Horkheimer and the most important of his fellowtheoreticians the sense that important insights could also be achieved - or evenbetter achieved - by skipping over the specialized disciplines" (Wiggershaus]994, 186). We shall see that psychoanalysis as a nonempirically basedhermeneutic structure (which nevertheless masqueraded as a science)turned out to be an infinitely plastic tool in the hands of thoseconstructing a theory aimed at achieving purely political objectives.

For Horkheimer and Adorno, the fundamental shift from the sociological tothe psychological level that occurred during the 1940s was motivated bythe fact that in Germany the proletariat had succumbed to fascism and in theSoviet Union socialism had not prevented the development of an authoritariangovernment {both reactions to Jewish dominance} that failed to guaranteeindividual autonomy or Jewish group interests (Tar 1977, 80; Wiggershaus 1994,137ff, 391ff). Within the new perspective, authoritarianism was viewed as thefundamental problem, its origin traceable to family interactions and ultimatelyto the suppression of human nature (Tar 1977, 87-88). Nevertheless, the formaloutline of the theory can be seen in philosophical form in the earlier workStudies on Authority and the Family of 1936, a work that presented Fromm'spsychoanalytic theory of authoritarian "sado-masochistic" familyrelationships and their putative linkages with bourgeois capitalism and fascism.

This philosophical-speculative approach to anti-Semitism was refined in thechapter on anti-Semitism in Horkheimer and Adorno's (1944/1990) Dialectic ofEnlightenment.3 In addition to being highly abstract and written in what mightbe termed a Hegelian manner, the style of writing is assertional: Statementsabout anti-Semitism are simply asserted with no attempt to provide any empiricaljustification.4 As Jacob Katz (1983, 40) notes, the Frankfurt School has"not been notable for the accuracy of its evaluation of the Jewishsituation either before the advent of Nazism or afterward." However, manyof the ideas simply asserted there in a philosophical, speculative manner areidentical to the theories of anti-Semitism contained in The AuthoritarianPersonality. Indeed, the authors viewed the chapter on anti-Semitism as atheoretical study for their anticipated empirical study of anti-Semitism (Wiggershaus1994, 324). The Authoritarian Personality may thus be viewed as an attempt toprovide these philosophical theories of anti-Semitism with empirical support,but the theory itself was fundamentally an a priori philosophical theory and wasnot viewed by its authors as subject to either verification or falsification:

{p. 162} Forbidden actions underlain by powerful instincts are thus turnedinto aggression, which is then projected onto victims in the external world,with the result that "he attacks other individuals in envy or persecutionjust as the repressed bestialist hunts or torments an animal" (p. 192). Alater passage decries the "suppression of animal nature into scientificmethods of controlling nature" (p. 193). Domination of nature,viewed as central to Christianity and fascism, thus derives ultimately fromsuppressing our animal nature.

Horkheimer and Adorno then attempt to explain the role of conformity infascism. They argue that cohesive gentile group strategies are fundamentallybased on a distortion of human nature - a central theme of The AuthoritarianPersonality. They posit a natural, nonconforming, reflective self in oppositionto society that has been corrupted by capitalism or fascism. The developmentof large industrial interests and the culture industry of late capitalism havedestroyed in most people the inner-directed, reflective power that canproduce "self-comprehending guilt" (p. 198), which could oppose theforces leading to anti-Semitism. This inner directed reflection was"emancipated" from society and even directed against society (p. 198),but under the above-mentioned forces, it conforms blindly to the values of theexternal society.

Thus humans are portrayed as naturally opposed to the conformity demanded bya highly cohesive society. As indicated below, a consistent theme of TheAuthoritarian Personality is the idea that gentile participation incohesive groups with high levels of social conformity is pathological,whereas similar behavior of Jews with respect to the group cohesivenesscharacteristic of Judaism is ignored: Indeed, we have seen that Judaismis portrayed in The Dialectic of Enlightenment as morally superior toChristianity.

The gentile elite is then said to take advantage of the situation bydirecting the projected hostility of the masses into anti-Semitism. Jews are anideal target for this projected hostility because they represent all that isantithetical to totalitarianism: "Happiness without power, wages withoutwork, a home without frontiers, religion without myth. These characteristics arehated by the rulers because the ruled secretly long to possess them. The rulersare only safe as long as the people they rule turn their longed-for goals intohated forms of evil" (p. 199).

The conclusion is that if the rulers in fact allowed the ruled to be like theJews, there would be a fundamental turning point of history:

By overcoming that sickness of the mind which thrives on the ground ofself-assertion untainted by reflective thought, mankind would develop from a setof opposing races to the species which, even in nature, is more than merenature. Individual and social emancipation from domination is thecountermovement to false projectlon, and no Jew would then resemble thesenseless evil visited upon him as upon all persecuted beings be they animals ormen. (p. 200)

The end of anti-Semitism is thus viewed as a precondition for thedevelopment of a utopian society and the liberation of humanity - perhapsthe closest

{p. 163} that the Frankfurt School ever came to defining utopia.7 Theenvisioned utopian society is one in which Judaism can continue as a cohesivegroup but in which cohesive, nationalistic, corporate gentile groupsbased on conformity to group norms have been abolished as manifestations ofpsychopathology. Horkheimer and Adorno developed the view that the uniquerole of Judaism in world history was to vindicate the concept of differenceagainst the homogenizing forces thought to represent the essence of Westerncivilization: "The Jews became the metaphoric equivalent of that remnant ofsociety preserving negation and the non-identical" (Jay 1980, 148). Judaismthus represents the antithesis of Western universalism. The continuation andacceptance of Jewish particularism becomes a precondition for the development ofa utopian society of the future.

Within this perspective, the roots of anti-Semitism are therefore to besought in individual psychopathology, not in the behavior of Jews.Nevertheless, there is some acknowledgment that the actual characteristics ofJews may be involved in historical anti-Semitism, but Horkheimer and Adornotheorize that the Jewish characteristics that have led to anti-Semitism wereforced on Jews. Jews are said to have incurred the wrath of the lowerclasses because Jews were the originators of capitalism: "For the sake ofeconomic progress which is now proving their downfall, the Jews werealways a thorn in the side of the craftsmen and peasants who were declassed bycapitalism. They are now experiencing to their own cost the exclusive,particularist character of capitalism" (p. 175). However, this Jewishrole is viewed as forced on the Jews who were completely dependenton gentile elites for their rights even into the nineteenth century.Under these circumstances, "Commerce is not their vocation, it is theirfate" (p. 175) {why, then, continue it now?}. The success of the Jewsthen constituted a trauma to the gentile bourgeoisie, "who had to pretendto be creative" (p. 175); their anti-Semitism is thus "self-hatred,the bad conscience of the parasite" (p. 176).

There are indications that the original anti-Semitism project envisioned amore elaborate discussion of "Jewish character traits" that led toanti-Semitism along with suggested methods for overcoming them. However,"The topic never became part of the Institute's programme, perhaps partlyout of consideration for the sensitivity of most Jews towards this topic, andpartly to avoid exposing the Institute to the accusation that it was turning theproblem of anti-Semitism into a Jewish problem" (Wiggershaus 1994, 366).Indeed, the Institute was well aware of a 1945 Jewish Labor Committee survey ofworking-class Americans in which the latter complained of Jewish behaviorsrelated to the types of actual dealings working-class individuals would belikely to have with Jews (see SAID, p. 50). Adorno appears to have believed thatthese attitudes were "less irrational" than the anti-Semitism of otherclasses (see Wiggershaus 1994, 369).

{p. 198} "cultural revolution to destroy the Christian West" (Wiggershaus1994, 657). "The inseparability of concepts such as FrankfurtSchool, Critical Theory, and neo-Marxism indicates that, from the 1930'sonwards, theoretically productive left-wing ideas in German-speaking countrieshad focused on Horkheimer, Adorno and the Institute of Social Research" (Wiggershaus1994, 658).

However, the influence of the Frankfurt School has gone well beyond theGerman-speaking world, and not only with The Authoritarian Personality studies,the writings of Erich Fromm, and the enormously influential work of HerbertMarcuse as a countercultural guru to the New Left. In the contemporaryintellectual world, there are several joumals devoted to this legacy, includingNew German Critique, Cultural Critique, and Theory, Culture and Society:Explorations in Critical Social Science. The influence of the FrankfurtSchool increased greatly following the success of the New Left counterculturalmovement of the 1960s (Piccone 1993, xii). Reflecting its current influencein the humanities, the Frankfurt School retains pride of place as a majorinspiration at the meetings of the notoriously postmodern Modern LanguageAssociation held in December 1994. Kramer and Kimball (1995) describe the largenumber of laudatory references to Adorno, Horkheimer, and especially WalterBenjamin, who had the honor of being the most-referred-to scholar at theconvention.33 Marxism and psychoanalysis were also major influences at theconference. One bright spot occurred when the radical Marxist Richard Ohmannacknowledged that the humanities had been revolutionized by the"critical legacy of the Sixties" (p. 12) - a point of view, Kramerand Kimball note, often denied by the academic left but commonplace inconservative publications like The New Criterion and central to the perspectivedeveloped here.

Reflecting the congruence between the Frankfurt School and contemporarypostmodemism, the enormously influential postmodernist Michel Foucaultstated, "If I had known about the Frankfurt School in time, I would havebeen saved a great deal of work. I would not have said a certain amount ofnonsense and would not have taken so many false trails trying not to get lost,when the Frankfurt School had already cleared the way" (in Wiggershaus1994, 4). Whereas the strategy of the Frankfurt School was to deconstructuniversalist, scientific thinking by the use of "criticalreason," postmodernism has opted for complete relativism and the lackof objective standards of any kind in the interests of preventing any generaltheories of society or universally valid philosophical or moral systems(Norris 1993, 287ff).34

Contemporary postmodernism and multiculturalist ideology (see, e.g., Gless& Herrnstein Smith 1992) have adopted several central pillars of theFrankfurt School: the fundamental priority of ethics and values in approachingeducation and the social sciences; empirical science as oppressive and anaspect of social domination; a rejection of the possibility of shared values orany sense of universalism or national culture (see also Jacoby's [1995, 35]discussion of "post-colonial theory" - another intellectual descendantof the Frankfurt

{p. 199} School); a "hermeneutics of suspicion" in which anyattempt to construct such universals or a national culture isenergetically resisted and "deconstructed" - essentially thesame activity termed by Adorno "negative dialectics." There isan implicit acceptance of a Balkanized model of society in which certaingroups and their interests have a priori moral value and there is no possibilityof developing a scientific, rational theory of any particular group, much less atheory of pan-human universals. Both the Frankfurt School and postmodernismimplicitly accept a model in which there is competition among antagonisticgroups and no rational way of reaching consensus, although there is also animplicit double standard in which cohesive groups formed by majorities areviewed as pathological and subject to radical criticism.

It is immensely ironic that this onslaught against Western universalismeffectively rationalizes minority group ethnocentrism while undercutting theintellectual basis of ethnocentrism. Intellectually one wonders how onecould be a postmodernist and a committed Jew at the same time. Intellectualconsistency would seem to require that all personal identifications be subjectedto the same deconstructing logic, unless, of course, personal identityitseif involves deep ambiguities, deception, and self-deception. This in factappears to be the case for Jacques Derrida, the premier philosopher ofdeconstruction, whose philosophy shows the deep connections between theintellectual agendas of postmodernism and the Frankfurt School.35 Derrida has acomplex and ambiguous Jewish identity despite being "a leftist Parisianintellectual, a secularist and an atheist" (Caputo 1997, xxiii). Derridawas born into a Sephardic Jewish family that immigrated to Algeria from Spain inthe nineteenth century. His family were thus crypto-Jews who retained theirreligious-ethnic identity for 400 years in Spain during the period of theInquisition.

Derrida identifies himself as a crypto-Jew - "Marranos that we are,Marranos in any case whether we want to be or not, whether we know it ornot" (Derrida 1993a, 81) - a confession perhaps of the complexity,ambivalence, and self-deception often involved in post-Enlightenment forms ofJewish identity. In his notebooks, Derrida (1993b, 70) writes of thecentrality that Jewish issues have held in his writing: "Circumcision,that's all I've ever talked about." In the same passage he writes thathe has always taken "the most careful account, in anamnesis, of the factthat in my family and among the Algerian Jews, one scarcely ever said'circumcision' but 'baptism,' not Bar Mitzvah but 'communion,' with theconsequences of softening, dulling, through fearful acculturation, that I'vealways suffered from more or less consciously" (1993b, 72-73) - anallusion to the continuation of cryptoJewish practices among the Algerian Jewsand a clear indication that Jewish identification and the need to hide it haveremained psychologically salient to Derrida. Significantly, he identifieshis mother as Esther (1993b, 73), the biblical heroine who "had not madeknown her people nor her kindred" (Est. 2:10) and who was an inspiration togenerations of crypto-Jews. Derrida was deeply attached to his mother and statesas she nears death, "I can be sure that

{p. 200} you will not understand much of what you will nonetheless havedictated to me, inspired me with, asked of me, ordered from me." Likehis mother (who spoke of baptism and communion rather than circumcision andBar Mitzvah), Derrida thus has an inward Jewish identity while outwardlyassimilating to the French Catholic culture of Algeria. For Derrida,however, there are indications of ambivalence for both identities (Caputo 1997,304): "I am one of those marranes who no longer say they are Jews evenin the secret of their own hearts" (Derrida 1993b, 170).

Derrida's experience with anti-Semitism during World War II in Algeria wastraumatic and inevitably resulted in a deep consciousness of his own Jewishness.Derrida was expelled from school at age 13 under the Vichy government because ofthe numerus clausus, a self-described "little black and very Arab Jewwho understood nothing about it, to whom no one ever gave the slightest reason,neither his parents nor his friends" (Derrida 1993b, 58).

The persecutions, which were unlike those of Europe, were all the sameunleashed in the absence of any German occupier.... It is an experience thatleaves nothing intact, an atmosphere that one goes on breathing forever. Jewishchildren expulsed from school. The principal's office: You are going to go home,your parents will explain. Then the Allies landed, it was the period of theso-called two-headed government (de Gaulle-Giraud): racial laws maintained foralmost six months, under a "free" French government. Friends who nolonger knew you, insults, the Jewish high school with its expulsed teachers andnever a whisper of protest from their colleagues.... From that moment, I felt -how to put it? - just as out-of-place in a closed Jewish community as I did onthe other side (we called them "the Catholics"). In France, thesuffering subsided. I naively thought that anti-Semitism had disappeared.... Butduring adolescence, it was the tragedy, it was present in everything else.... Paradoxicaleffect, perhaps, of this brutalization: a desire for integration in thenon-Jewish community, a fascinated but painful and suspicious desire,nervously vigilant, an exhausting aptitude to detect signs of racism,in its most discreet configurations or its noisiest disavowals. (Derrida1995a, 12~121; italics in text)

Bennington (1993, 326) proposes that the expulsion from school and itsaftermath were "no doubt . . . the years during which the singularcharacter of J.D.'s 'belonging' to Judaism is imprinted on him: wound,certainly, painful and practiced sensitivity to antisemitism and any racism,'raw' response to xenophobia, but also impatience with gregariousidentification, with the militancy of belonging in general, even if it is Jewish....I believe that this difficulty with belonging, one would almost say ofidentification, affects the whole of J.D.'s oeuvre, and it seems to me that 'thedeconstruction of the proper' is the very thought of this, its thinkingaffection." Indeed, Derrida says as much. He recalls that just beforehis Bar Mitzvah (which he again notes was termed 'communion' by the AlgerianJewish community), when the Vichy government expelled him from school andwithdrew his citizenship, "I became the outside, try as they might tocome close to me they'll never touch me again.... I did my 'communion' by

{p. 201} fleeing the prison of all languages, the sacred one they tried tolock me up in without opening me to it [i.e., Hebrew], the secular [i.e.,French] they made clear would never be mine" (Derrida 1993b, 289).

As with many Jews seeking a semi-cryptic pose in a largely non-Jewishenvironment, Derrida altered his name to Jacques. "By choosing whatwas in some way, to be sure, a semi-pseudonym but also very French, Christian,simple, I must have erased more things than I could say in a few words (onewould have to analyze the conditions in which a certain community - the Jewishcommunity in Algeria - in the '30s sometimes chose American names)"(Derrida 1995a, 344). Changing his name is thus a form of crypsis aspracticed by the Algerian Jewish community, a way of outwardly conforming tothe French, Christian culture while secretly remaining Jewish. Derrida'sJewish political agenda is identical to that of the Frankfurt School:

The idea behind deconstruction is to deconstruct the workings of strongnation-states with powerful immigration policies, to deconstruct therhetoric of nationalism, the politics of place, the metaphysics of native landand native tongue.... The idea is to disarm the bombs . . . ofidentity that nation-states build to defend themselves against the stranger,against Jews and Arabs and immigrants, . . . all of whom . . . are whollyother. Contrary to the claims of Derrida's more careless critics, the passion ofdeconstruction is deeply political, for deconstruction is a relentless, ifsometimes indirect, discourse on democracy, on a democracy to come. Derrida'sdemocracy is a radically pluralistlc polity that resists the terror of anorganic, ethnic, spiritual unity, of the natural, native bonds of the nation(natus, natio), which grind to dust everything that is not a kin of the rulingkind and genus (Geschlecht). He dreams of a nation without nationalist ornativist closure, of a community without identity, of a non-identicalcommunity that cannot say I or we, for, after all, the very idea of acommunity is to fortify (munis, muneris) ourselves in common against the other.His work is driven by a sense of the consummate danger of an identitariancommunity, of the spirit of the "we" of "Christian Europe,"or of a "Christian politics," lethal compounds that spell death ofArabs and Jews, for Africans and Asians, for anything other. The heaving andsighing of this Christian European spirit is a lethal air for Jews and Arabs, forall les juifs [i.e., Jews as prototypical others], even if they go back tofather Abraham, a way of gassing them according to both the letter and thespirit. (Caputo 1997, 231-232)

Derrida has recently published a pamphlet advocating immigration ofnon-Europeans into France (see Lilla 1998). As with the Frankfurt School, theradical skepticism of the deconstructionist movement is in the service of preventingthe development of hegemonic, universalist ideologies and other foundations ofgentile group allegiance in the name of the tout autre, i.e., the "whollyother." Caputo ascribes Derrida's motivation for his deconstruction ofHegel to the latter's conceptualization of Judaism as morally and spirituallyinferior to Christianity because of its legalism and tribalistic exclusivism,whereas Christianity is the religion of love and assimilation, a product of theGreek, not the Jewish spirit. These Hegelian interpretations are remarkably

{p. 202} congruent with Christian self-conceptualizations and Christianconceptions of Judaism originating in antiquity (see SAID, Ch. 3), and such aconceptualization fits well with the evolutionary analysis developed in PTSDA.Reinterpretations and refutations of Hegel were common among nineteenth centuryJewish intellectuals (see SAID, Ch. 6), and we have seen that in NegativeDialectics Adorno was concerned to refute the Hegelian idea universal historyfor similar reasons. "Hegel's searing, hateful portrait of the Jew . . .seem[s] to haunt all of Derrida's work; . . . by presenting in the mostloyal and literal way just what Hegel says, Derrida shows . . . that Hegel'sdenunciations of the Jew's castrated heart is a heartless, hateful castration ofthe other" (Caputo 1994, 234, 243). As with the Frankfurt School,Derrida posits that the messianic future is unknown because to say otherwisewould lead to the possibility of imposed uniformity, "a systematicwhole with infinite warrant" (Caputo 1994, 246), a triumphal and dangeroustruth in which Jews as exemplars of the tout autre would necessarily suffer. Thehuman condition is conceptualized as "a blindness that cannot be remedied,a radical, structural condition in virtue of which everyone is blind frombirth" (Caputo 1994, 313).

As with the Frankfurt School, the exemplars of otherness have a priorimoral value. "In deconstruction love is extricated from the polemicagainst the Jews by being re-thought in terms of the other, of les juifs.... Ifthis organic Hegelian Christian-European community is defined as making a common(com) defense (munis) against the other, Derrida advances the idea of layingdown his arms, rendre les armes, surrendering to the other" (p. 248). Fromthis perspective, acknowledging the possibility of truth is dangerous becauseof the possibility that truth could be used against the other. The beststrategy, therefore, is to open up "a salutary competition amonginterpretations, a certain salutary radical hermeneuticizing, in which wedream with passion of something unforeseeable and impossible" (Caputo 1994,277). To the conflicting views of differing religions and ideologies, Derrida"opposes a community, if it is one, of the blind[;] . . . of the blindleading the blind. Blindness makes for good communities, provided we all admitthat we do not see {This has similarities to the second of Thomas Aquinas'sThree Ways of Knowing God, the Negative Way}, that in the crucial matters we areall stone blind and without privileged access, adrift in the same boat without alighthouse to show the other shore" (Caputo 1997, 313-314) {Why then paymore attention to Derrida than to anyone else?}. Such a world is safe forJudaism, the prototypical other, and provides no warrant for the universalizingtendencies of Western civilization (Caputo 1997, 335) - what one might term deconstructionas de-Hellenizatlon or de-Westernization. Minority group ethnicconsciousness is thus validated not in the sense that it is known to be based onsome sort of psychological truth, but in the sense that it can't be proveduntrue. On the other hand, the cultural and ethnic interests of majorities are"hermeneuticized" and thus rendered impotent - impotent because theycannot serve as the basis for a mass ethnic movement that would conflict withthe interests of other groups. Ironically from the standpoint of the theory ofJudaism developed here, Derrida (who has thought a great deal about his owncircumcision in his

{p. 203} Circonfession [Derrida 1993b]) realizes that circumcision,which he likens to a shibboleth because of its usefulness as a mechanism ofingroup demarcation (i.e., as a mark of Jewish exclusiveness and"otherness"), is a two-edged sword. Commenting on the work ofHolocaust poet Paul Celan, Derrida (1994, 67) states, "the mark of acovenant or alliance, it also intervenes, it interdicts, it signifies thesentence of exclusion, of discrimination, indeed of extermination. One may,thanks to the shibboleth, recognize and be recognized by one's own, for betterand for worse, in the cleaving of partaking: on the one hand, for the sake ofthe partaking and the ring of the covenant, but also, on the other hand, forthe purpose of denying the other, of denying him passage or life.... Becauseof the shibboleth and exactly to the extent that one may make use of it, onemay see it turned against oneself: then it is the circumcised who are proscribedor held at the border, excluded from the community, put to death, or reduced toashes" (Derrida 1994, 67-68; italics in text). Despite the dangers ofcircumcision as a two-edged sword, Derrida (1994, 68) concludes that "theremust be circumcision," a conclusion that Caputo (1997, 252) interpretsas an assertion of an irreducible and undeniable human demand "for adifferentiating mark, for a mark of difference." Derrida thus subscribes tothe inevitability (innateness?) of group demarcations, but, amazingly andapologetically, he manages to conceptualize circumcision not as a sign of tribalexclusivism, but as "the cut that opens the space for the incoming ofthe tout autre" (Caputo 1994, 250) - a remarkable move because, as wehave seen, Derrida seems quite aware that circumcision results in separatism,the erection of ingroup-outgroup barriers, and the possibility ofbetween-group conflict and even extermination. But in Derrida's gloss, "spirituallywe are all Jews, all called and chosen to welcome the other" (Caputo1994, 262), so that Judaism turns out to be a universalist ideology wheremarks of separatism are interpreted as openness to the other. In Derrida'sview, "if circumcision is Jewish it is only in the sense that all poets areJews.... Everyone ought to have a circumcised heart; this ought to form auniversal religion" (Caputo 1994, 262). Similarly in a discussion of JamesJoyce, Derrida contrasts Joyce and Hegel (as prototypical Western thinkers) who"close the circle of the same" with "Abrahamic [i.e., Jewish]circumcision, which cuts the cord of the same in order to be open to theother, circumcision as saying yes . . . to the other" (Caputo 1997,257). Thus in the end, Derrida develops yet another in the age-oldconceptualizations of Judaism as a morally superior group while ideologies ofsameness and universality that might underlie ideologies of social homogeneityand group consciousness among European gentiles are deconstmcted and rendered asmorally inferior.


1 Part of this balancing act was a conscious practice of self-censorship inan effort to remove Marxist language from their publications so that, forexample, "Marxism'

{p. 228 (Chapter 6 The Jewish Criticism of Gentile Culture: A reprise)}Strauss complains of the assimilatory tendencies in liberal society and itstendencies to break down the group loyalty so central to Judaism and to replaceit with "membership in a nonexistent universal human society" (Tarcov& Pangle 1987, 909). Strauss's political philosophy of democratic liberalismwas fashioned as an instrument of achieving Jewish group survival in thepost-Enlightenment political world (see Tarcov & Pangle 1987, 909-910). Priorto their conversion, Goldberg (1996, 160) notes that the futureneoconservatives were disciples of Trotskyist theoretician Max Shachtman,also a Jew and a prominent member of the New York Intellectuals (see also IrvingKristol's [1983] "Memoirs of a Trotskyist").

In the cases of psychoanalysis and the Frankfurt School, and to a lesserextent Boasian anthropology, we have seen that these cohesive groups typicallyhad strong overtones of authoritarianism, and like traditional Judaismitself, they were highly exclusionary and intolerant of dissent.Cuddihy (1974, 106) points out that Wilhelm Reich had the distinction of beingexpelled from both the German Communist Party (for his "incorrect"view of the causes of fascism) and psychoanalysis (for his politicalfanaticism): "Reich's attempt to 'marry' two of the Diaspora ideologues,Freud and Marx, ended in his separation from the two movements speaking in theirnames." Recall also David Horowitz's ( 1997, 42) description of theworld of his parents who had joined a "shul" run by the CPUSA.Note the ingroup-outgroup mentality, the sense of moral superiority, the senseof being a minority persecuted by the goyim, and the powerful overtones ofauthoritarianism and intolerance of dissent:

What my parents had done in joining the Communist Party and moving toSunnyside was to return to the ghetto. There was the same shared privatelanguage, the same hermetically sealed universe, the same dual posturingrevealing one face to the outer world and another to the tribe. Moreimportantly, there was the same conviction of being marked for persecutionand specially ordained, the sense of moral superiority toward thestronger and more numerous goyim outside. And there was the same fear ofexpulsion for heretical thoughts, which was the fear that riveted thechosen to the faith.

An ingroup-outgroup orientation, noted above as a characteristic of the PRcoterie, was apparent also in leftist political groups which were alsopredominantly Jewish during this period. In the words of PR {Partisan Review}editor William Phillips (1983, 41), "The Communists were experts atmaintaining a fraternal atmosphere that distinguished sharply between insiderand outsider. One couldn't just leave; one had to be expelled. And expulsionfrom the tribe brought into motion a machinery calculated to make the expelledone a complete pariah. Party members were forbidden to talk to theex-Communist {this happens with Jehovah Witnesses too}, and a campaign ofvilification was unleashed whose intensity varied according to the importance ofthe expelled person." We have seen that psychoanalysis dealt with itsdissenters in a similar manner.

These movements tended to center around a charismatic leader (Boas,Freud, or Horkheimer) with a powerful moral, intellectual, and social vision

{p. 229} and the followers of these leaders had an intense devotion towardthem. There was an intense psychological sense of missionary zeal and, aswe have seen, moral fervor. This phenomenon occurred in the case ofpsychoanalysis and the Boasian movement, and (with massive irony) this was alsothe case with Critical Theory: "The theory which filled Adornoand Marcuse with a sense of mission both before and after the war was atheory of a special sort: in the midst of doubts it was still inspiring, in themidst of pessimism it still spurred them on towards a kind of salvationthrough knowledge and discovery. The promise was neither fulfilled norbetrayed - it was kept alive" (Wiggershaus 1994, 6). Like Freud, Horkheimerinspired intense loyalty combined with personal insecurity (at leastpartly because of his control over the Institute's budget [Wiggershaus 1994,161-162]), so that his underlings at the Institute, like Adorno, became fixatedon him and intensely jealous of their rivals for their master's favors. Adorno"was prepared to identify himself completely with the great cause of theInstitute, measuring everything by that standard" (Wiggershaus 1994, 160).When fellow institute member Leo Lowenthal complained that "Adorno showed asense of zealousness not far removed from a sense of resentment,"Horkheimer commented that this is what he valued in Adorno: "For [Horkheimer],all that mattered was that [Adorno's] zealous aggressiveness, which was able todetect concessions to the bourgeois academic system in the work of Lowenthal,Marcuse, Fromm, and even more so in the work of others, should be channeledalong the right lines, namely those with significance for social theory" (Wiggershaus1994,163).

Rallying around charismatic leaders (Leon Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg) has alsobeen apparent among Jewish radicals (see Ch. 3). The New York Intellectuals maybe an exception because they were relatively de-centralized and quite querulousand competitive with each other, with no one rising to the preeminent status ofa Freud or Boas. However, like many Jewish leftists, they tended to idolizeTrotsky, and, as we have seen, Sidney Hook played a decisive leadership role inthe group (Jumonville l991, 28). They also constituted a distinct coteriecentered around the "little magazines" whose editors wielded greatpower and influence over the careers of would-be group members. ElliotCohen, despite his lack of presence as a writer, had a charismatic influence onthose who wrote for him as editor of Menorah Journal and Commentary. LionalTrilling labeled him a "tormented 'genius'" (in Jumonville 1991, 117),a leader who influenced many, including Trilling in their journey fromStalinism to anti-Stalinism and finally toward the beginnings of neoconservatism.Prospective members of the ingroup typically idolized ingroup members ascultural icons. Norman Podhoretz (1967, 147) writes of his "wide-eyedworshipful fascination" with the PR crowd at the beginning of his career.Ingroup members paid "rapt attention" to others in the group (Cooney1986, 249). Like different branches of psychoanalysis, there were offshoots ofthese magazines initiated by people with somewhat different aesthetic orpolitical

{p. 230} visions, such as the circle around Dissent whose central figure wasIrving Howe.

This tendency to rally around a charismatic leader is also acharacteristic of traditional Jewish groups. These groups are extremelycollectivist in Triandis's (1990, 1991) sense. The authoritarian nature ofthese groups and the central role of a charismatic rabbi are particularlystriking: "A haredi . . . will consult his rabbi or hasidic rebbe onevery aspect of his life, and will obey the advice he receivesas though it were an halachic ruling" (Landau 1993, 47). "Theharedim's blind obeisance to rabbis is one of the most strikingcharacteristics of haredism in the eyes of the outside world, both Jewish andGentile" (Landau 1993, 45). Famous rebbes are revered in an almostgodlike manner (tzaddikism, or cult of personality), and indeed there was arecent controversy over whether the Lubavitcher Rebbe Schneerson claimed to bethe Messiah. Many of his followers believed that he was; Mintz (1992, 348ff)points out that it is common for Hasidic Jews to view their rebbe as theMessiah.

This intensity of group feeling centered around a charismatic leader isreminiscent of that found among traditional Eastern European Jews who were theimmediate ancestors of many of these intellectuals. Zionist leader Arthur Ruppin(1971, 69) recounts his visit to a synagogue in Galicia (Poland) in 1903:

There were no benches, and several thousand Jews were standing closelypacked together, swaying in prayer like the corn in the wind. When therabbi appeared the service began. Everybody tried to get as close to himas possible. The rabbi led the prayers in a thin, weeping voice. It seemedto arouse a sort of ecstasy in the listeners. They closed their eyes,violently swaying. The loud praying sounded like a gale. Anyone seeingthese Jews in prayer would have concluded that they were the most religiouspeople on earth.

Later those closest to the rabbi were intensely eager to eat any foodtouched by the rabbi, and the fish bones were preserved by his followersas relics.

As expected on the basis of social identity theory, all these movementsappear to have a strong sense of belonging to an ingroup viewed asintellectually and morally superior and fighting against outgroups seen asmorally depraved and as intellectually inferior (e.g., Horkheimer's constantadmonition that they were among the "chosen few" destined to developCritical Theory). Within the ingroup, disagreement was channeled into anarrowly confined intellectual space, and those who overstepped theboundaries were simply excised from the movement. The comments of EugenBleuler to Freud when he left the psychoanalytic movement in 1911 are worthquoting again because they describe a central feature of psychoanalysis andthe other movements reviewed in this volume: "[T]his 'who is not forus is against us,' this 'all or nothing,' is necessary for religious communitiesand useful for political parties. I can therefore understand theprinciple as such, but for science I consider it harmful" (in Gay1987, 144-145). All these features are central to

{p. 231} traditional Judaism as well and are compatible with proposing that abasic feature of all manifestations of Judaism is a proneness to developinghighly collectivist social structures with a strong sense of ingroup-outgroupbarriers (see PTSDA, Ch. 8).

Another important theme is that psychoanalysis and the AuthoritarianPersonalitu studies showed strong overtones of indoctrination. Theories weredeveloped in which behavior that did not conform to politically acceptablestandards was conceptualized as an indication of psychopathology.This is apparent in the tendency for psychoanalysis to attribute rejection ofpsychoanalysis itself to various forms of psychopathology, as well as in itsgeneral perspective that a pathology-inducing gentile culture was the sourceof all forms of psychiatric diagnosis and that anti-Semitism was the sign ofa disturbed personality. The Authoritarian Personality studies built on thistradition with its "discovery" that the failure to develop a"liberal personality" and to deeply and sincerely accept liberalpolitical beliefs was a sign of psychopathology.

Indeed, one might note that a common theme of all these movements of culturalcriticism is that gentile-dominated social structures are pathogenic.From the psychoanalytic perspective, including the Frankfurt School, humansocieties fail to meet human needs that are rooted in human nature withthe result that humans develop a variety of psychiatric disorders as aresponse to our fall from naturalness and harmony with nature {I accept thatviewpoint; it's quite Taoist}. Or humans are seen as a blank slate on whichWestern capitalist culture has written greed, gentile ethnocentrism, and othersupposed psychiatric disorders (Marxism, Boasian anthropology).

Group cohesion can also be seen in the support these movements have obtainedfrom the wider Jewish community. In Chapter 5 I noted the importance Jewishradicals placed on maintaining ties with the wider Jewish community. The widerJewish community provided economic support for psychoanalysis as the preferredform of psychotherapy among Jews (Glazer & Moynihan 1963); it also providedphilanthropic support for institutes of psychoanalysis. Jews also provided thegreat majority of the financial support of the University of Frankfurt as ahaven for German-Jewish intellectuals beginning in the Wilhelmine period (see W.E. Mosse 1989, 318ff), and the Institute for Social Research at theUniversity of Frankfurt was established by a Jewish millionaire, Felix Weil,with a specific intellectual-political mission that eventually developed intoCritical Theory (Wiggershaus 1994). In the United States foundations such asthe Stern Family Fund, the Rabinowitz Fund, and the Rubin Foundation providedmoney for radical underground publicatiOns during the 1960s (Sachar 1992, 804).Much earlier, American Jewish capital ists like Jacob Schiff financed Russianradical movements directed at over throwing the Czar and may well have hadconsiderable impact (GOIdStein 1990, 26-27: Szajkowski 1967).

{p. 232} Moreover, Jewish influence in the popular media was an importantsource of favorable coverage of Jewish intellectual movements, particularlypsychoanalysis and 1960s political radicalism (Rothman & Lichter 1982).Favorable media depictions of psychoanalysis were common during the 1950speaking in the mid-sixties when psychoanalysis was at the apex of its influencein the United States (Hale 1995, 289). "Popular images of Freud revealedhim as a painstaking observer, a tenacious worker, a great healer, atruly original explorer, a paragon of domestic virtue, the discover ofpersonal energy, and a genius" (p. 289). Psychiatrists wereportrayed in movies as "humane and effective. The number of Hollywoodstars, directors, and producers who were 'in analysis' was legion" (p.289). An important aspect of this process has been the establishment of journalsdirected not only at a closed community of academic specialists but also at awide audience of educated readers and other consumers of the counterculture.

The support of the wider Jewish community can also be seen in the associationbetween Jewish-owned publishing houses and these intellectual movements, as inthe case of the association between the Frankfurt School and the HirschfeldPublishing Company (Wiggershaus 1994, 2). Similarly the Straussianneoconservative movement developed access to the mainstream intellectual media.Disciples of Leo Strauss have developed their own publishing and reviewingnetwork, including neoconservative publications, Basic Books, and the universitypresses at Cornell University, Johns Hopkins University, and the University ofChicago (Gottfried 1993, 73).

These ideologies were promulgated by the most prestigious institutionsof the society, and especially by elite universities and the mainstreammedia, as the essence of scientific objectivity. The New York Intellectuals,for example, developed ties with elite universities, particularly Harvard,Columbia, the University of Chicago, and the University of California-Berkeley,while psychoanalysis and Boasian anthropology became well entrenched throughoutacademia. The moral and intellectual elite established by these movementsdominated intellectual discourse during a critical period after World War II andleading into the countercultural revolution of the 1960s. These movementsdominated intellectual discourse by the time of the sea change in immigrationpolicy in the 1960s (see Ch. 7). The implication is that individualsreceiving a college education during this period were powerfully socializedto adopt liberal-radical cultural and political beliefs. The ideology thatethnocentrism was a form of psychopathology was promulgated by a group thatover its long history had arguably been the most ethnocentric group among allthe cultures of the world. This ideology was promulgated by stronglyidentified members of a group whose right to continue to exist as a cohesive,genetically impermeable group ideally suited to maximizing its own political,economic, and cuitural power was never a subject of discussion. However, thefailure to adopt these beliefs on the part of gentiles was viewed as anadmission of personal

{p. 233} inadequacy and an acknowledgment that one was suffering from acondition that would benefit from psychiatric counseling.

Scientific and intellectual respectability was thus a critical feature of themovements reviewed here. Nevertheless, these intellectual movements have beenfundamentally irrational - an irrationality that is most apparent in theentire conduct of psychoanalysis as an authoritarian, quasi-scientificenterprise and in the explicit depiction of science as an instrument of socialdomination by the Frankfurt School. It is also apparent in the structure ofpsychoanalysis and radical political ideology, which are, liketraditional Jewish religious ideology, essentially hermeneutic theories in thesense that the theory is derived in an a priori manner and is constructed sothat any event is interpretable within the theory. The paradigm is shiftedfrom a scientific perspective that emphasizes the selective retention oftheoretical variants (Campbell 1987; Hull 1988; Popper 1963) to a hermeneuticexercise in which any and all events can be interpreted within the context ofthe theory. In the case of Critical Theory, and to a considerable extent,psychoanalysis, the actual content of the theory continually changed and therewas divergence among its practitioners, but the goal of the theory as a tool ofleftist social criticism remained intact.

Despite the fundamental irrationality of these movements, they have oftenmasqueraded as the essence of scientific or philosophical objectivity. Theyhave all sought the aura of science. Hollinger (1996, 160), in describing whathe terms "a secular, increasingly Jewish, decidedly left-of-centerintelligentsia based largely but not exclusively in the disciplinary communitiesof philosophy and the social sciences," notes that "science offereditself to [Harvard historian Richard] Hofstadter and to many of his secularcontemporaries as a magnificent ideological resource. Or, to put the point moresharply, these men and women selected from the available inventory those imagesof science most useful to them, those serving to connect the adjectivescientific with public rather than private knowledge, with open ratherthan closed discourses, with universal rather than local standards ofwarrant, with democratic rather than aristocratic models of authority."Harvard Sociologist Nathan Glazer included himself and the other New YorkIntellectuals in his statement that "Sociology is still for manysocialists and sociologists the pursuit of politics through academic means(in Jumonville 1991, 89). Jumonville (1991, 90) comments that "Part of theimpact of the New York group on American intellectual life is that theydignified that outlook of political pursuit. They were never embarrassed toadmit the political content of their work, and in fact brought into theintellectual mainstream the idea that all strong work had ideological andpolitical overtones."

Even the Frankfurt School, which developed an ideology in which science,politics, and morality were systematically conflated, presented TheAuthoritarian Personality as a scientifically based, empirically grounded studyof human behavior because of a perceived need to appeal to an American audienceof empirically oriented social scientists.

{p. 238} As we have seen in SAID (Ch. 7), Jewish religious ideology was aninfinitely plastic set of propositions that could rationalize and interpret anyevent in a manner compatible with serving the interests of the community. Authoritywithin the Jewish intellectual community was always understood to bebased entirely on what recognized (i.e., consensual) scholars had said. Itnever occurred to the members of this discourse community to seek confirmationof their views from outside the community of intellectual discourse itself,either from other (gentile) discourse communities or by trying to understand thenature of reality itself. Reality was whatever the group decided it should be,and any dissent from this socially constructed reality would have to be performedwithin a narrow intellectual space that would not endanger the overall goals ofthe group.

Acceptance of the Jewish canon, like membership in the intellectualmovements reviewed here, was essentially an act of authoritarian submission.The basic genius of the Jewish intellectual activity reviewed in these chaptersis the realization that hermeneutic communities based solely on intellectualconsensus within a committed group are possible even within thepost-Enlightenment world of intellectual discourse and may even besuccessfully disseminated wtthm the wider gentile community to facilitatespecific Jewish political interests.

The difference from the pre-Enlightenment world, of course, is thatthese intellectual dlscourses were forced to develop a facade of science inorder to appeal to gentiles. Or, in the case of the skepticalthrust of Derrida's philosophy of deconstruction and the Frankfurt School(but not involvement in activities such as The Authoritarian Personality), itwas necessary to defend the viability of philosophical skepticism. Thescientific veneer and philosophical respectability sought by these movementsthen functioned to portray these intellectual movements as the result ofindividualistic free choice based on rational appraisals of the evidence.This in turn necessitated that great efforts were required to maskJewish involvement and domination of the movements as well asthe extent to which the movements sought to attain specific Jewish pohtlcalinterests.

Such efforts at deemphasizing Jewish involvement have been most apparent inradtcal political movements and psychoanalysis, but they are also apparent inBoasian anthropology. Although the Jewish political agenda of the FrankfurtSchool was far less camouflaged, even here an important aspect of the programwas the development of a body of theory applicable to any universalistconception of society and not in any way dependent on thearticulation of a specifically Jewish political agenda. As a result, thisideological perspective and its postmodern descendants have beenenthusiastically embraced by non-Jewish minority group intellectuals withtheir own political agendas.

{p. 239} The phenomenon is a good example of the susceptibility of Westernindividualist societies to invasion by cohesive collectivist groups of anykind. I have noted a strong historical tendency for Judaism to prosperin Western individualist societies and to decline in Eastern or Westerncollectivist societies (see SAID, Chs. 3 5: PTSD,4, Ch. 8). Jews benefitgreatly from open, individualistic societies in which barriers to upwardmobility are removed and in which intellectual discourse is notprescribed by gentile-dominated institutions like the Catholic Church.But, as Charles Liebman (1973, 157) points out, Jews "sought the optionsof the Enlightenment but rejected its consequences" by (in my terms) retaininga strong sense of group identity in a society nominally committed toindividualism. Individualist societies develop republican politicalinstitutions and institutions of scientific inquiry that assume that groups aremaximally permeable and highly subject to defection when individual needs arenot being met. Individualists have little loyalty to ingroups and tendnot to see the world in terms of ingroups and outgroups. There is a strongtendency to see others as individuals and evaluate them as individualseven when the others are acting as part of a collectivist group (Iriandis1995).

As a result, intellectual movements that are highly collectivist maycome to be regarded by outsiders in individualistic societies as theresult of individualistic, rational choice of free agents. Evidence suggeststhat Jews have been concerned to portray Jewish intellectual movements as theresult of enlightened free choice. Thus Jewish social scientists wereinstrumental in portraying Jewish involvement in radical political causes as"the free choice of a gifted minority" (Rothman & Lichter1982, 118), and I have noted the role of the media in portraying Freud as atireless seeker of truth. Yet because of their collective highly focusedefforts and energy, these groups can be much more influential than the atomized,fragmented efforts of individuals {as a Taoist, I maintain that in the longrun this is false: action produces reaction, as Benjamin Ginsberg shows in hisbook The Fatal Embrace;this is another reason why resistance to Judaism should not take the form of imitationof Judaism}. The efforts of individualists can easily be ignored,marginalized, or placed under anathema; in contrast, the collectivity continuesto dominate intellectual discourse because of its cohesiveness and its controlof the means of intellectual production. In the long run, however, there isreason to believe that the Western commitment to individualism depends on theabsence of powerful and cohesive collectivist groups acting within society(SAID, Chs. 3-5).

It is of some importance that none of these post-Enlightenment intellectualmovements reviewed here developed a specific positive rationale for continuedJewish identification. The material reviewed in this volume indicates that suchan ideological rationale will not be forthcoming because, in a very basicsense, Judaism represents the antithesis of the Enlightenment values ofindividualism and its correlative scientific intellectual discourse. In theeconomic and social sphere, Judaism represents the possibility of a powerful,cohesive group ethnic strategy that provokes anti-individualist reactions ingentile outgroups and threatens the viability of individualist political andsoclal institutions. In the intellectual sphere Judaism has resulted incollectivist

{p. 240} enterprises that have systematically impeded inquiry in thesocial sciences in the interests of developing and disseminating theoriesdirected at achieving specific political and social interests {this is myfinding too}.

{p. 312 Conclusion} Western ideals of objectivity, universalism,individualism, rationality, and the scientific method are rejected because oftheir ethnic origins. Asante accepts a naive racialist theory in which Africans(the "sun people") are viewed as superior to Europeans (the "icepeople").

Such movements mirror similar Jewish ideologies that rationalize a powerfulconcern with Jewish ethnicity and attempt to produce feelings of ethnicsuperiority within the group. These ideologies have been common throughoutJewish intellectual history, the most enduring embodied in the idea ofchosenness and the "light of the nations" concept. SAID (Ch. 7)reviewed evidence indicating that Jewish historians and intellectuals, beginningin the ancient world, have often attempted to show that gentile culturalinfluences have had specifically Jewish precedents or even that variousgentile philosophers and artists were actually Jews. This tradition has beencarried on recently by two Sephardic Jews, Martin Bernal (1987) in his BlackAthena {with which I agree} and Jose Faur (1992) in his In the Shadow ofHistory: Jews and Conversos at the Dawn of Modernity.

Indeed, there may well be a general trend since the Enlightenment in whichJewish intellectuals have been at the vanguard of secular politicalmovements, such as the movement for cultural pluralism, intended to serve Jewishinterests as well as appeal to segments of the gentile population. Alsoapparent is a trend such that eventually these movements fractionate, theresult of antiSemitism within the very segment of the gentile populationto which the ideology attempts to appeal, and Jews abandon these movementsand seek to pursue their interests by other means.

Thus it has been noted here that Jews have played a prominent role in thepolitical left in this century. We have also seen that as a result ofantiSemitism among gentiles on the left and on the part of Communistgovernments, eventually Jews either abandoned the left or they developedtheir own brand of leftism in which leftist universalism was compatiblewith the primacy of Jewish identity and interests. Gore Vidal (1986)is a prominent example of a gentile leftist intellectual who has been highlycritical of the role of neoconservative Jews in facilitating the U.S. militarybuildup of the 1980s and allying themselves with conservative political forcesto aid Israel - charges interpreted as implying anti-Semitism because of theimplication that American Jews place the interests of Israel above Americaninterests (Podhoretz 1986). Vidal also suggests that neoconservatism ismotivated by the desire of Jews to make an alliance with gentile elites as adefense against possible anti-Semitic movements emerging during times ofeconomic crisis.

Indeed, fear of anti-Semitism on the left has been the major impetus forfounding the neoconservative movement (see Gottfried 1993, 80) - thefinal resting point of many of the New York Intellectuals whose intellectualand

{p. 313} political evolution was discussed in Chapter 6. As Gottfried pointsout, the cumulative effect of neoconservatism and its current hegemony overthe conservative political movement in the United States (achieved partly byits large influence on the media and among foundations) has been to shift theconservative movement toward the center and, in effect, to define thelimits of conservative legitimacy. Clearly, these limits of conservativelegitimacy are defined by whether they conflict with specifically Jewishgroup interests in a minimally restrictive immigration policy, support forIsrael, global democracy, opposition to quotas and affirmative action, and soon.

As indicated in William F. Buckley's (1992) In Search of Anti-Semitism,however, the alliance between gentile paleoconservatives and Jewishneoconservatives in the United States is fragile, with severalaccusations of antiSemitism among the paleoconservatives. Much of the difficultyderives from the tension between the nationalist tendencies of an importantsegment of U.S. conservatism and the perceptions of at least some gentileconservatives that Jewish neoconservatism is essentially a device for pursuingnarrow Jewish sectarian interests, particularly with regard to Israel,church-state separation, and affirmative action. Moreover, theneoconservative commitment to many aspects of the conservative social agenda ishalf-hearted at best (Gottfried 1993). Most importantly, neoconservativespursue what is essentially an ethnic agenda regarding immigration whileopposing the ethnocentric interests of the paleoconservatives in retaining theirethnic hegemony. The ethnic agenda of neoconservatism can also be seen intheir promotion of the idea that the United States should pursue a highlyinterventionist foreign policy aimed at global democracy and the interests ofIsrael rather than aimed at the specific national interests of the United States(Gottfried 1993). Neoconservatism has also provided a Jewish influence onthe American conservative movement to counterbalance the strong tendency forJews to support liberal and leftist political candidates. Jewishethnic interests are best served by influencing both major parties toward aconsensus on Jewish issues, and, as indicated above, neoconservatism hasserved to define the limits of conservative legitimacy in a manner that conformsto Jewish interests.

As anti-Semitism develops, Jews begin to abandon the very movements forwhich they originally provided the intellectual impetus. This phenomenon mayalso occur in the case of multiculturalism. Indeed, many of the most prominentopponents of multiculturalism are Jewish neoconservatives, as well asorganizations such as the National Association of Scholars (NAS), which have alarge Jewish membership. (The NAS is an organization of academics opposed tosome of the more egregious excesses of feminism and multiculturalism in theuniversity.) It may well be the case, therefore, that the Jewish attempt to linkup with secular political ideologies that appeal to gentiles is doomed in thelong run. Ginsberg (1993, 224ff) essentially makes this point when he notes thatthere is increasing evidence for anti-Semitism among American liberals,conservatives, and populist radicals.

{p. 314} The case of multiculturalism is particularly problematic as aJewish strategy. In this case one might say that Jews want to have their cakeand eat it too. "Jews are often caught between fervent affirmation ofthe Enlightenment and criticism of it. Many Jews believe that the replacement ofthe Enlightenment ideal of universalism with a politics of difference and afragmented 'multiculture' would constitute a threat to Jewish achievement. Atthe same time, they recognize the dangers of a homogeneous 'monoculture' forJewish particularity.... [Jews] seek to rescue the virtues of the Enlightenmentfrom the shards of its failures and salvage an inclusive vision from multiculturalism,where fragmentation and divisiveness now reign" (Biale, Galchinsky,& Heschel 1998, 7). Multicultural societies with their consequentfragmentation and chronic ethnic tension are unlikely to meet Jewishneeds in the long run even if they do ultimately subvert the demographic andcultural dominance of the peoples of European origin in lands where they havebeen dominant.

This in turn suggests a fundamental and irresolvable friction betweenJudaism and prototypical Western political and social structure. Certainlythe very long history of anti-Semitism in Westem societies and its recurrencetime and again after periods of latency suggests such a view. Theincompatibility of Judaism and Western culture can also be seen in thetendency for individualistic Western cultures to break down Jewish groupcohesiveness. As Arthur Ruppin (1934, 339) noted earlier in the century,all modern manifestations of Judaism, from neo-Orthodoxy to Zionism, areresponses to the Enlightenment's corrosive effects on Judaism - a set ofdefensive structures erected against "the destructive influence of Europeancivilization." And at a theoretical level, there is a very clear rationalefor supposing that Western individualism is incompatible with group-basedresource conflict that has been the consistent consequence of the emergence of apowerful Judaism in Western societies (see SAID, Chs. 3-5).

One aspect of this friction is well articulated in Alan Ryan's (1994, 11)discussion of the "latent contradiction" in the politics of Richard J.Herrnstein and Charles Murray, the authors of the highly controversial volumeThe Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life. Ryan states,"Herrnstein essentially wants the world in which clever Jewish kids ortheir equivalent make their way out of their humble backgrounds and end uprunning Goldman Sachs or the Harvard physics department, while Murraywants the Midwest in which he grew up a world in which the local mechanicdidn't care two cents whether he was or wasn't brighter than the local mathteacher. The trouble is that the first world subverts the second, while thesecond feels claustrophobic to the beneficiaries of the first."

The social structure whose acceptance is here attributed to Murray envisionsa moderately individualistic society, a society that is meritocratic andhierarchical but also cohesive and culturally and ethnically homogeneous. It isa society with harmony among the social classes and with socialcontrols on extreme individualism among the elite.

{p. 315} There has been a powerful Western tendency to develop suchsocieties, beginning at least in the Middle Ages, but also present, Ibelieve, in the classical Roman civilization of the Republic. The ideal ofhierarchic harmony is central to the social program of the Catholic Churchbeginning during the late Roman Empire and reaching its pinnacle during the HighMiddle Ages (MacDonald 1995c; SAID, Ch. 5). This ideal is apparent also in apowerful strand of German intellectual history beginning with Herder in theeighteenth century. A very central feature of this prototypical Westernhierarchical harmony has been the social imposition of monogamy as a formof reproductive leveling that dampens the association between wealth andreproductive success. From an evolutionary perspective, Western societiesachieve their cohesion because hierarchical social relationships aresignificantly divorced from reproductive consequences.

Such a world is threatened from above by the domination of anindividualistic elite without commitment to responsible lower-statusindividuals who may have lesser intellectual ability, talent, or financialresources. It is threatened from within by the development of a societyconstituted by a set of ethnically divided, chronically competing,highly impermeable groups as represented historically by Judaism andcurrently envisioned as the model for society by the proponents ofmulticulturalism. And it is threatened from below by an increasingunderclass of people with the attributes described by Herrnstein and Murray:intellectually incompetent and insufficiently conscientious to hold mostkinds of job; irresponsible and incompetent as parents; prone torequiring public assistance; prone to criminal behavior, psychiatricdisorders, and substance abuse; and prone to rapid demographic increase.Such people are incapable of contributing economically, socially, or culturallyto a late-twentieth-century society or, indeed, to any human civilizationcharacterized by a substantial degree of reciprocity, voluntarism and democracy.

Given that the continued existence of Judaism implies that the society willbe composed of competing, more or less impermeable groups, the neoconservativecondemnation of multiculturalism must be viewed as lacking in intellectualconsistency. The neoconservative prescription for society embraces a particularbrand of multiculturalism in which the society as a whole will be culturallyfragmented and socially atomistic. These social attributes not only allow Jewishupward mobility, but also are incompatible with the development of highlycohesive, anti-Semitic groups of gentiles; they are also incompatible withgroup-based entitlements and affirmative action programs that would necessarilydiscriminate against Jews. As Horowitz (1993, 86) notes, "High levels ofcultural fragmentation coupled with religious options are likely to findrelatively benign forms of anti-Semitism coupled with a stable Jewish condition.Presumed Jewish cleverness or brilliance readily emerges under suchpluralistic conditions, and such cleverness readily dissolves withequal suddenness under politically monistic or totalitarian conditions."

{p. 318} hierarchic harmony is threatened by the development of anunderclass whose membership consists disproportionately of racial and ethnicminority members and which has also resulted in intense group-basedconflict. In particular, it is the large disproportion of African Americansin the American underclass that makes any political solution to thisthreat to hierarchic harmony problematic.

I have suggested that there is a fundamental and irresolvable frictionbetween Judaism and prototypical Western political and social structure. Thepresent political situation in the United States (and several other Westerncountries) is so dangerous because of the very real possibility that theWestern European tendency toward hierarchic harmony has a biological basis. Thegreatest mistake of the Jewish-dominated intellectual movements described inthis volume is that they have attempted to establish the moral superiority ofsocieties that embody a preconceived moral ideal (compatible with thecontinuation of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy) rather than advocatesocial structures based on the ethical possibilities of naturally occurringtypes. In the twentieth century many millions of people have been killed inthe attempt to establish Marxist societies based on the ideal of completeeconomic and social leveling, and many more millions of people have beenkilled as a result of the failure of Jewish assimilation into Europeansocieties. Although many intellectuals continue to attempt to alter fundamentalWestern tendencies toward assimilation, muted individualism, and hierarchicharmony, there is a real possibility that these Western ideals are not only moreachievable but also profoundly ethical. Uniquely among all stratified culturesof the world, prototypical Western societies have provided the combination of agenuine sense of belonging, a large measure of access to reproductiveopportunities, and the political participation of all social classes combinedwith the possibilities of meritocratic upward social mobility.

As an evolutionist, one must ask what the likely genetic consequences of thissea change in American culture are likely to be. An important consequence - andone likely to have been an underlying motivating factor in the counterculturalrevolution - may well be to facilitate the continued genetic distinctiveness ofthe Jewish gene pool in the United States. The ideology of multiculturalismmay be expected to increasingly compartmentalize groups in American society,with long-term beneficial consequences on continuation of the essential featuresof traditional Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy. There is increasingconsensus among Jewish activists that traditional forms of Judaism are far moreeffective in ensuring long-term group continuity than semi-assimilationist,semi-cryptic strategies such as Reform Judaism or secular Judaism. ReformJudaism is becoming steadily more conservative, and there is a major effortwithin all segments of the Jewish community to prevent intermarriage (e.g.,Abrams 1997; Dershowitz 1997; see pp. 244-245). Moreover, as discussed inseveral parts of this book, Jews typically perceive themselves to benefit from anonhomogeneous culture in which they appear as

{p. 319} only one among many ethnic groups where there is no possibility ofthe development of a homogeneous national culture that might exclude Jews.

In addition, there may well be negative genetic consequences for theEuropean-derived peoples of the United States and especially for the"common people of the South and West" (Higham 1984, 49) - that is,for lower-middle-class Caucasians derived from Northern and Western Europe -whose representatives desperately battled against the present immigrationpolicy. Indeed we have seen that a prominent theme of the New York Intellectualsas well as the Authoritarian Personality studies was the intellectual andmoral inferiority of traditional American culture, particularly rural Americanculture. James Webb (1995) notes that it is the descendants of the WASPSwho settled the West and South who "by and large did the most to layout the infrastructure of this country, quite often suffering educationaland professional regression as they tamed the wilderness, built the towns,roads and schools, and initiated a democratic way of life that later whitecultures were able to take advantage of without paying the price of pioneering. Todaythey have the least, socioeconomically, to show for these contributions.And if one would care to check a map, they are from the areas now evincing thegreatest resistance to government practices." The war goes on, but it iseasy to see who is losing.

The demographic rise of the underclass resulting from the triumph of the1960s counter-cultural revolution implies that European-derived genes andgene frequencies will become less common compared to those derived from theAfrican and the Latin American gene pools. On the other end of the IQreproductive strategy distribution, immigrants from East Asian countries areoutcompeting whites in gaining admission to universities and inprestigious high-income jobs. The long-term result will be that theentire white population (not including Jews) is likely to suffer a social statusdecline as these new imnmigrants become more numerous. (Jews are unlikelyto suffer a decline in social status not only because their mean IQ is wellabove that of the East Asians but, more importantly, because Jewish IQ isskewed toward excelling in verbal skills. The high IQ of East Asians is skewedtoward performance IQ which makes them powerful competitors in engineeringand technology. See PTSDA, [Ch. 7] and Lynn [1987] Jews and East Asians are thuslikely to occupy different niches in contemporary societies.) Presently whitegentiles are the most underrepresented group at Harvard, accounting forapproximately 25 percent of the students, while Asians and Jews constitute atleast half of the student body while constituting no more than five percent ofthe population (Unz 1998). The United States is well on the road to beingdominated by an Asian technocratic elite and a Jewish business, professional,and media elite.

{Is the decline of white Gentiles caused by their genes, or the abandonmentof "future preference" via the 60s Counterculture? Did thatCounterculture affect Jews too? Those Asians are a specially selected elite -they are no more representative of Asians back home, than whites in the colonialterritories were of their home countries, before decolonisation. In colonialPapua New Guinea, for example, the natives never saw whites doing manual work -it was quite a shock for them to go to Australia and see them doing it there

Moreover, the shift to multiculturalism has coincided with an enormous growthof immigration from non-European-derived peoples beginning with the ImmigrationAct of 1965, which favored immigrants from non-European countries (see Auster1990; Brimelow 1995). Many of these immigrants come from non-Western countrieswhere cultural and genetic segregation are the

{p. 322} vis its own group strategy and Jewish attempts to manipulate Westernsocieties to conform to Jewish group interests.

At present the interests of non-European-derived peoples to expanddemographically and politically in the United States are widely perceived as amoral imperative, whereas the attempts of the European-derived peoples to retaindemographic, political, and cultural control is represented as"racist," immoral, and an indication of psychiatric disorder. From theperspective of these European-derived peoples, the prevailing ethnic morality isaltruistic and self-sacrificial. It is unlikely to be viable in the long run,even in an individualistic society. As we have seen, the viability of a moralityof self-sacrifice is especially problematic in the context of a multiculturalsociety in which everyone is conscious of group membership and there isbetween-group competition for resources.

Consider from an evolutionary perspective the status of the argument that allpeoples should be allowed to immigrate to the United States. One might assertthat any opposition to such a principle should not interest an evolutionistbecause human group genetic differences are trivial, so any psychologicaladaptations that make one resist such a principle are anachronisms withoutfunction in the contemporary world (much like one's appendix). A Jew maintainingthis argument should, to retain intellectual consistency, agree that thetraditional Jewish concern with endogamy and consanguinity has been irrational.Moreover, such a person should also believe that Jews ought not attempt toretain political power in Israel because there is no rational reason to supposethat any particular group should have power anywhere. Nor should Jews attempt toinfluence the political process in the United States in such a manner as todisadvantage another group or benefit their own. And to be logically consistent,one should also apply this argument to all those who promote immnigration oftheir own ethnic groups, the mirror image of group-based opposition to suchimmigration.

Indeed, if this chain of logic is pursued to its conclusion, it isirrational for anyone to claim any group interests at all. And if one alsorejects the notion of individual genetic differences, it is also irrational toattempt to further individual interests, for example, by seeking to immigrate asan individual. Indeed, if one accepts these assumptions, the notion of geneticconsequences and thus of the possibility of human evolution past and presentbecomes irrational; the idea that it is rational is merely an illusion producedperhaps by psychological adaptations that are without any meaningfulevolutionary function in the contemporary world. One might note that thisideology is the final conclusion of the anti-evolutionary ideologies reviewed inthis volume. These intellectual movements have asserted that scientific researchshows that any important ethnic differences or individual differences are theresult of environmental variation, and that genetic differences are trivial.

But there is an enorrnous irony in all of this: If life is truly without anyevolutionary meaning, why have advocates propagated these ideologies so

[p. 323} intensely and with such self-consciously political methods? Why havemany of these same people strongly identified with their own ethnic group andits interests, and why have many of them insisted on cultural pluralism and itsvalidation of minority group ethnocentrism as moral absolutes? By their ownassumptions, it is just a meaningless game. Nobody should care who wins orloses. Of course, deception and self-deception may be involved. I have noted (p.195) that a fundamental agenda has been to make the European-derived peoples ofthe United States view concern about their own demographic and cultural eclipseas irrational and as an indication of psychopathology.

If one accepts that both within-group and between-group genetic variationremains and is non-trivial (i.e., if evolution is an ongoing process), then theprinciple of relatively unrestricted immigration, at least under the conditionsobtaining in late twentieth-century Western societies, clearly involves altruismby some individuals and established groups. Nevertheless, although the successof the intellectual movements reviewed in this volume is an indication thatpeople can be induced to be altruistic toward other groups, I rather doubt suchaltruism will continue if there are obvious signs that the status and politicalpower of European-derived groups is decreasing while the power of other groupsincreases. The prediction, both on theoretical grounds and on the basis ofsocial identity research, is that as other groups become increasinglypowerful and salient in a multicultural society, the European-derived peoples ofthe United States will become increasingly unified; among these peoples,contemporary divisive influences, such as issues related to gender andsexual orientation, social class differences, or religious differences, will beincreasingly perceived as unimportant. Eventually these groups will developa united front and a collectivist political orientation vis-a-vis the otherethnic groups. Other groups will be expelled if possible or partitions will becreated, and Western societies will undergo another period of medievalism.

Jewish interests in immigration policy are an example of conflicts ofinterest between Jews and gentiles over the construction of culture. Thisconflict of interests extends well beyond immigration policy. There is agrowing realization that the countercultural revolution of the 1960s is awatershed event in the history of the United States. Such aconceptualization is compatible with the work of Roger Smith (1988), who showsthat until the triumph of the cultural pluralist model with the counterculturalrevolution of the 1960s, there were three competing models of American identity:the "liberal" individualist legacy of the Enlightenment based on"natural rights"; the "republican" ideal of a cohesive,socially homogeneous society (what I have identified as the prototypical Westernsocial organization of hierarchic harmony); the "ethnocultural" strandemphasizing the importance of Anglo-Saxon ethnicity in the development andpreservation of American cultural forms.

{p. 326} First Amendment freedom of speech (deriving from the Enlightenmentliberal strand of American identity) have clearly facilitated specificallyJewish interests in the construction of culture, interests that conflict withthe possibility of constructing a cohesive society built around high-investmentparenting. Given that the popular media and the current intellectualenvironment of universities thrive on the freedom of elites to producesocially destructive messages, the political movements attempting torestore the traditional Western cultural supports for high-investment parentingwill undoubtedly be forced to restrict some traditional American freedoms(see, e.g., Bork 1996). Cultural supports for high-investment parenting actas external forces of social control that maximize high-investment parentingamong all segments of the population, even those who for genetic orenvironmental reasons are relatively disinclined to engage in such practices(MacDonald 1997, 1998b). Without such cultural controls, it is absolutelypredictable that social disorganization will increase and the society asa whole will continue to decline.

Nevertheless, the continuity of peculiarly Western forms of socialorganization will remain a salient concern even if one ignores issues of ethniccompetition entirely. I have emphasized that there is an inherent conflictbetween multiculturalism and Western universalism and individualism {butHellenism surely was a synthesis of these?}. Even were Western universalism toregain its moral imperative, whether all of humanity is willing or able toparticipate in this type of culture remains an open question. Universalism is aEuropean creation, and it is unknown whether such a culture can be continuedover a long period of time in a society that is not predominantly ethnicallyEuropean. When not explicitly advocating multiculturalism, the rhetoric in favorof immigration has typically assumed a radical environmentalism in which allhumans are portrayed as having the same potentials and as being equally moldableinto functioning members of Western universalist and individualist societies{was this not also the premise of Hellenism?}. This premise is highlyquestionable. Indeed, one might say that the present volume in conjunction withPTSDA and SAID is testimony to the extremely ingrained anti-Western tendenciesthat occur among human groups. Given that a great many human cultures bear astrong resemblance to the collectivist, anti-assimilatory tendencies present inJewish culture, it is highly likely that many of our present immigrants aresimilarly unable or unwilling to accept the fundamental premises of auniversalistic, culturally homogeneous, individualistic society.

Indeed, there is considerable reason to suppose that Western tendenciestoward individualism are unique and based on evolved psychological adaptations(see PTSDA, Ch. 8). This genetic perspective proposes that individualism, likemany other phenotypes of interest to evolutionists (MacDonald 1991), showsgenetic variation. In PTSDA (Ch. 8) I speculated that the progenitors of Westernpopulations evolved in isolated groups with low population density. Such groupswould have been common in northern areas characterized by harsh ecologicalconditions, such as those that occurred during the ice age (see Lenz 1931, 657).

{p. 327} Another critical component of the evolutionary basis ofindividualism is the elaboration of the human affectional system as anindividualistic pair-bonding system, the system that seemed so strange thatit was theorized to be a thin veneer overlaying a deep psychopathology to ageneration of Jewish intellectuals emerging from the ghetto (Cuddihy 1974, 71).This system is individualistic in the sense that it is based not on external,group-based social controls or familial dictate but, rather, on theintrinsically motivated role of romantic love in cementing reproductiverelationships (see pp. 136-139). The issue is important because Western culturesare typically characterized as relatively individualistic compared to othersocieties (Triandis 1995), and there is reason to suppose that theaffectional system is conceptually linked to individualism; that is, itis a system that tends toward nuclear rather than extended family organization.Triandis (1990) finds that individualistic societies emphasize romantic loveto a greater extent than do collectivist societies, and Western cultureshave indeed emphasized romantic love more than other cultures (see PTSDA, 236245; MacDonald 1995b,c; Money 1980). This system is highly elaborated in Westerncultures in both men and women, and it is psychometrically linked withempathy, altruism, and nurturance {but traditional extended-family societiesare also nurturing, perhaps moreso}. Individuals who are very high on thissystem - predominantly females - are pathologically prone to altruistic,nurturant and dependent behavior (see MacDonald 1995a). On an evolutionaryaccount, the relatively greater elaboration of this system in females is to beexpected, given the greater female role in nurturance and as a discriminatingmechanism in relationships of pair bonding. Such a perspective also accounts forthe much-commented-on gender gap in political behavior in which females are moreprone to voting for political candidates favoring liberal positions on socialissues.

{p. 330} If the analysis of anti-Semitism presented in SAID is correct,the expected reaction will emulate aspects of Judaism by adopting group-serving,collectivist ideologies and social organizations. The theoreticallyunderdetermined nature of human group processes (PTSDA, Ch. I; MacDonald 1995b)disallows detailed prediction of whether the reactive strategy will besufficient to stabilize or reverse the present decline of European peoples inthe New World and, indeed, in their ancestral homelands; whether the processwill degenerate into a self-destructive reactionary movement as occurred withthe Spanish Inquisition; or whether it will initiate a moderate and permanentturning away from radical individualism toward a sustainable group strategy.What is certain is that the ancient dialectic between Judaism and the West willcontinue into the foreseeable future. It will be ironic that, whateveranti-Semitic rhetoric may be adopted by the leaders of these defensivemovements, they will be constrained to emulate key elements of Judaism as agroup evolutionary strategy. Such strategic mimicry will, once again,lead to a "Judaization" of Western societies not only in the sensethat their social organization will become more group-oriented but also in thesense that they will be more aware of themselves as a positively evaluatedingroup and more aware of other human groups as competing, negatively evaluatedoutgroups. In this sense, whether the decline of the European peoples continuesunabated or is arrested, it will constitute a profound impact of Judaism asa group evolutionary strategy on the development of Westem societies.

This book is the final volume in the series on Judaism as a groupevolutionary strategy. A future comparative book, tentatively titled DiasporaPeoples, extends the focus to groups other than Jews and European peoples - theRomany, Assyrians, overseas Chinese, Parsis, and Sikhs, among others. It willtest the extent to which the concepts and analyses employed in this seriesexpand our understanding of group interaction, cooperation, and competition, andtherefore human evolution in general.


1. Similarly, L. C. Pogrebin (1991) describes her involvement as a majorfigure in the early feminist movement and her eventual disenchantment resultingfrom the blatant anti-Semitism of "third world" women, which wasapparent at international conferences, and the lack of zeal on the part ofWestern feminists in condemning these outbursts. As did many Jewish leftists,Pogrebin eventually developed a hybrid in which feminist ideas were combinedwith a deep commitment to Jewish culture. {end of selections}

More of MacDonald's The Culture of Critique: theJewish Communists of Poland

The new Preface to MacDonald's Culture of Critique is at

The Frankfurt School of Social Research by Kevin MacDonald

Unlike MacDonald, I believe that religion is the bond unitingatheistic Jews (anon-theistic version of the Jewish religion):philos.html.

MacDonald's website:

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Essential Papers on Jews and the Left

Edited by Ezra Mendelsohn
ISBN 0814755712
272 pages
Publication date: 6/1/1997 

Historically leftist ideas and theories have had a profound impact on modern Jewish life. But, the left's impact on the Jewish community has greatly diminished today. Nonetheless, it can still be detected in the tendency of American Jews to vote for the liberal camp. This political tendency has also influenced Jewish communities actions as illustrated by the large numbers of Jews who participated in the civil rights movements of the post-World War II period and in the so-called new Left.

Essential Papers on Jews and the Left presents a sweeping portrait of the defining impact of the left on modern Jewish politics and culture in Europe, Palestine/Israel, and the New World. The contributions in the first part, entitled The Jewish Left, discuss specifically Jewish radical organizations such as the Bund and Poale Zion. The second section, Jewsin the Left, explores the activities of Jews in general leftwing politics, emphasizing their role in the Russian revolutionary movement. In the final section, The Left and the Jews, the essays examine the attitudes of the left in Europe and America toward the Jewish question, including the key issue of Karl Marx and his reputedly anti-Jewish attitudes.

Ezra Mendelsohn is Professor at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and Lerner Visiting Professor of Judaic Studies at Duke University. He is the author of four books on modern Jewish history, including On Modern Jewish Politics, and co-editor of Studies in Contemporary Jewry.



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